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Jennifer Frey, Ph.D. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2012 
 
Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism is a program in normative ethics that attempts to explain 
moral goodness by showing it to be an instance of natural goodness.  The ethical naturalist 
argues as follows.  An activity is naturally good for a living thing if it is characteristic of the 
species.  If virtuous activity is characteristic of the human species, then it is naturally good and 
normative for human beings.  Virtuous activity is so characteristic, and therefore is morally 
good. 
Ethical naturalism has seemed implausible to most moral theorists, because it does not 
seem to take adequate account of the fact that we humans, as rational creatures, must make up 
our own minds about how to live.  Our conception of human goodness, and the good human life, 
is a rational one, and so the norms that govern its construction are formal and universally binding 
for all rational beings.  Indeed, it is because we are rational that the norms pertaining to us as 
members of a determinate animal species cannot be morally relevant.  I call this the irrelevancy 
objection against ethical naturalism.   
My dissertation argues that the irrelevancy objection is predicated upon a false dichotomy 
between reason and nature.  On the positive account of practical reason and will put forward 
 v 
here, practical reason cannot operate in absence of some general knowledge of the end for the 
sake of which it came to be: human form.  In practical reasoning, this knowledge of human form 
is practical—it is the cause of that very life whose understanding it operates under.  My claim is 
that reflection on the nature of action, which is a material reality constituted by an order of 
reason, shows that there is a formally distinctive practical mode of  reasoning that cannot be 
explained without an appeal to a power of will that naturally tends to certain ends because of the 
knowledge that they are good.  This picture of the will and practical reason shows us how we can 
block the argument from irrelevancy, and in turn, how we can be ethical naturalists.   
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PREFACE 
I left my undergraduate days thinking that I wanted to be a crusty Medievalist.  I entered 
graduate school at the University of Pittsburgh two years later, wondering how exactly I had 
arrived there, and having no clear idea what I was going to do.  One decade later I find myself at 
the very same place I began: thinking and writing about St. Thomas Aquinas.  No matter how 
much contemporary philosophy I absorbed, I was never shaken of the conviction that we have 
much to learn from him.     
I consider myself especially lucky to have studied philosophy at the University of 
Pittsburgh, where I was not only free but explicitly encouraged to engage with historical figures 
in a critical way.  I am particularly grateful to those who have helped shape the ideas that appear 
in this dissertation, most especially: Alp Aker, Ian Blecher, Matt Boyle, Karin Boxer, Stephen 
Engstrom, Anton Ford, Matthias Haase, John McDowell, Jessica Moss, Kieran Setiya, and 
Joshua Stuchlik. 
I must single out my gratitude in a special way to my dissertation advisor, Michael 
Thompson.  If I have become anything close to a decent philosopher, it will be on account of the 
relentlessly high standards to which he has held me over the years.  I am quite sure I never met 
them, but I have certainly become better for trying.          
I have also benefitted greatly from philosophical friendships and exchanges that extend 
well beyond Pittsburgh.  In this regard, I am most indebted to Fr. Stephen Brock, Mandel 
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Cabrera, Patricio Fernandez, Fr. Kevin Flannery, S.J., Andrew Hsu, Steven A. Long, Matthew 
O’Brien,   John   O’Callaghan,   Jose   M.   Torralba,   Charles   Todd,   John   Schwenkler,   Fr.   Michael  
Sherwin, O.P., David Solomon, and Will Small.  Special thanks in this regard go to Anselm 
Mueller, my outside reader.  I have learned so much from him, and his friendship over the past 
four years has been an unexpected and incredible gift.  Special thanks are also due to Candace 
Vogler.  Without her encouragement, this dissertation would not have taken its current shape.   
I have benefited from sharing portions of this dissertation with larger audiences of 
philosophers.  Portions of what follows were presented at Boston College, Johns Hopkins 
University,   Mt.   St.   Mary’s   University,   University   of   Amsterdam,   University   of   Chicago,  
University College Dublin, and the University of Notre Dame.  I am grateful to the members of 
those audiences for helping me to clarify my own view.     
The last two years of my graduate career were spent in Chicago so that my husband could 
begin his academic career.  This meant that I had to give up my funding from my own 
department, my opportunities to teach philosophy, and much else besides.  I would not have 
survived that period without Thomas Levergood, the executive director of the Lumen Christi 
Institute at the University of Chicago.  I am tremendously grateful to him for counting this 
project worthy of his ongoing support.    
Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my family and friends.  Both my 
mother and mother-in-law have logged countless hours watching my four children while I was 
squirreled away somewhere writing.  My brother, Mark Bullio has very patiently edited the first 
three chapters of this dissertation, as well as provided valuable insight.  Thanks are also in order 
to my sister-in-law, Bridget Bullio, for her friendship and her keen interest in the person and 
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philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe.  And to all my friends who have sustained me over the 
years, my gratitude is immense.  
My greatest debt of gratitude is to my husband, Chris Frey.  His criticisms of, comments 
on, and suggestions for my work over the years have been most useful.  More importantly, he 
always had confidence in me when I needed it the most.  This dissertation is dedicated to him, in 
love and gratitude for all he sacrificed to make its completion possible. 
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1.0  A DIVISION WITHIN REASON 
Raphael’s  School of Athens is one of the most famous depictions of wisdom—that which the 
philosophers is supposed to love above all else.  At the center of the fresco we see the figures of 
two of the greatest philosophers of the Western tradition, Plato and Aristotle.  Plato is holding a 
copy of his cosmological treatise, the Timaeus, while Aristotle is holding a copy of his ethical 
treatise, the Nicomachean Ethics.  
In addition to holding two very different kinds of texts, the two philosophers are seen 
gesturing in opposite directions.  We see Plato gesturing vertically and upward along the picture 
plane, pointing up into the unseen heavens above him; next to him we see his student Aristotle, 
who gestures horizontally at right angles to the picture plane, as if simultaneously pointing 
downwards and out beyond the painting itself, into the world. 
Though it is often suggested that these differences in text and gesture are meant to 
represent  the  contrast  between  Plato’s  rationalism  and  Aristotle’s  empiricism,  a  more  interesting  
(and far less philosophically suspect) interpretation is that each philosopher represents the two 
different  manifestations  of  reason’s  perfection,  wisdom  itself.    On  this  interpretation,  because  he  
points up to the eternal heavens, Plato represents sophia, or theoretical wisdom, while Aristotle, 
because he points out to the world of action and change, represents phronesis or practical 
wisdom.   
2 
Understood in this way, the painting is an especially vivid articulation of a venerable 
tradition of thought about the nature of the power of reason and its two modes of perfection.  
According to this tradition, in the theoretical order of reason, the mind seeks to distance itself 
from the material particulars it encounters through the senses in order to comprehend the 
universal forms (or concepts) under which each particular is rationally cognized.  Theoretical 
reason is, fundamentally, a movement away from particular material things towards a general 
apprehension of reality on the whole.  It is reasoning towards truth and concerns the unity of 
being, or what is.  Its work is complete once being can be comprehended as a totality, grasped 
according to universal first principles of understanding. 
In the practical order of reason, by contrast, the movement of thought runs in the opposite 
direction, from universal first principles down to the particular, material actions in the world that 
in some way instantiate or preserve them.  Practical reason is the movement of thought towards, 
rather than away from, material particulars.  As I shall argue in what follows, practical reasoning 
is a movement from general knowledge of what is good and how to live, towards the production 
of the kind of life that is essentially characterized by such knowledge.  When it is done well, 
what is understood is the same as what is produced: human form or human life.   
So the practical order is meaningfully different from the theoretical order of reason, 
though they are orders of one and the same power.  They differ according to their ends, and 
therefore according to their formal objects.  The practical order is not essentially the order of 
reality and truth, but the order of action and the good.  It is not the order of the explanation of 
form, but the order of the exemplification or realization of form. 
In what follows, I argue that if there is a genuine, philosophically significant division 
within the activity of reason, it must be as Raphael so memorably depicted it: one grounded in 
3 
the two distinctive ways of directing the human capacity for knowledge, either toward the truth 
about being (what is), or towards the realization of what ought to be (the good). 
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2.0  ACTION, ETHICS, AND HUMAN LIFE 
Since man is, for better or worse, and by the most distinctive impulse of his nature, a reflective 
and interpretive animal, always seeking rerum cognoscere causa, to find in the bare data of 
experience more than meets the eye, the record of the reactions of his intellect upon the brute 
facts of his sensible existence constitutes, at the least, as essential a part of the natural history of 
the species, or sub-species, which has somewhat too flatteringly named itself homo sapiens; and 
I have never been able to see why what is distinctive in the natural history of that species should 
appear—especially to a member of it—a less respectful subject of study than the natural history 
of the paramecium or the white rat. 
Alfred O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being 
 
Action theorists tend to think of their discipline as neatly carved off from moral theory; moral 
theorists, in turn, often proceed as if the question of the nature and explanation of action is, if not 
unimportant, at least off stage.  And almost no one seems to think that either discipline is 
concerned with concepts that are specific to human life.  In what follows, I am going to argue 
that these standard assumptions are all mistaken.  I will argue that it is impossible to understand 
the action of a living thing without reference to the life form for the sake of which the action 
comes to be.  If that is the case, then it is impossible to explain human action except by reference 
to the human life form, which is the unifying end for the sake of which all action and desire is 
ultimately explained.  Moreover, I argue that to reference human form is to reference human 
excellence or the human good, and that human goodness just is moral goodness.  And if it is 
correct to identify human form, human good, and moral good, then the explanation of human 
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action necessarily involves reference to moral goodness, and action theory and moral theory are 
not as separate as analytic philosophers have always assumed. 
The argument proceeds in several stages.  I begin by discussing ethical naturalism, a 
moral theory that attempts to identify human goodness and moral goodness, by utilizing the 
concept of natural good and defect.  The promise of ethical naturalism is that it will show us that 
human goods are objectively grounded in facts about human life, and that right practical 
reasoning  will  secure  these  goods  for  us  when  we  act  in  accordance  with  reason’s grasp of these 
facts, which is to act in accordance with virtue.   
The  ethical  naturalist’s  master  thought  is  this:  man  needs  the  virtues  just  as  much  as  a  bee  
needs   its  sting.     Such  a   thought   is   intriguing   insofar  as   it   takes   the  ethereal  and  elusive  ‘moral  
ought’  and  brings  it  back  down  to  earth,  by  locating  it  within  a wider structure of evaluation we 
already readily grasp and acknowledge as objectively valid.  It is also intriguing as it holds out 
the promise of explaining why certain human goods are intrinsically valuable in a way that is 
consistent with explaining how the goods of any form of life are intrinsically valuable to it.  It 
should be no more or less surprising that human beings seek the goods that pertain to their form 
of life, than that any other living thing does.  
In the third chapter I consider an objection against ethical naturalism, which I call the 
irrelevancy objection.  The worry the objection articulates is fairly simple.  Though there may be 
natural norms that pertain to human life, insofar as the human will is governed by norms of 
reason, goodness of will stands in need of a sui generis account which will hold for all rational 
biengs.  In order for the ethical naturalist to block this objection, I argue that she must be able to 
show that practical norms are not species transcendent, but norms that govern our specifically 
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human form of life.  This is no small task, and upon scrutiny, I argue that the ethical naturalist 
does not manage to carry it out effectively.  
Rosalind Hursthouse tries to meet this requirement by showing that the virtues are 
necessary for the attainment of the four ends shared by all sophisticated social animals, which 
maps out the basic structure of goodness for that form of life.  We achieve these ends through the 
virtues, which is the rational way characteristic of our species.      Hursthouse’s   view   fails   on  
several counts, the most problematic of which is that she is unable to show how an appeal to 
these  norms  can  be  made  salient  from  a  practical  point  of  view.    Hursthouse’s  norms  appear  to  be  
natural but not practical.  
Philippa Foot runs into similar problems.  Unlike Hursthouse, she recognizes that natural 
norms must appear salient from a practical point of view.  Foot tries to meet this condition by 
understanding practical reason as a recognitional faculty that tracks intrinsically valuable human 
goods (i.e., facts about the natural history of human beings).  Such an account shows how the 
norms that govern the will are natural, because they are internal to the natural history of our life 
form.  Such norms are also practical because, as objects of practical reason, they have an 
“essential   connection   with   the   will”   and   are   intrinsically   motivating.      Action   springs   from  
practical insight into the human good. 
Although  Foot’s  account  may  initially  seem  promising,  it  fails  because  it  tries to meet the 
practicality requirement by invoking human goods as the special subject matter of practical 
thought.  I argue that practical thought is not practical in virtue of its content, and thought about 
human goodness is not intrinsically motivating, not even to the virtuous person.  I argue that 
however thoughts about the human form are related to right practical reasoning, it cannot enter at 
the level of content, because it cannot enter our practical reasoning as a premise. 
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The trouble the ethical naturalist faces is that the kind of third personal facts about the 
species that one finds in a theory of natural normativity has its natural home in theoretical, rather 
than practical thought.  So long as the only picture we have of these facts is third personal and 
theoretical, they are plainly irrelevant to moral theory.  I end chapter three with the conclusion 
that if ethical naturalism is going to be a plausible alternative to Kantianism or Humeanism, then 
the ethical naturalist must be able to show how the knowledge of our life form can be practical. 
At the beginning of the fourth chapter, I pose a dilemma for the ethical naturalist.  I argue 
that if she takes the first horn, and stresses that ethical naturalism provides objective, natural 
norms as the ground of our moral beliefs, then she fails to meet her own practicality requirement.  
If she takes the second horn, and stresses how ethical naturalism yields a picture of knowledge of 
human form that is practical because it comes through virtue, then we lose our grip on how the 
knowledge is based on natural, objective facts about the species, potentially accessible from a 
third personal, external perspective.    
I then proceed to show that Aquinas has a theory which shows us how we might resolve 
this dilemma, as he provides an account of the teleology of practical reason that is ultimately 
grounded in the natural telos of human nature, which is the integrated good of the human life 
form, or happiness.  On his account, the will is a natural, vital power, because it has a natural or 
inherent tendency towards the integrated, complete good of man, which in turn provides a 
criterion for right practical reasoning.  And practical reason is a natural, vital power that is 
naturally apt to recognize certain ends as good.   
I  do  not  argue  that  Aquinas’s  theory  is  true,  because  we  cannot  know  if  it  is  true  until  we  
have a theory of the kind of knowledge of human nature on which it rests.  This knowledge is 
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practical knowledge of human nature, and Aquinas thinks that every sane, mature adult possesses 
it, for the simple reason that human action is impossible to explain without an appeal to it.   
In my fifth and final chapter, I begin to give an account of such knowledge, starting with 
the knowledge that we have of our own actions.  I argue that reflection on the explanation of 
intentional action shows us that an action is a material reality whose principle comes from an act 
of practical reason and will.  In understanding action, we see how practical, non-observational 
knowledge of the end is necessary in order to explain a material reality.  This fits within a larger 
picture of the movements of living things in general.  In order to have this practical knowledge of 
particular ends, one must have general knowledge of the ends  of  one’s  life.    For  us  as  agents,  this  
knowledge is practical knowledge of our own nature and ends.  I argue that such knowledge is 
not practical wisdom.  Rather, it is the knowledge that any human actor has insofar as he acts 
intentionally: practical knowledge of life form, or the general good for man. 
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3.0  NATURAL NORMATIVITY AND PRACTICAL NORMATIVITY 
3.1 AN OBJECTION TO ETHICAL NATURALISM 
In   her   famous   critique   of   various   “modern”   presuppositions   in   moral   philosophy,   Elizabeth  
Anscombe argued that philosophers  ought  to  give  up  on  the  idea  that  there  is  a  sense  of  ‘ought’  
that is specifically moral, as we no longer have available to us a notion of divine law that could 
possibly ground its legitimacy.1  Moreover, even if we could somehow make sense of an appeal 
to   such   a   categorical   ‘ought’   without   wading   too   far   into   theological   waters,   she   urges   us   to  
notice that moral philosophy can get along rather well without it.  She suggests that we look for 
the ground of normative claims regarding human life and action in our knowledge of our own 
“species,”  when  this  is  understood  “not  just  biologically,  but  from  the  point of view of the activity 
of thought and choice in regard to the various departments of life.”2 
Anscombe’s  suggestion  that  we  look  for  the  sources  of  practical normativity in the idea 
of the human species or human nature has been taken up by an increasingly diverse group of 
moral   theorists,   often   referred   to   as   the   “Neo-Aristotelians.”3  Neo-Aristotelians attempt to 
ground their accounts of the goodness of  the  virtues  in  some  idea  of  human  “flourishing,”  “living  
well,”  or  simply,  “living  a  good  human  life.”     The  virtues,   the  Neo-Aristotelian argues, are the 
                                                 
1 Anscombe (2005, 169ff). 
2 Anscombe (2005,188, emphasis added). 
3 Some philosophers that can be grouped under this heading are: Peter Geach (1977), David Braine (1988), Warren 
Quinn (1994), Alasdair MacIntyre (1999), Rosalind Hursthouse (1999), Philippa Foot (2001), Julia Annas (2005), 
Judith Jarvis Thomson (2008), and Michael Thompson (2008).    
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states of character that make living a good human life possible.  Without the virtues, we simply 
cannot live and act well. 
On  these  accounts,  what  one  ‘ought’   to  do,  quite  generally,   is  what   the  virtuous  person  
would do in similar circumstances, where the virtuous person is a representation of the ideal 
human being, one who most fully exemplifies human life or human form.  Thus, when we say 
that  one  ‘ought’  to  keep  her  promises,  the  ethical  naturalist  wants  to  say  that  we  do  not  mean  that  
she   has   a   special,   ‘moral’   obligation   to   do   this.      Rather,   what   we  mean   is   that   it   befits   or   is  
especially suitable for her to act from the virtue of fidelity, just as it befits or is especially 
suitable for her to eat fruit in order to maintain her health.  The norms at play here, the ethical 
naturalist suggests, are not as different as we might be initially inclined to think.  We might even 
say, with Plato, that virtue is the healthy state of human beings, while vice is a kind of disease.4  
The ethical naturalist is not content with vague analogies to health.  She wants to make a 
direct comparison between judgments of how human beings ought to live with judgments about 
living things in general: just as a virtuous man is one with good dispositions of will in a man, 
which are the dispositions necessary for a good human life, a good oak tree is one that has 
strong, deep roots, which are the kind of roots necessary for a good oak life.  Here the sense of 
necessity  is  taken  from  Aristotle,  and  means  that  “without  which  good  cannot  be  or  come  to  be.”5 
Goodness of will is a form of natural goodness, then, because the capacity to will in a human 
being, like the capacities of growth in an oak tree, is a natural, vital capacity, whose acts can be 
judged good or bad as necessary for a good human life.  Because of the emphasis it places on 
natural goodness and vital powers, let us call this view ethical naturalism. 
                                                 4 See Crito, 47c8-48a-4 and Republic 403c-404e. 5 Metaph. 1015a20-27.  See also Anscombe (1981c, 15).  The idea is that the virtues are necessary for human 
goodness to be or come to be, just as strong deep roots are necessary for Oak goodness to be or come to be.    
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The  ethical  naturalist’s  master  thought  is  that  judgments  of  practical  normativity—about 
what it is good for us to be, do, and have in general—are just one species of a much broader 
genus, judgments of natural normativity.6  On this account, moral virtue is an instance of natural 
goodness while vice is an instance of natural defect—specifically, defect of will and practical 
reasoning.  Since moral judgments are judgments of good and bad action, they are judgments of 
whether a natural power is operating well or badly.  Thus, Philippa Foot argues that  
evaluations of human will and action share a conceptual structure 
with evaluations of characteristics and operations of other living 
things, and can only be understood in these terms.7 
And also that 
there  is  no  change  in  the  meaning  of  ‘good’  between  the  word  as  it  
appears   in   ‘good  roots’  and  as   it  appears   in   ‘good  dispositions  of  
the  human  will.’8 
Foot insists that the only real change when we make the transition in thought from plants and 
animals   to   human   beings   is   one   of   “context”   and   “purpose.”9  The formal account of natural 
goodness and normativity remains exactly the same. 
The   ethical   naturalist’s   claim   that   moral   judgment   is   of   the   same   logical   type   as  
judgments about the life of the species is obviously controversial, and objections against it 
immediately begin to crowd in from all sides.  The objection that has gained the most traction, I 
think, is what I call the irrelevancy objection.  Suppose that we grant the ethical naturalist her 
theory of natural normativity, and suppose that we grant her that there are many natural norms 
that govern human life (norms of physical health, say, and bodily integrity).10  We might still 
deny that the norms that govern the power of will and practical reason are or could be natural 
                                                 6 Philippa  Foot  puts  it  this  way:  “Moral judgment of human actions and dispositions is one example of a genre of 
evaluation itself actually characterized by the fact that its objects  are  living  things.”  (2001, 4) 7 Foot (2000, 5). 8 Foot (2000, 39). 9 Foot (2000, 39). 10 Of course, many will not.  See especially Williams (1985, chapter 3) FitzPatrick (2000), and Murphy (2003).   
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norms that pertain to our species alone.  Though it is natural to man to reason about how to 
live—all properly constituted human beings do this—the account of this has nothing to do with 
substantive facts about the   specific   sort   of   material   life   form   we   bear.      Assuming   that   “the  
activity   of   thought   and   choice”   Anscombe   underscores   are   activities   governed   by   norms   of  
reason, then the good that is central to the project of moral theory does not appear to be naturally 
constituted at all. 
We tend to understand rational norms as formal canons that are universally binding on all 
beings with a power of reason.  If this standard account of the norms of right reason is correct, 
then nothing about the vicissitudes of one form of material life over another could possibly make 
a difference either to the constitution or force of such norms.  
The irrelevancy objection questions   the   importance  of   the  concept   ‘human  being’   for  a  
properly philosophical theory of ethics, because it looks like a mere placeholder for something 
more interesting and important: rational agency, or a rational form of life.  Rational norms, 
which by definition are purely formal and universal, appear to supplant natural norms in an 
ethics that is not merely empirical and anthropological. 
Besides looking to Kant as a source for this line of resistance, one might turn to Aristotle 
himself.11  After all, in his ethical treatises, Aristotle does not concern himself with different 
species of living things at all. Rather, he speaks about different levels or kinds of life: vegetable, 
animal,   rational.     And   the   upshot   of   his   famous   “function”   argument   is   that   the   standard   of   a  
good   human   life   and   action   just   is   “activity   of   the   soul   in   accordance  with   reason.”12  But if 
living well as a human being just is to live in accordance with reason, then it looks like what we 
ethicists should really be after is a theory of rational norms, or a theory of a power of practical 
                                                 11 Certainly, this is how Christine Korsgaard reads Aristotle.  See Korsgaard (2009, chapter 4). 12 NE, 1098a4-5. 
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reason and will that might be present to guide any manner of different material forms of life.  But 
whether reason and will breaks out in a featherless biped on earth or a lizard-like creature on 
Mars, it will be governed by the same canon of formal norms—consistency, coherence, 
universalizability, and so forth—and its commands, though they might be materially 
differentiated in various ways, will all have the rational form in virtue of which they are 
genuinely obligatory.  
If we put this line of objection into the form of an argument against ethical naturalism, it 
would look like this:  
1) All norms of reason are formal, and so species transcendent.  They are the same 
norms for any finite, rational being. 
2) Natural norms of the human species are not species transcendent, by definition. 
3) So, natural norms of the human species are not norms of practical reason. 
4) A rational will is good iff it adheres to the species transcendent norms of practical 
reason. 
5) So, natural norms of the human species are irrelevant to the goodness or badness of 
the will. 
6) Moral judgments are about the goodness or badness of the practically rational will. 
7) So, natural norms of the human species are irrelevant to the soundness of moral 
judgments. 
8) Moral theory is concerned with the principles for making sound moral judgments. 
9) So, natural norms of the human species are irrelevant to moral theory. 
The burden is on the ethical naturalist, I take it, to show that premises one and four are false.  
And she clearly must be able to show this.  For so long as it remains open to us to think that 
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practically rational norms are species transcendent, then we will inevitably conclude that 
whatever natural norms are to be found in human beings, they can have no bearing on our 
assessment of the rational will.   
The irrelevancy objection is clearly just a more sophisticated version of an accusation of 
committing   the  ‘naturalistic   fallacy.’    But rather than reject any move   from  ‘is’   to   ‘ought’,   the  
irrelevancy objection merely blocks the inference at one crucial juncture—the inference from the 
‘is’  of  any  particular  species  of  living  thing,  to  the  ‘ought’  that  governs  the  rational  will  as  such.    
The challenge for the ethical naturalist, in light of this move, is to be able to say that it is a 
philosophical error of some kind to think that we can separate a theory of the rational will and 
the norms that govern it, from reflection upon the human life form.  The ethical naturalist must 
show that rational norms are natural norms; that is, she must show how it can be possible that the 
norms that govern excellent practical reasoning and willing are norms of specifically human life.  
When we look to the writings of the ethical naturalists, however, we find no account of the error 
in question, and no convincing argument as to how practically rational norms can be natural. In 
this chapter, I argue that what the ethical naturalist fails to show is how we can reconcile two 
seemingly opposed forms of teleology—that of life, on the one hand, and that of rational choice 
on the other. 
Before we can arrive at this conclusion, however, we must first become clearer about our 
target. 
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3.2 VIRTUES AS NATURAL GOODS 
The goal of this section is to be clear about what ethical naturalism claims about moral judgment, 
and to show that these claims rest upon a theory of natural goodness.  This is a somewhat 
difficult task, as there are notable points of divergence between different ethical naturalists.13  In 
what follows, I do not exhaustively canvas the literature.  Instead, I elaborate the strongest 
account that I think can be culled from it.  I then show that ethical naturalism, as it is articulated 
so far, lacks the conceptual resources to meet the irrelevancy objection head-on. 
3.2.1 Natural Normativity 
The easiest way into any account of natural goodness and defect comes by reflecting on the 
reality of defect, lack, failure, harm, and disability in the realm of the living.  We all know from 
everyday experience that many living things fail to be good exemplars of their kind: we see crops 
that are brown and disease ridden, animals that have missing limbs or poor eyesight, and cases 
where nature has gone totally awry, sending forth conjoined twins or two headed snakes.  What 
the ethical naturalist has noticed is that it is impossible to identify defect, disability, or harm in 
any particular living thing, except against  one’s  general  knowledge  of  the  species  the  particular  
exemplifies or instances (albeit highly imperfectly).14  And   that’s   because   what   it   is   for   any  
                                                 
13 Some ethical naturalists, like Stephen Brown (2008), argue that ethical naturalists should be reductivists, while 
others, like Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) and Julia Annas (2005), seem to offer a kind of quasi-reductive account by 
focusing on the importance of our mere animality for moral theory, where mere animality is construed as some kind 
of sub-rational metaphysical foundation upon which our rationality is somehow super-added.  It is a virtue of the 
theory of Alasdair MacIntyre (1999), Philippa Foot (2000) and Michael Thompson (2004) (2008) that they 
resolutely locate ethical thought in our capacity for practical reason, and do not seem to want to seek a ground 
outside of it.     
14 This knowledge can be vague and inarticulate (and most often  is).    We  needn’t  be  expert  gardeners  or  botanists to 
judge that a flower is faring well or poorly.  Sometimes we must be—for example, upon encountering some kind of 
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particular living thing to be defective in some respect, is just for it to fail to have, be, or to be 
able to get for itself what it needs in order to be what it is, at least in the fullest sense.   
In order to be able to recognize an F as a living thing with specific needs, one must 
already have some general knowledge of what it is to be an F.  More specifically, one must have 
some kind of general knowledge of the tendencies and activities that are characteristic of the 
species to which it belongs—that it tends to bloom in Spring, for example.  This is not the 
knowledge of a highly trained specialist.   This is the sort of knowledge any human being will 
come to possess quite a bit of, just in virtue of growing up in a world that is full of living things. 
Seeing as we do live and come to acquire language in such a world, we know that living 
things have needs, and we know that in the absence of whatever is necessary to fulfill them, 
these living things are straightforwardly harmed.  A plant without sunlight or water is unable to 
carry out the activities that characteristically exemplify plant life.  The details of this are played 
out at the level of the individual species, and sub-species.  For example, sunflowers, in absence 
of exposure to sunlight for most of the day, will develop a weak stem that eventually breaks 
under  the  weight  of  the  flower’s  enormous  head.   Since this sunflower needs a robust and strong 
stem in order to maintain its form of life, a weak stem is a defect in it.  This separates the 
sunflowers from shade plants like pansies, which would wilt in those same conditions.  A pansy 
has a short and flimsy stem, and unproblematically so.  Of course, one who knows nothing about 
pansies or sunflowers will not know this.15  
                                                                                                                                                             
rare jungle plant whose flourishing appears to the uninitiated as some form of disease—but for the most part we can 
tell, just by looking, how things are going for it generally. 15 Even more specifically, one must have some knowledge of this particular species of pansy in order to know 
whether those brown spots on its leaves are normal for it, rather than a sign of distress.   
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Because this general knowledge of life forms is so central to an account of natural 
normativity, it will benefit the discussion to briefly (though incompletely) characterize what a 
life form is and what sort of judgments we make of them.16 
Suppose you see some green stuff stuck to a rock and you want to know whether it is 
alive and growing on the rock, or whether it is something that has merely been stuck there, like 
some  gelatinous  slime  from  a  kid’s  toy  box,  or  a  bit  of  chewed  up  gum.  Suppose  you  come  to  
realize that the stuff is Spanish moss.  Your ability to do that depends upon your seeing in the 
particular something general—what Anscombe calls the species, and what Thompson calls the 
life form.   
A life form is something general, knowledge of which is always implicit in the 
representation of an individual of its kind.  A life form is a kind of substance sortal, susceptible 
to classification such as  
“This  a is  an  S.” 
A   substance   sortal   is   characterized   by   what   David   Wiggins   calls   “some   particular   way   of  
behaving,  coming   to  be,  being,  being  qualified,  or  passing  away.”17   So we can use it in kind 
characterizing generic sentences such as:  
“S’s  are  (have,  do)  F.” 
“The  S  is  (has,  does)  F.” 
“An  S  is  (has,  does)  F.” 
Michael  Thompson  calls  these  “natural-historical  judgments,”  since  they  register  facts  about  the  
life form that falls under the subject term.  Such judgments yield informative sentences that 
Thompson  calls  “Aristotelian  categoricals.”  Some  examples  are: 
                                                 16 My goal in this discussion is to say just enough about this category to be able to comprehend it.  For a robust 
defense, see Michael Thompson (2004) and (2008, chapter one).  17 Wiggins (1997, 417). 
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“Beavers  build  dams.” 
“The  beaver  builds  dams.” 
“A  beaver  builds  dams.” 
Now,  when  such  generic  statements  are  “essence-expressing  generics”  as  Julius  Moravcsik  calls  
them,18 they are not propositions about what individuals always and in every case have or do.  
For  while  it  is  true  to  say  that  ‘Horses  have  four  legs’,  this  claim  is  not  vitiated  by  an  encounter  
(or even many encounters) with a three legged horse.  Nor do these propositions express what 
members   of   a   kind   ‘typically   do’   in   a   sense   that   is   empirically informed by statistical 
generalizations.    For  while  it  is  true  to  say  generally  that  “Mayflies  breed  shortly  before  dying,”  
most mayflies die well before they breed.  We cannot get to the truth of the proposition from a 
mere survey of what happens to be going on with populations of Mayflies at any point.  This 
shows that these judgments have a unique logical form, and capture what Aristotle seems to have 
meant when he said that certain claims hold, not exceptionlessly or even in a statistically 
significant range of cases, but hos epi to polu,  or  “for  the  most  part.”19 
Though not empirical, neither do these judgments purport to describe things in some form 
of an idealized subjunctive that would express how things would be for members of a species in 
specifiable   “ideal   conditions.”     And   that   is   because   the   specification   of   “ideal”   conditions,   as  
anyone who studies physics knows, does not necessarily have any existential import, whereas 
what is specified by a natural historical judgment does.  There must exist, or have at some point 
in history have existed, something corresponding to the subject term of the judgments in 
question; a natural historical judgment does not concern a mere abstraction or idealization, but 
                                                 18 Moravcsik (1994).   19 This is not to say that something like a ceteris paribus clause is what restricts the generality.  For a further 
discussion of the reasons against such a move, see Thompson (2008, 69-73). 
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something that is in some sense—either past or present—a real, material substance in the 
world.20  
Relatedly, these judgments are typically made in some form of a timeless present tense, 
and thus do not reference the here and now, but rather, something that can, in principle, be 
instantiated at various times and places.  Though these judgments can be ordered in relations of 
before or after, they do not concern a specific occasion.  Thus, we can say that our judgments 
reference  what  ‘beavers’  do  in  the  course  of  a  typical  year  of  beaver  life,  but  not  what particular 
ones  did  over  the  course  of  this  past  year  in  Vermont,  or  in  the  summer  of  ‘75  in  Yosemite.     
Nor (and this cannot be stressed enough) are these judgments equivalent to hypotheses 
about the past, especially not to hypotheses regarding what accounts  for   the  tendency  of  S’s  to  
have or do F (say, on an account that appeals to a process of natural selection).  The ethical 
naturalist’s  category  of  species  or  life  form  is  not the same as that employed by the evolutionary 
biologist, nor does it somehow stand in competition with that notion.21  The biological concept of 
species is a theory-laden concept that we need not (and of course, typically do not) deploy in 
order   to  make   the  kind  of   layperson’s   judgments  now  under  discussion.22  A representation of 
something as alive is logically more primitive than the concept of a biological species, since the 
evolutionary biologist would fail to have a topic of inquiry if she could not first merely represent 
                                                 20 The  operative  word  here  is  “mere,”  since  there  is  clearly  some  bit  of  idealization at work in these judgments, as 
they  can  be  said  to  describe  what  “typifies”  or  is  “paradigmatic”  of  the  species,  and  this  is  always  in  some  sense  to  
make reference to an ideal.  The main point to stress is that such idealization is based on the existence of a concrete 
material  substance.    As  Moravscik  writes,  “A  species  is  not  just  a  property.    It  is  a  class  of  actual  and  derivatively  
possible entities, causally connected, and with a  common  causal  origin”  (1994,  232). 21 Many readers of Foot have failed to appreciate this point about the theory.  See Murphy (2003) and FitzPatrick 
(2000), to take two prominent examples.  Though his analysis is more nuanced, I would say the same of Millgram 
(2009),  in  so  far  as  he  takes  it  to  be  plausible  that  “evidence”  of  what  is  naturally  normative for human beings must 
come from the empirical (and in particular, the biological) sciences.  For an especially emphatic refutation of the 
idea that this knowledge could be based on observational evidence (let alone evidence that comes from the 
application of sound evolutionary biological principles), see Thompson (2004). 
22 In   fact,   one   could   plausibly   formulate   the   claim   in   even   stronger   terms:  What   I   am   calling   a   “life   form”   is  
necessary in order for the evolutionary biologist so much as to have a topic for study.  For reasons of space, I will 
not here defend such a claim, though I think it is true.    
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something as a particular living being or life form.  One does not need any such theory to 
experience certain things as animate in contrast to others as inanimate.  What interests the ethical 
naturalist is this sort of representation, the pre-theoretical representation of life, or our encounter 
with life in what  Sellars  called  “the  manifest  image.”23    
The biological notion of species is further differentiated from the category of life form in 
that it is an empirical concept, one that we come to possess through observation and inference.  
The notion of a life-form,  by  contrast,  is  not  a  concept  at  all,  neither  “innate”  nor  “acquired.”24  
Rather,  much  like  Frege’s  concept/object  distinction,  it  signifies  an  a priori form of description 
or predication, one that we employ whenever it is possible to represent something as alive.  The 
philosopher is able to articulate this form of description through rational reflection upon our 
deployment of it in our true judgments about living things.  The idea is that when we reflect on 
our thought about the living in general, we can come to see that our capacity to represent 
something as alive—as engaged in any life process such as eating, growing, reproducing—is 
bound up in a certain a priori framework or of interrelated judgments.  Making that framework 
of judgment explicit is not a project the evolutionary biologist is or should want to be engaged in.  
I emphasize these differences because many ethical naturalists are not explicit enough 
about them, and this has led to some confusion about what the theory is really up to.  I hope that 
by now it is clear why no empirical concept of species could play any role in a sound doctrine of 
natural normativity, and thus we do not need to look to biology, ethology, zoology, botany, or 
                                                 
23 On the scientific versus the manifest image, see Sellars (1962).  Whether we wish to reduce, eliminate, or throw a 
fictional operator around this image is a separate question that does not concern me here.  All that I wish to point to 
is the fact that the ethical naturalist is interested in our common experience of things as living.  This makes sense, 
since the ethical naturalist is interested in ethics and what is choiceworthy for the will.  And from the point of view 
of choice is the point of view of tables, chairs, mid-sized objects, in addition to rights, contracts, and much else 
besides.  This should also serve to block the sort of objections one finds against ethical naturalism from within the 
the theory of evolution.  For those objections, see FitzPatrick (2000) and Street (2006). 
24 Rödl (2007) and (2011) would call it a formal concept.  I have found, however, that once the word concept is 
used, most philosophers will only ask whether it is innate or acquired.  I find the term unhelpful for that reason. 
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any other science in order to construct a proper ethics. For it is supposed to be characteristic of 
ethical naturalism (as opposed to other forms of naturalism) that it is non-reductive in the strong 
sense that it affirms the following: any account of moral judgment cannot and does not need to 
be reduced to any form of explanation that pertains to any of the empirical sciences.25  We 
cannot  move  from  the  ‘is’  of  empirical  science  to  the  ‘ought’  of  moral  theory.     
Of   course,   not   all   “essence   expressing   generics”   demand   explanation   by   a   form   of  
predication, but what is supposed to be special about what can fall under the subject term of a 
natural historical judgment is that it does. But the reason for this is not explained by anything 
said about them so far.  What is predicated of the subject in a natural historical judgment is 
always   such   that   it   can   be   an   element   in   a   “natural   history   story,”   because   these   judgments  
articulate the relations of dependence among the various parts, aspects, and phases of the activity 
of a given kind of life taken as a whole.  Thus they can appear in teleological combinations, as 
in: 
“S’s  (have,  do)  F  in  order  that  S’s  (have,  do)  G.” 
(1) Beavers have powerful jaws in order that beavers chop down 
trees. 
(2) Beavers chop down trees in order that beavers build dams. 
(3) Beavers build dams in order that beavers store food for the 
winter. 
Such combinations form a system of inter-related   judgments.      ‘Why?’  and   ‘What’s  next?’   are  
questions that, when applied to the activity of any particular living thing, have answers that will 
                                                 
25 Ethical naturalists are not always as careful about this point as they need to be.  Hursthouse, to take one example, 
goes so far as to say that  her  claims  are  “objective,”  precisely  because  “scientific.”  (1999,  202).    She  does  not  seem  
to appreciate that (1) this is a contentious and radically un-Aristotelian account of objectivity, and (2) even if true 
would render her own theory basically useless.  Julia Annas follows Hursthouse.  In her article on virtue and 
naturalism  (2005)  we  read  that  “the  way  we  should  live  and  act”  should  be  informed  by  what  we  can  find  out  from  
the  sciences  about  nature,  “including  aspects  of  ourselves  that  form  part  of that  nature.”  (2005,  11) 
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take the form of natural facts  about  that  living  thing’s  general  kind.    A  life  form  is  what  is  suited  
to be the subject of just this sort of teleological system.26 
The preceding materials give us all the conceptual resources we need to define an abstract 
category of natural goodness and defect, by employing the following form of inference among 
the  “facts”  that  natural  historical  propositions  pick  out.     
 “S’s  have  F  &  This  S  has  F.”  [natural  historical  fact  &  fact  about  particular  of  the  
species] 
 “S’s  have  F  &  This  S  does  not have  F.”  
  E.g.,  “Beavers  have  powerful  jaws  and  this  beaver  has  a  powerful  jaw.” 
  E.g.,  “Beavers  have  powerful  jaws  and  this  beaver  does  not.” 
We can infer a normative judgment of natural goodness or defect from this: 
 This S is good in that is has F. 
 This S is defective, bad, or lacking in that is does not have F. 
  E.g., This beaver is good in that is has a powerful jaw. 
  E.g., This beaver is defective in that it does not have a powerful jaw. 
That   there   are   these   two   kinds   of   judgments   of   “facts”   in   relation   to   one   another—natural-
historical judgments, which relate general statements of facts about the life form as such, and 
judgments about the facts of what is happening with a particular, individual member of the 
species, here and now—is what makes judgments of natural goodness and defect possible.  It is 
because  we  can  say  that  ‘A  beaver  has  powerful  jaws  in  order  to  chop  down  trees  for  its  dams’  
                                                 26 Philippa  Foot  tries  to  capture  this  thought  by  talking  about  how  some  feature  must  serve  a  “function”  in  the  life-
cycle of S (2000, 30-32).  I think this talk of function is a mistake for three reasons.  First, because we are at present 
unable to disentangle the practical (and thus psychological) from the non-practical sense of the term. Second, even if 
we can hear this word in a non-psychological register, we are apt to confuse it with an account that ultimately 
reduces final causal explanation to efficient causal explanation or probabilistic explanation, if that is supposed to be 
something  different.    And  third,  this  way  of  speaking  makes  “the  life  cycle”  sound  like  some  end  over  and  above  the  
activities in question, which it is not.         
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that we can say of this beaver that it is gnawing on that tree because it is building a dam, or that 
this beaver is defective in that it fails in this task on account of having a loose jaw. 
That we do make such inferences from natural facts to normative judgments suggests that 
our description of what a life form is also provides a standard against which we judge whether it 
is doing well or badly.  This standard of goodness or badness is immanent to the life form itself: 
to  do  well  just  is  to  most  completely  or  most  fully  exemplify  one’s  life  form.    No  more, and no 
less.  
3.2.2 The Logical Grammar of Natural Goodness 
The fact that there are natural norms in human beings and living things more generally does not 
entail that ethical or rational norms are a species of natural norms; the burden is clearly on the 
ethical  naturalist  to  establish  that  rational  norms  are  natural  norms.    In  Foot’s  case,  the  argument  
to this effect begins from certain commitments about the semantics of goodness in general.   
Following Peter Geach,27 Foot wants to exploit the fact that the adjective   ‘good’,   like  
‘big’  or  ‘small’  and  unlike  ‘yellow’  or  ‘straight’,  is  logically  attributive  rather  than  predicative.    
An attributive adjective is one whose meaning is specified by the nature of that to which the 
substantive noun it modifies refers.  On  Geach’s  account,  there  is  nothing  that  it  is  to  be  ‘good’  
in   general,   as   there   is   something   that   it   is   to   be   ‘yellow’   in   general;;   good   is   not   a   separably  
definable property in the way that yellow is.  This thought can be brought out by looking at the 
difference in entailments between propositions that use these two different kinds of adjectives.  
Consider that one can make the following pattern of inference with predicative adjectives:  
From the truth of the proposition 
                                                 27 Geach (1956).   
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  x is a yellow bird, 
one can infer the truth of the following conjunction 
x is a bird & x is yellow. 
However, from the truth of the proposition 
  x is a good lawyer, 
one cannot infer the truth of the following conjunction 
  x is a lawyer &  x is good. 
Perhaps x is a lawyer and is also quite bad—not as a lawyer, of course, but in some more 
substantive sense.28   
Geach concludes that we can only truly speak about there being goodness when we are 
speaking about a good such-and-such—a good knife, house, lawyer, or human being.29  On this 
account, what is good for an F depends on what we substitute in for F, where F must be a 
“descriptive   noun.”      Good   has   no   independent,   “objective”   meaning;;   rather,   good   has  
“descriptive   force,”   which   depends   essentially   on   the   descriptive   noun   it   is   modifying   in 
whatever context it is being attributed.     
Though what is good for an F depends on what F is, not just any noun can be substituted 
in   for  F  on  Geach’s  account.     For  example,   there   is  no  such   thing  as  a  good  state  of  affairs,  a  
good event, or a good possible world.  These terms are far too general to have the necessary 
                                                 
28 We can also make the point going the other way around.  Suppose you start with the conjunction of x is a good 
tennis player & x is a chess player.  This does not entail that x is a good chess player, whereas the conjunction x is a 
red car and x is a Mercedes does entail that x is a red Mercedes.  I owe this example to Thomson (2008, 4ff). 
29 It is an important question whether this is the correct account of the logic of evaluation in general, or whether 
Geach has picked out just one kind of evaluation, the account of which fits alongside others (such as mere 
recommendation or subjective endorsement, which might depend on a predicative account in limited cases).  After 
all,   there   are   other   ‘attributive’   adjectives:   ‘big’,   ‘tall’,   ‘slow’,   and   ‘heavy’,   to   name   a   few.      Though   I   cannot  
adequately  argue  the  case  here,  I  think  the  right  way  to  understand  Geach’s  theory  is  to  say  that  the  attributive  use  of  
good is primitive or primary, in that any other account ultimately presupposes the truth of what he is saying. On this 
reading, while there may be cases where good functions predicatively, ultimately the account of why that is so will 
fall back on an attributive case, and that ultimately what is subjectively endorsed must be understood in terms of 
human  projects  and  needs.    We  might  say,  following,  G.E.L.  Owen  (1960)  that  this  is  its  “focal  meaning.”    Until  this  
sort  of  case  can  be  argued,  R.M.  Hare’s  (1957)  objections  against  Geach  will  be  legitimate.     
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descriptive force.  Likewise, we cannot speak meaningfully of a good smudge, stick, or dot, as 
these   things  are  not  what  Thomson  calls  “goodness   fixing  kinds.”30  Something is a goodness-
fixing kind if being an F sets a substantive standard that any particular F has to meet if it is to be 
good qua F. This account of the grammar of goodness depends on an idea of an internal or 
immanent measure.  A pebble has no such measure.  There is nothing being a pebble is such that 
it sets a standard any pebble must meet if it is to be a good pebble.   
What is especially noteworthy about this view is that it brings to light scores of cases in 
which the so-called fact-value dichotomy collapses.  It allows us to say that something is good or 
bad by reference to what it is.  This not only shows that we can be  legitimately  infer  an  ‘ought’  
from  an  ‘is’,  but  also  that  it  is  necessary  to  do  so  in  a  vast  range  of  cases.31 
As  important  as  I  take  Geach’s  point  to  be, I would caution against making too much of 
it.  In particular, we should not be tempted to think that we can build up out of these materials a 
general  theory  of  normativity,  into  which  ‘natural  norms’  will easily be subsumed.  Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, for instance, writes as if being a toaster, umbrella, tennis player, liar, beefsteak 
tomato,   tiger,   or   human   being   all   equally   fit   her   general   category   of   “goodness   fixing   kind,”  
which serves as the conceptual foundation of her general theory of normativity.  She does not at 
all seem impressed by the thought that there are any philosophically salient differences between 
the account of the goodness we would give of an artifact, such as a toaster, and the account of the 
goodness we would give of a living thing, such as a human being.32  This comes out especially 
                                                 
30 (2008, 21ff).  
31 Neither Geach nor Thomson has shown that this account defines all legitimate uses of good.  On this point, see 
Hare (1957), and more recently, Smith (2010). 
32 The  only  difference  she  mentions  in  this  regard  is  that  artifacts  have  “functions”  because  they  are  “manufactured,”  
whereas living things are not manufactured, and thus it makes no sense to ascribe a specific function to them.  But 
since Foot is happy to talk  about  “function”  with  respect  to  activities  and  characteristics  of  living  things,  this  does  
not really seem to get at the fundamental difference between the two.  Hursthouse also speaks in the same terms 
(1999, 195).   
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clearly when we look at her account of virtue, which is based on her attributive theory of 
goodness and normativity.  She argues that 
being a courageous person—a conscientious person, a loyal 
person, a prudent person—is a virtue in a person.  These are moral 
virtues, of course, but it is worth noticing that they are, also, 
(simply) virtues in their possessors, and that they are so in light of 
meeting the very same condition the meeting of which marks being 
a sharp carving knife as a virtue in a carving knife.33    
The  difference  between  a  “moral”  virtue  and  any  other  is  just  that  its  explanation  depends  on  a  
reference  to  “moral”  capacities,  rather  than  merely  “physical”  capacities. 
However we are supposed to parse  the  division  between  the  “moral”  and  the  “physical,”  I  
hope that we can already see how this line of thought goes wrong.  Though a life form is 
certainly  a  “goodness   fixing  kind,”  we  should  not   think   that  we  can   take  for  granted  a  general  
notion  of  “goodness  fixing  kind”  and  then  simply  add  to  it  whatever  we  think  we  need  in  order  to  
get to a life form and the kind of goodness that pertains to it.  That method of division will not 
help  us.    For  we’ve  already  seen  that  the  sort  of  goodness  or  badness  that pertains to living things 
is supposed to be categorically unique, because it makes essential reference to a teleologically 
ordered system of judgments.   And if that is so, then we cannot just slot them into a general 
theory of normativity that builds upon the idea of a goodness fixing kind.  Likewise, if the 
virtues are supposed to be naturally normative for human beings, then we cannot just slot them 
into a general theory of virtue for all goodness fixing kinds. 
Therefore our account of the goodness or badness of life forms must go beyond a merely 
attributive  account  of  goodness.     A   life   form   is   not   just  one  more  species  of  “goodness   fixing  
kind,”  it  is  a  sui generis kind of kind and needs its own account.   We can see this more clearly if 
we reflect upon the unity that defines a principle of life; although I will not argue the case 
                                                 
33 (2008, 74). 
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exhaustively, I think that it is reasonably clear that we cannot grasp this unity from reflection 
upon  the  concept  of  “descriptive  noun”  or  “goodness  fixing  kind”  in  general.  The trouble with 
that  approach  is  that  it  does  not  take  into  account  that  the  very  notion  of  ‘kind’  changes  once  we  
begin to talk about life. 
To see this, we need to consider that a life form, unlike a knife, is a natural unity.  Thus, 
its sense of good can only be understood in terms of the self-sustaining system of capacities that 
characterize the life form as such.  Living things are comprised of a multitude of capacities, each 
of which has its own defining activity, but these capacities taken together constitute a natural 
unity.  And this unity is such that the identity of any of its individual capacities presupposes an 
implicit reference to an already unified whole, for the sake of which each individual capacity 
comes to be in the first place.34  The explanation and identification of any part of a natural unity 
presupposes the unified whole—the life form as such—for the sake of which any identifiable 
part  comes  to  be  and  acts  so  as  to  achieve.    Thus,  when  we  speak  of  ‘flourishing’  we  necessarily  
refer to this self-sustaining whole, even if the subject matter of our judgment is relegated to one 
particular capacity and its well-functioning.35  
A knife can be good or bad—that is, its blade sharp or dull—depending on whether it 
performs  the  “function”  of  a  knife  well,  which  is  to  cut.    It  doesn’t  seem  appropriate,  however,  to  
                                                 
34 The same is true of any of its parts or organs.  For example, think of what Aristotle says about the heart of a 
human being.  On his view, the heart would not come to be at all, and certainly would not come to be as something 
that has the function it does—to pump blood—unless its coming to be was part of the coming to be of a particular 
living organism.  For what a heart is, as a material organ, is determined by the specific life form of the organism for 
the sake of which it comes to be.  And moreover, in order for the organism to come to be, a heart must come to be 
that pumps blood.  What it is to be a heart depends essentially upon the larger life process for the sake of which it 
comes to be, and that larger life process just is the coming to be of some specific life form.  In this explanation, the 
whole is logically prior to any part, because the whole—the principle of natural unity—is what explains the parts, 
which are not independently intelligible.  For a more developed account of this relationship in Aristotelian 
metaphysics,  see  Frey  (2007),  as  well  as  his  unpublished  manuscript,  “From  Blood  to  Flesh.”             
35 I   do  not   necessarily  mean   ‘flourishing’   to  be   equivalent   to   the  Greek   eudaimonia,   as   the   latter   seems   to  me   to  
import a notion of the divine that is inherent to a rational form of life as opposed to lower forms of life in an 
Aristotelian scala naturae.  For my purposes,   I   just   take   ‘flourishing’   to   be   equivalent   to   ‘exemplification   of   life  
form’,  as  opposed  to  mere  ‘exemplification  of  form.’     
28 
say  that  a  sharp  knife  is  “flourishing”  qua knife, for the simple reason that propositions relating 
to  any  particular  knife’s  ability  to  cut  do  not  (and  could  not)  make  reference  to  a  self-maintaining 
system of powers that defines a knife as such.  Here we begin to see the distinction between 
well-functioning and flourishing. 
3.2.3 Natural Vs. Practical Unity 
But it is only a  beginning,  and  things  cannot  be  as  simple  as  I’ve  currently  described  them.  After 
all,   there   is   no   reason   not   to   call   a   car   or   a   steam   engine   “a   complex   system   of   powers   or  
capacities”  that  come  to  be  for  the  sake  of  the  whole  car’s  well-functioning.  A car is a complex 
teleological system of various capacities if anything is, and to understand how any part of it 
functions we need to make reference to the function or purpose of the car as a whole.  And yet a 
car is not alive.    After  all,  a  wheel  does  not  come  to  be  for  the  sake  of  the  car’s  coming  to  be  in  
anything like the way  that  a  leg  comes  to  be  for  the  sake  of  a  human  being’s  coming  to  be.    For  
one thing, a wheel that has been removed from a car is just a wheel, easily interchangeable into 
other cars, and put to other uses.  Moreover, a wheel can be and is manufactured on its own as a 
mere part, before the car to which it will ultimately be made from is fully fashioned.  But 
Aristotle tells us that a severed human hand is not even a hand, let alone an autonomous part that 
is easily interchangeable.   
Why does Aristotle say this?  After all, if I lose my hand in an accident, I can have it re-
attached or replaced by a mechanical one.  Why, then, is a wheel just a wheel in whatever 
context we find it, but a hand is only a human hand properly speaking in a living human being?  
Though the answer is complex, here are three considerations I think can help to bring out the 
relevant contrast: (1) a severed hand is unable to perform the tasks that are characteristic of a 
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human hand qua human hand (tasks like grasping, holding, lifting, pulling, smoothing, and the 
like); (2) a severed hand almost immediately begins to decompose, and thus to cease even to 
have the appearance of being a hand, let alone perform the tasks that human beings need hands 
to perform.  (3) You cannot assemble a human being out of its severed parts, for a simple reason: 
in a living organism, the whole is not the sum of its parts.  Rather, the whole explains its parts, 
for the sake of which the parts come to be.  This is not the case with a wheel.  The matter of man 
is informed by the end for the sake of which it comes to be in a way that is not true of a wheel, or 
any part of any product of techne.       
However we theorize these differences, we must conclude that at least part of what it 
means to say that something is a natural unity is that its movements have a single, internal 
principle of motion and rest as their source and occur for the sake of a single, unitary end: the life 
form as such.  The fact that every part comes to be and operates for a single, unified end explains 
why its organs and parts come to be what they are qua organs and qua parts of this particular 
kind of living thing, and in no other way, and also why such parts exist qua parts of this 
integrated whole, and could exist qua organ or part in no other way.  
A car, by contrast, is something that is assembled from parts that can and do exist as parts 
independently of the whole, since they come to be in accordance with a judgment as to their 
suitability to carry out the ends of a pre-conceived design.  A car and its part come to be on 
account of some judgment that it ought to take on a certain form.  The car, we might say, is a 
unity by courtesy of practical reason and techne; a living thing, on the other hand, is a natural 
unity, a per se unity.  The unity of the material parts of a living thing is not given to it by 
something from without;36 the unity does not depend upon some judgment of the suitability of 
                                                 
36 I take Aristotle to be making a similar point when he cites the fact that if you plant a bed, what grows is not 
another bed, but mere wood.   See Phys. 2. 1, 193b10.   
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the part for the operation of the whole.  Therefore the explanation of the parts of a living thing 
does not depend on any judgment of the goodness of their coming to be in the way they do.  
Those parts would exist, qua parts, whether anyone bothered to notice them at all.   
Considerations such as this explain some ethical naturalists place so much emphasis on 
the idea that natural historical judgments must be elements of a teleologically ordered system, 
because there is nothing outside of that system which could make a normative claim upon 
anything within it.37  Self-maintenance and reproduction describe nothing over and above the 
life-cycle itself, and the life cycle itself did not come to be in accordance with a judgment that it 
ought to come  to  be  in  just  that  way.    A  living  thing  “self-maintains”  because  its  essential  powers  
and parts come to be and exist for the whole system, and are interdependent in the strong sense 
that in coming to be they constitute themselves as parts of the whole interdependent system—the 
life form itself. 
There is of course much more to be said about the division between natural and artificial 
unities, and therefore natural and practical teleological explanations, and I am certainly not 
putting forth a theory here that would adequately account for these differences.  I bring up the 
division  because  an  attributive  account  of  the  semantics  of  ‘good’  can  tempt  us  into  thinking  that  
we  can  begin  from  a  basic  notion  of  ‘goodness  fixing  kind’  or  ‘descriptive  noun’  and  work our 
way  down  to  the  idea  of  living  thing.    But  if  what  I’ve  said  about  natural  unities  is  even  close  to  
correct, this method of division cannot be correct.  For when we appeal to natural goodness, we 
                                                 
37 See Thompson (2008, 78-79).  We should not be concerned that such a view fails to place life forms within the 
wider context of the habitat in which they come to be and the other life forms on which they depend.  Such matters 
will   be   part   of   the   “facts”   of   the   life   form   itself:  where   it   flourishes,  what   other   life   forms   it   depends   on   for   its  
flourishing, the world in which it comes to be, etc.  And this has nothing to do with keeping the view properly 
naturalistic in some non-Theistic sense.  In fact, if we think of God as alive (as many have) then this even allows for 
life forms to be dependent on God for their flourishing, if such dependence is rightly specified in terms of what the 
living thing needs.  I take that to be something like the view one finds in the works of Aquinas.  It also shows just 
how  different   the  sense  of  “naturalism”   is   that  we  are  now  considering from the sort of theory that typically falls 
under that title.  
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are   not   just   appealing   to   the   concept   of   a   “descriptive   noun”   that   can   somehow   cover   the  
differences between butcher knives and sago palms.38 We must appeal to what can be the subject 
of a system of judgments, each element of which is part of a larger unity, where the notion of 
what is unified is as coming to be and persisting through time through its own act and in no other 
way. 
Without some idea of a natural, per se unity, and the idea of flourishing that comes with 
it, the theory of natural normativity becomes nothing more than a vague appeal to functional 
teleology in general, and, I suspect, a philosophically useless one at that.39  
3.2.4 Moral Judgment and the Will 
I have been arguing that an idea of natural unity is crucial to the logical grammar of natural 
goodness as distinct from a merely attributive grammar of goodness that is centered on the bare 
idea   of   a   “goodness   fixing   kind.”      Natural   historical   judgments   and   the   facts   they   pick   out  
depend upon the existence of material beings that have a natural, per se unity—a unity that does 
not depend upon an act of judgment.  When we speak of any part, process, or phase of the life of 
such a thing as going well or badly, we are always referencing the life form as such, and this 
gives  rise  to  a  different  sense  of  goodness  that  I  have  called  “flourishing”  or  “doing  well.”   
                                                 
38 I think it would be best for the ethical naturalist to dispense with their talk of function altogether, as it invites the 
sort of comparisons I am being careful to rule out.  Although I will not argue for this here, it seems to me we can say 
everything we need to say about natural goodness and normativity without appealing to a notion of function at all (in 
this chapter, I have tried to do just that).  Foot herself is especially careless in equating function, purpose, and 
goodness  of  a  particular  activity  with  “teleological  explanation”  in  general.    (2000,  31-32, and 39-42).      
39  It would be useless precisely because it would be unable to distinguish between the natural and the artificial, and 
therefore unable to account for the difference between natural and practical teleology.  Another example of an 
account that openly elides the two can be found in FitzPatrick (2000), who begins his attack on Foot with a notion of 
function that equally applies to machines and life forms, and then uses it to attack ethical naturalism.    FitzPatrick’s 
criticism  amounts   to  nothing  more,   I   think,   than  a   refusal   to   take   the  ethical  naturalist’s  central   idea   that   life   is  a  
categorically  distinctive  form  of  representation  seriously  (I  say  this,  because  his  only  criticism  of  it  is  that  it  doesn’t  
fit an account of function it neither aspired to nor contended to fit).        
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Now, the ethical naturalist wants to say that a human action or disposition is good if it is 
a particular instantiation or exemplification of a flourishing human life, and bad insofar as it fails 
to be this.  Facts about what constitutes a flourishing human life are facts about the life form—
how it pertains to a human being to live, given that such-and-such natural history story is true of 
human beings quite generally.  For instance, Foot argues that 
a moral evaluation does not stand over against the statement of 
matter of fact, but rather has to do with facts about a particular 
subject matter, as do evaluations of such things as sight and 
hearing in animals, and other aspects of their behavior.  Nobody 
would, I think, take it as other than a plain matter of fact that there 
is something wrong with the hearing of a gull that cannot 
distinguish the cry of its own chick, as with the sight of an owl that 
cannot see in the dark.  Similarly, it is obvious that there are 
objective, factual evaluations of such things as human sight, 
hearing, memory, and concentration, based on the life form of our 
own species.  Why, then, does it seem so monstrous a suggestion 
that the evaluation of the human will should be determined by facts 
about the nature of human beings and the life of our own species?40  
For Foot, moral evaluations have to do with a particular subject matter, the human will.  
Whatever complications come with their being moral, will just be complications having do with 
the fact that they are evaluations of a power of will, rather than the power to digest, or the power 
to see or remember.  What is it about the power of will that makes it seem that its goodness or 
badness  cannot,  in  fact,  “be  determined  by  facts  about  the  nature  of  human  beings  and  the  life  of  
our  own  species?”     
Before  we  can  answer   that,  we  should   look  at  some  of   the  “facts”   that  are  supposed   to  
determine  these  evaluations.    Foot’s  paradigm  case  of  an  ethically  salient  natural  historical  fact  
about   human   beings   is   that   we   are   “social   animals.”41  She argues that we, like other social 
animals, need to cooperate with one another and consider the needs of other members of our 
                                                 40 (2001, 24, emphasis added). 41 (2001,16). 
33 
species in order to live well together.  Consequently, we need to perform actions that contribute 
to the well-functioning of the communities in which we live.  This means, inter alia, that our 
habits of practical reasoning must be fundamentally other-regarding, such that the good of others 
is always taken into account.  If we were not social animals these general claims about how we 
ought to think and live would not be true. 
Another fact about the species Foot takes as a candidate to play this determining role is 
that   we   need   to   depend   upon   our   ability   to   bind   one   another’s   wills   through   contracts   and  
promises, because we cannot simply force one another to cooperate (the latter is, she thinks, an 
ineffective  and   inefficient  means  of  control).      If  we  had   the  power   to  bind  one  another’s  wills  
automatically, then promising would not matter to us, nor would the virtue of fidelity be of any 
importance to human life. 
So Foot takes natural historical facts about the species to place quite definite constraints 
on (1) what we can take excellence of practical reasoning to be (it cannot be egoist), (2) what we 
can take to be the proper goods and ends of human life to be (one of these ends must be the good 
of the community as a whole), and (3) what the virtues are (justice must be one of them).  
Because natural historical facts play this role in determining what human goodness is via the 
concept of human life, and because judgments about human goodness are moral judgments, 
moral judgments are instances of natural normativity. On this account, although there is a change 
in  the  meaning  of  ‘good’  from  ‘good’  knife  to  ‘good’  roots,  there  is  no  change of meaning of the 
word  good  when  we  move  from  ‘good’  roots,  to  ‘good’  dispositions  of  the  will.42  It is the same 
notion of flourishing, applied to a different species of living thing.   
                                                 
42 See Foot (2001, 39 and 47).  Again, this is a major difference with  Thomson’s  view,  who  does  not  allow  for  a  
fundamental shift in the sense of good that applies to living things, as her theory is primarily attributive.  She writes, 
“The  adjective  good  is  not  ambiguous.    It  means  the  same  in  ‘good  government’  as  it  does  in  ‘good  umbrella.’  (Just  
as  the  word  ‘big’  means  the  same  in  ‘big  camel’  and  big  mouse’”  (2008,  37).     
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Matters  can’t  possibly  be  this  straightforward,  and  almost  as  soon  as Foot says that there 
is no change in meaning when we make this transition of subject matters she sets out to weaken 
the claim.  She goes on to argue that when we make the transition to evaluating human beings, 
we do not evaluate the life form as a whole as we do every other species of living thing; when it 
comes to human beings we only evaluate acts of will.43  Moral judgments only concern this 
power in isolation from the rest.  Thus, in a sense that is not true for lower forms of life, the 
evaluation of human beings as good or bad instances of their kind is not concerned with the life 
form as such.  Foot writes:   
In  so  far  as  we  do  speak  of  ‘a  good  S’  in  these  other  cases  [plants  
and  animals]…we  are   thinking  about   the  plant  or   the  animal  as  a  
whole; whereas to call someone a good human being is to evaluate 
him or her only in a certain respect...For to speak of a good person 
is to speak of an individual not in respect of his body, or of 
faculties like sight and memory, but as concerns his rational will.44   
Foot sees an asymmetry between rational animals and all other forms of life.  If a tiger has poor 
eyesight or hearing, this makes it defective not just with respect to these senses, but as a tiger.  
For such a tiger will not be able to hunt well, and because tigers are solitary, a tiger with 
defective  senses  will  certainly  not  make  it  except  through  luck  and  circumstance.    But  it  doesn’t  
seem like that with us.  As the story of Helen Keller shows, a human being can be blind and deaf 
and yet still become an exemplar of human goodness.   So human beings are evaluated as good 
or bad only with respect to the operation of a single power, in isolation from the rest: the 
‘rational  will.’     
                                                 
43 At least the ethicist is only interested in this power.   44 (2001, 66).  Similar thoughts are expressed in Hursthouse (1999), (2004) and Thomson (2008), though 
unfortunately  cast  in  terms  of  a  dichotomy  between  the  “physical”  on the  one  side  and  the  “rational”  or  “moral”  on  
the other.  We should avoid speaking this way at all costs.  Only the most hardened Cartesian would follow 
Thomson  in  thinking  that  “being  good  qua tiger  is  being  a  physically  fit  tiger,”  as  opposed  to  being  a good human 
being which is to point to some non-physical standard. (2008, 20)  As if tigers do not have a conscious form of life 
that involves primitive forms of judgment and desire!  Thomson should know better than to think that this is just 
“physical  fitness.”    However  we  mark  the differences here, it cannot possibly be this crude. 
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There   is   surely   something   right   about   Foot’s   conclusion.      After   all,   whatever it is we 
value in the virtuous person, it is surely not her exceptional eyesight, her fine muscle tone, or the 
fact that she has attained perfect health.  In fact, from the moral point of view we are not much 
interested in health, except insofar as it enables one to execute her good will more effectively.  
But this anodyne claim about the importance of the will somehow has to rest on a much more 
contentious one—viz., that the will is the power that explains why things go well or badly in a 
human being, even with respect to the well-functioning of all its other powers.  Foot has to show 
that a good will is necessary for the well-functioning of all the operations of a human being in 
order for her claims to fit coherently into the framework of natural goodness and defect.   
This is a tall order.  But the ethical naturalist needs to fulfill it because she wants to show 
that moral goodness is a kind of flourishing.  According to a theory of natural normativity, we 
cannot merely hive off specific capacities and evaluate them in isolation from the well-
functioning of the living thing taken as a whole, because it is essential to the idea of a life form 
that the functioning of any power comes to be and operates for the sake of the well-being of the 
whole.  Again, the idea of a natural, per se unity depends on the thought that every capacity, 
though it can be defined separately in terms of its object and act, is a capacity that comes to be 
and operates for the sake of a single end: the exemplification or flourishing of that kind of life.  
The very idea of life as self-maintenance depends on this.   
Matt Boyle and Doug Lavin put this point nicely in their own account of self-
maintenance.  They write: 
For any kind of living thing, we can describe powers that it has that 
subserve each of these two sorts of self-maintenance, powers 
whose various acts contribute to fulfilling the conditions in which 
life of that kind of creature can continue.  And it is characteristic of 
these powers that they not only contribute variously to the 
maintenance of the kind of living thing in question, but thereby 
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contribute to the maintenance of themselves and one another in 
sound order: By seeking out and consuming nourishing food, a 
creature makes it possible for its injuries to heal; by healing its 
injuries, it makes it possible to seek out and consume nourishing 
food, etc.  Indeed, this reciprocal interdependence extends to all of 
the essential powers of a living thing, for precisely insofar as they 
are essential, they are each needed to contribute to the maintenance 
of the system of which they are powers, but equally they each 
depend on all the other powers to operate in a way that maintains 
that system, and thus makes each power possible.45       
Boyle and Lavin make especially salient the reason why we cannot evaluate human life on the 
level of just one part or capacity: because each part or capacity is only intelligible as what it is 
when understood in terms of the role it plays in the self-maintenance of the whole life form.  The 
evaluation  of  human  beings  in  terms  of  the  goodness  of  the  power  of  ‘rational  will’  cannot  be  an  
exception to this holistic form of explanation, at least not if we are to remain within the 
framework of natural normativity.  
Consequently, the ethical naturalist cannot agree with Kant that goodness of will contains 
its value completely within itself, shining forth like a jewel even if it accomplishes nothing.  
However gratifying we might find this image, it cannot guide a moral theory that purports to take 
life as the standard of good or bad moral judgment.  Life is not inner beauty, but activity.  The 
will, insofar as it is a vital power, will be good insofar as it exemplifies the life form as such, and 
bad insofar as it fails to do this.   
It can look like there is a tension here between maintaining the thought that human 
goodness is moral goodness, which is only goodness of will, and the thought that natural 
goodness   is  a  kind  of   ‘flourishing,’  and  necessarily   references   the life form as a whole.  How, 
one might wonder, could it possibly be both? 
                                                 
45 Boyle and Lavin (2010, 183). 
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Before we attempt to resolve this tension, it may help to clarify things to notice that the 
problem would not arise if we had a merely attributive account of goodness and normativity, 
which would not concern itself with an idea of the flourishing of a natural unity.  Then we could 
just  worry   about   standards   internal   to   the  descriptive  noun  “the   rational  will.”     And  supposing  
that  we   think   the  will   is   “nothing   other   than   practical   reason,”   then  we  might   think   there   are  
purely   formal,  universal   principles  or   “laws”   that  govern   its  operation   in  whatever   life   form   it  
might break out.  On such a view, the facts about the material life of any living being are just so 
much matter on which pure reason operates.  Such facts could in principle make no difference to 
the operation of reason, whose norms are formal, and thus always and everywhere exactly the 
same.   
The ethical naturalist faces a problem.  She wants to say that human goodness is moral 
goodness,   and   that  moral  goodness   is   the  goodness  of   the   ‘rational  will.’  An  ethical  naturalist,  
however,  insofar  as  she  purports  to  be  a  naturalist,  cannot  take  something  so  general  as  ‘rational  
will’  as  the  standard  of  evaluation  for  specifically  human life and action.  As we have seen, the 
relation between the subject and predicate in a natural historical judgment determines the subject 
concept as a life form or living species concept, and the reality to which the concept refers as 
falling under the logical  category  of  concrete  ‘living  being.’    Moreover,  only  the  combination  of  
a natural historical judgment plus some fact about an individual member of the species can 
license  an  evaluation  of  natural  goodness  or  defect.    Thus  the  concept  of  the  ‘rational  will’  is  not  
fit  to  be  the  subject  of  a  natural  historical  judgment  for  two  reasons.    (1)  ‘Rational  will’  refers  to  
a  single  power  in  a  living  being;;  it  does  not  refer  to  any  living  being  as  such.    (2)  ‘Rational  will’  
is  an  abstraction,  like  ‘sight’  or ‘memory’  and  could  refer  to  a  power  of  ‘sight’  or  ‘memory’  in  
any living thing.  Natural historical judgments, on the other hand, are necessarily life form 
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specific.    Whatever  we  could  say  about  the  ‘rational  will’  in  general,  would  apply  equally  to  all  
forms of life that bear it.  
In   denying   that   the   ‘rational   will’   is   a   suitable   standard   of   evaluation   for   the   ethical  
naturalist, I am not denying that we can say true things about it in general.  On the Aristotelian 
picture the ethical naturalist wants to deploy, a capacity is defined in terms of its act, and its act 
in terms of its object.  For instance, a capacity for sight is defined by its act, seeing, which is 
defined by its object, the visible.  Something in the world is an object of a power of sight insofar 
as its visible properties are processed by the animal that be, through its visual capacity (or system 
of capacities).   
Now this way of defining a capacity quite generally clearly yields some kind of standard, 
since any being with a capacity for sight could see visible properties to a better or worse degree.  
But we do not know, from reflecting on this fact, what counts as good or bad sight in any 
particular living thing.  Consider any creature with astonishing powers of sight, like a mantis 
shrimp. Mantis shrimp have eyes that are so complex and powerful that they are able to perceive 
both polarized light and hyperspectral colors.  In some sense, these remarkable crustaceans see 
the   “best”  of   any  animal  we  know  of.     But   it  would  be  obviously  wrong   to say that a human 
being is defective insofar as he cannot see hyperspectral colors.   
This shows that a capacity of sight, when considered in general, simply cannot supply the 
standard of sight in a man, because sight in man operates for the sake of human life.  If we flew 
and hunted with talons from the air, our sight would no doubt be different.  Similarly, whatever 
holds  of   ‘the  rational  will’  generally,   it  will  be   too  wide  and   too   thin   to  generate  a  substantive  
standard of goodness or badness in the life of a human being.   
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Important as the preceding consideration is, it alone will not be enough for the ethical 
naturalist to argue against an attributive account of goodness of will.  For if I understand them 
correctly,   Kantians   can   concede   that   “a   good   life”   in   human   beings   will   be   materially   quite  
different  from  “a  good  life”  in  Alpha  Centaurians,  or  any  other  rational  species.    And  Kantians  
can even agree that the two species might have different general ends.  But if we concede that 
“the   will   is   nothing other than practical reason because it is the power to act according to 
principles”46 and if we think these principles are purely formal principles, then whatever ends 
turn out to be characteristic of specific forms of life, they can only be good ends insofar as they 
can   be  willed   in   accordance  with   “a   universal   law”   or   some   other   purely   formal   principle   of  
reason.  It is the formal principle that determines whether any end is good, not the life form as 
such. 
These considerations show that Foot needs an account of goodness of will that does not 
suppose   ‘the   will’   is   an   autonomously   intelligible   capacity   whose   standard   of   goodness   or  
badness is purely formal and life form independent.  That is, it cannot turn out that we can 
specify  “the  form  of  the  will”  or “the  form  of  practical  reason”  independently  of  what  it  is  to  live  
well as a human being as opposed to anything else, otherwise any appeal to facts about the life 
form are plainly irrelevant to the substance of that standard.47  
Only if the ethical naturalist can give us an account of the will that shows how the 
standard of its operation is internal to the natural history story of the life form itself—that is, 
how its norms explain the self-maintenance of human form—can she show that the meaning of 
the   word   ‘good’   does   not   change   when   we   make   the   transition   from   oak   life   to   human   life.    
                                                 
46 This  is  how  Rödl  (2011)  characterizes  Kant’s  view.  For a similar interpretation, see Wood (2003). 
47 For a recent attempt to isolate the form of practical reason as a standard of evaluation of goodness of will, see 
Engstrom (2009). 
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Unfortunately, I think it is reasonably clear that no ethical naturalist has managed to furnish any 
such account. 
3.3 MORAL JUDGMENT AND HUMAN NATURE 
We want to know how standards of a rational will can be natural standards—i.e., how they can 
be standards that describe the self-maintenance of a specifically human form of life.  How does 
the ethical naturalist conceive of such standards?  And how do we come to know them? These 
are difficult questions to answer, because ethical naturalists do not appear to think in concert on 
this matter.  In the interests of space, I will consider the two most prominent and influential 
proposals currently on offer: the different versions of ethical naturalism we find in the work of 
Rosalind Hursthouse and Philippa Foot.   
3.3.1 Hursthouse’s  Naturalism 
First, let us consider the quasi-reductive naturalism advanced by Rosalind Hursthouse.  
Hursthouse argues that virtues are necessary for the attainment of independently specifiable 
natural  ends:   the  four  ends  shared  by  all  sophisticated  social  animals.     She  argues  that  “ethical  
evaluations  of  ourselves  as  rational  social  animals”  will  look  like  our  evaluation  of  the  lives of 
other social animals we can learn about from reading ethological field reports.48  Her definition 
of this sort of animal life is as follows:  
A good sophisticated social animal is one that is well fitted or 
endowed with respect to its (i) parts (ii) operations (iii) actions and 
                                                 
48 Hursthouse, (2004, 268). 
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(iv) desires and emotions.  Whether it is thus well fitted or 
endowed is determined by whether these four aspects well serve 
(1) its individual survival through its natural life span, (2) the 
continuance of the species, (3) its characteristic freedom from pain 
and its characteristic enjoyments, and (4) the good functioning of 
its social group—in the ways characteristic of the species.49   
A character trait will be a human virtue, on this account, just in case it can be shown to serve the 
four ends appropriate to higher social animals in general.  
Hursthouse  then  goes  on  to  “validate”  the  “most  familiar”  list  of  virtues  by  showing  that  
each one can actually be said to serve these four, independent ends.  Charity, on her account, 
turns  out  to  be  a  virtue  because  it  helps  human  beings  “live  longer,  avoid  some  suffering,  [and]  
enjoy  more.”50  Justice  is  a  virtue  on  this  evaluative  scheme  because  it  “enable[s]  us  to  function  
as a social, co-operating  group.”51  Impersonal benevolence, on the other hand, is not a virtue 
because it does not promote any of these ends.  Hursthouse recommends that if we want to know 
if our belief in the traditional list of virtues is rational, then we have to look to this evaluative 
scheme and assess the results.52   
One   benefit   of   Hursthouse’s   view   is   that   it   makes   especially   clear   what   the   natural  
standards of goodness are and the manner and context in which they are properly deployed.  A 
disposition or character trait is good insofar as it fosters the four ends appropriate to a social 
animal,  in  the  way  “characteristic  of  the  species.”    Our  characteristic  way  to  attain  these  ends  is  
by reasoning our way towards them.  For Hursthouse, all that it means to say that we achieve 
these four ends rationally is that there is no fixed or biologically determined path for laid out in 
                                                 
49 (2004, 268). 
50 (2004, 269). 
51 (2004, 270). 
52 Hursthouse believes that this investigation will proceed from within our well formed ethical outlook.  By this she 
seems to mean nothing more than that we can only call particular virtues into question one at a time, rather than 
throw out the whole lot in order to build them up from scratch (though, notably, she does not rule out that the latter 
is possible). 
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advance for us to achieve them.  We need virtues of intellect and will because unaided instinct is 
not sufficient for us to attain these ends.53 
On   Hursthouse’s   view,   the   four   ends   of   social   animality are fixed points of right 
reasoning about human life and constrain what we can truthfully say about a good human will.  
Hursthouse argues: 
I cannot just proceed from some premises about what it is 
reasonable or rational to do to some conclusion that it is rational to 
act in such-and-such a way, and thence that a good human being is 
one who acts that way.  I have to consider whether the 
corresponding character trait (if such a thing could be imagined) 
would foster or be inimical to those four ends.54    
If  the  virtues  are  to  hold  up  to  reflective,  rational  scrutiny,  it  will  be  because  they  “benefit  their  
possessor”  in  that  each  virtue  allows  its  possessor  to  see  reasons  for  pursuing  virtuous  activity. 
Hursthouse avoids the argument from irrelevancy, because she has a picture on which 
there is a determinate structure of ends that are natural in the strong sense that they are shared by 
all animal life that lives in community with other members of its kind. In avoiding irrelevancy, 
however, Hursthouse ends up ensnared in worse problems.  These problems are threefold: (1) the 
theory gives us account of human nature that is ultimately reductive and empirical, (2) the 
account of nature underwriting the theory is at the wrong level of generality to provide natural 
norms, (3) the theory fails to provide an account of the intrinsic value of virtuous action. 
First, consider how Hursthouse arrives at her list of ends—by generalizing from our 
observational knowledge of all known species of social animals.  Her idea is that we know what 
the general ends that constitute human life are by extending our observational knowledge of 
social animals in general to see that it is basically the same for us.  This means that, at bottom, 
                                                 
53 This is not too far off from the sort of view that Kant lambasts at the beginning of the Groundwork (A: 395), when 
he  considers  a   “favored  creature”   for  whom  nature  has  determined  all   its  ends  but   needs reason to figure out the 
means to achieving them.  Such a creature would be better off, Kant argues, entrusting the means to instinct as well. 
54 (1999, 224). 
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fully justified ethical knowledge is a species of ethological knowledge.  This is already a strange 
result, one that Hursthouse herself is deeply ambivalent about accepting.55  Most moral theorists 
will reject the idea that we can gain moral knowledge by investigating what is going on at a high 
level of generality with wolves, beavers, or dolphins, and rightfully so.   
Second,  there  is  a  concern  about  the  account  of  ‘nature’  underwriting  this  particular  brand  
of naturalism. The standards of practical rationality that Hursthouse identifies are not species 
specific standards; the ends that govern right practical reasoning are ends shared in common by 
all sophisticated social animals.  The goodness fixing kind that is operative in this account is not 
a  flesh  and  blood  species  such  as  ‘human  being,’  but  something far more general and abstract.  
This is already a departure from the theory of natural normativity as it was originally presented, 
and it difficult to square with its basic principles.56  But the more pressing concern from our 
perspective is this: once we have made this generalizing move, why should we not think that the 
relevant generality lies somewhere higher up the scala naturae than Hursthouse suggests?  
Certainly  ‘sophisticated  social  animal’  is  not  a  category  that  Aristotle  himself  bothers  with, and 
Hursthouse  gives  us  no   reason   to   favor   it  over   ‘rational   life.’     Why  should  we  not  be  worried  
about the ends shared in common with members of that kind?  Hursthouse has no compelling 
answer  to  this  question,  other  than  the  former  seems  more  “scientific.”57   
There   is  another   reason   to   resist   the  generalizing  move   to   ‘sophisticated  social  animal,’  
which brings us to the third and final complaint.  The promise of ethical naturalism is supposed 
                                                 
55 On this issue, Hursthouse seems to be speaking out of both sides of her mouth.  She wants to acknowledge to 
Aristotelian critics like John McDowell that naturalistic considerations do not convince anyone to change their basic 
moral beliefs or motivate them to action.  But at the same time, she thinks that she can approach the Humean or the 
Kantian   and   argue   for   “the   rational   credentials”   of   our   moral   beliefs   based   upon   a   “scientific”   and   “objective”  
naturalistic account.  It is unclear how she is supposed to satisfy both parties at once, and the tension remains 
unresolved in her own work. 
56 The original suggestion comes from Anscombe (1958), and is later developed by Geach (1977).  The semantics of 
‘good’  utilized  by  the  theory  is  developed  by  Geach  (1956)  as  well.   
57 Hursthouse (2004, 272).  This is a line of justification also pushed by Annas (2005).   
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to be that it can make sense of moral judgment in objective terms.  But moral judgments are 
typically thought to address the question of intrinsic value—activities and actions whose 
goodness does not consist in the fact that they are instrumental to some other good, but whose 
value  is  contained  “in  itself.”    The  value  of  the  characteristic  activity  of  one’s  own  form  of  life  
cannot be explained by some good external to that form of life; the good of it just is that it is the 
vital operation of the species in question.    But  Hursthouse’s  picture  is  not  like  this.    According  to  
it, our rational activity is good when it serves ends that go beyond a description of our own form 
of life and its activities. 
We can bring this worry into sharper relief if we consider that  Hursthouse’s  stated  goal  in  
providing  this   theory  is   to  provide  “a  rational   justification  for  one’s  ethical  beliefs.”58  But her 
justificatory scheme yields that the wrong kind of reason to hold a moral belief.  To see this, 
consider a basic human activity, such as leisurely play.  Human beings engage in play from 
infancy on.  By play, I do not mean highly competitive sports or the highly structured events 
when these take place, but just the way we often are in our leisure time, when we are not actively 
fixed on some kind of work to be done or task to be achieved.  We are in these moments not 
concerned with our leisure or play purposively, say, in order to rest so that more work can be 
accomplished.  We are content merely to have fun and enjoy ourselves.  
Children, having a great deal of leisure time, are often engaged in this sort of purposeless 
human activity.  In fact, this sort of imaginative, pretend play is as natural to children as running 
and jumping.  A child who does not know how to engage in imaginative pretend play for no 
purpose (such as a child with an autism spectrum disorder), is a child who has a noticeable defect 
and will need therapeutic intervention.  Such a child will have to be taught what other children 
naturally do, and such instruction cannot merely be given by the parent, but come in the form of 
                                                 
58 (2004, 275). 
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theory-driven techniques aimed at incremental results.  Likewise, an adult who could not play 
with a child for no reason other than the joy of it would be similarly deprived.  A whole range of 
human activities lose part of their joy when they are done for the sake of something else: singing, 
making music, dancing, conversation, telling and hearing stories, etc.     
Of course, we know that play is very important for proper intellectual, social, moral, and 
even physical development in children, and for the overall health of adults.  Scores of 
empirically based psychological studies point to this fact.  However, it would destroy both 
leisure and play if these were our reasons for engaging in them.  If you told a child that you 
wanted her to play in order to increase her social and imaginative cognitive capacities, you 
would no longer be asking the child to play, because if done for the sake of those ends, what is 
done by the child would no longer be play.  Rather, the play would be transformed into the work 
of becoming smarter, more empathetic, insightful, adaptable, and so forth.  The play would 
become work because it would be for the sake of some end outside the activity of play, rendering 
it a means   to   some   further   goal.      In   providing   this   “rational   justification”   for   play—either for 
oneself  or  for  one’s  children—play has effectively been destroyed and denatured.   
I would like to suggest that Hursthouse is doing the same thing to virtuous activity that an 
overbearing parent might do to the play of the child in the nursery—destroying what is good in 
itself by trying to make it for the sake of something outside of it.  This objection is not primarily 
a claim about psychological motivation, but about the nature of the activity itself.  Play of the 
kind I am describing is a human good—it is an activity that exemplifies human life—and as such 
it must be done for its own sake and not for the sake of something else.  The only reason to play 
is because play is inherently joyful.  But this joy is not an end external to playing; the joy is the 
playing. 
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As an activity that exemplifies human life, there can be no further ground of the goodness 
of play.  It just is one of the basic human goods.  The extent to which we try to give it a further 
ground by trying to show how it meets an end external to it (such as one of the four ends of a 
sophisticated social animal) is the extent to which it ceases to be what it is and becomes 
something else.  The goodness of play is, like the good of knowledge or friendship, pure.59 But it 
is not pure as some kind of pure expression of rationality, whatever that would mean.  Its 
goodness comes from nothing other than its being a realization or exemplification of specifically 
human life. 
Hursthouse   gets   into   trouble   because   she   supposes   that   there   is   something   we   don’t  
know—viz., whether there is a rational basis for our belief that they are good states of character 
for human beings.  She thinks that naturalism might give us the proper theoretical context in 
which we can construct such a justification.  Her caveat that our reflection on the virtues is from 
within   our   own  moral   outlook   doesn’t   help   her   cause,   because   that   doesn’t   address   the   basic  
problem  I’ve  addressed,  which  is  that  her sort of naturalism yields the wrong kind of reasons.60 
                                                 
59 This  is  how  the  great  Roman  Catholic  theologian  Romano  Guardini  describes  it.    He  writes,  “The  child,  when  it  
plays, does not aim at anything.  It has no purpose.  It does not want to do anything but to exercise its youthful 
powers, pour forth its life in an aimless series of movements, words and actions, and by this to develop and to 
realize itself more fully; all of which is purposeless, but full of meaning nevertheless, the significance lying in the 
unchecked revelation of this youthful life in thoughts and words and movements and actions, in the capture and 
expression of its nature, and in the fact of its existence.  That is what play means; it is life, pouring itself forth 
without an aim, seizing upon riches from its own abundant store, significant through the fact of its existence.  It will 
be beautiful too, if it is left to itself, and if no futile advice and pedagogic attempts at enlightenment foist upon it a 
host  of  aims  and  purposes,  thus  denaturizing  it”    Guardini  (1935,  42). 
60 Hursthouse is not unaware of the tension, and she repeatedly insists that the reasons to do these things from a 
practical point of view are the reasons that the person with the relevant character trait does them.  But she also 
qualifies this by saying that when we raise children, or want to reform bad characters, or when we do moral 
philosophy, we can provide this sort of justification for our moral beliefs.  The trouble is that it is completely unclear 
how the two accounts are supposed to hang together, because it is unclear why when we are concerned with the truth 
of these activities (i.e., that they are really good human activities) we should give an account that looks radically 
incompatible with what we would say from a practical point of view, where we attend to something that is not 
supposed to stand in need of any such account.  And again, if we look to Aristotle, this extreme tension between the 
practical and theoretical point of view is not present.  For him, the difference between practical and theoretical 
reasoning is the end or aim; they are not, as it were, separate magisteria rendering incompatible pronouncements.  
And Aristotle speaks of a kind of truth that is practical, that is in accordance with right desire.  But his account of 
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Thus Hursthouse goes very wrong, it seems to me, when she argues that her kind of 
“Neo-Aristotelian”   naturalism  will   yield   “motivating   reasons”   in   children  who   are   learning   to  
acquire virtue, and in those who already have some semblance of virtue but might need extra 
justification in difficult situations.  She writes: 
I think that there are, indeed, contexts in which naturalistic 
arguments play a role in producing motivating reasons, most 
notably in the moral education of children.  When we are trying to 
inculcate the familiar virtues in them, indicating the important 
virtues in them, indicating the important role that charity, justice, 
honesty, etc., play in human life is, I suspect, an indispensable part 
of that training.  I might too, reflect on the naturalistic arguments 
to beef up my own motivation if I thought it was getting a bit 
slack.61  
I find this account of moral upbringing troubling, as it seems self-defeating.  Consider that if I 
tried to curb  my  daughter’s  selfish  tendencies  by  telling  her  that  she  ought  to  love  others  because  
if   she  does,   she  might   “live   longer,   avoid   some   suffering,   and   enjoy  more   things,”62  I would 
obviously not be instilling charity in her. By providing those sorts of reasons I am effectively 
destroying   the  possibility  of  charity   in  her,  which   is   to   take   the  good  of   another  as  one’s  own  
without counting the cost or hope of good consequences.    And  if  I  could  only  “beef  up  my  own  
motivation”  to  be  generous  by  telling  myself  that  if  I  am  not  I  will  “miss  out”  on  characteristic  
joys, then I am obviously not even close to being a generous person. 
Moreover, the sort of naturalistic considerations Hursthouse offers are not what is going 
to help me to become generous or charitable.  It will not help me to seek generosity for its own 
sake by being able to see how it instrumental to getting something else I actually want.  I think it 
should strike us as a bad picture of moral justification if it goes completely dark from the 
                                                                                                                                                             
right desire does not appeal to something outside of the characteristic activities of man; rather, he thinks that acting 
from right desire and right reasoning just is one aspect of the characteristic activities of man, period.   
61 (2004, 275). 
62 (2004, 269). 
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practical point of view.  It seems like whatever the moral theorist can offer as justification for 
moral belief should be something the virtuous person could accept, especially if we follow 
Aristotle in thinking that ethics is a practical science.   
These reflections show that we need a very different understanding of how the norms that 
govern the will can be natural.  Though Hursthouse has provided a theory in which it is clear 
how such norms are natural, she has not given us an account of these norms on which they are 
remotely intelligible from a practical, first personal point of view.  This is a problem, because 
rational norms must be grasped from the deliberative, first personal point of view of the rational 
agent.  I will assume that this is a condition for the possibility of being a proper ground of a 
moral belief or a reason for action.63  
3.3.2 Foot’s  Recognitional  Naturalism 
Philippa Foot purports to be giving a virtue ethics that is grounded in a notion of the human life 
form  that  will  meet  what  she  calls  “Hume’s  practicality  requirement.”64  And she does not seem 
to want to say that meeting the practicality requirement will require ignoring any appeal to 
natural norms from a practical point of view. Foot is concerned to show that the recognition of 
human goods can be practically efficacious and explain human actions.   
Foot’s   account  of  practical   rationality   and  will   largely   follows   that  of  Warren  Quinn.65  
Like Quinn, Foot argues that practical reason is distinguished from other kinds of reasoning in 
virtue of its distinctive subject matter: practical reasoning is reasoning about human goods and 
                                                 63 For clear arguments in service of the conclusion that reasons for belief or action must be accessible from a first 
personal, deliberative point of view, see Burge (2000), and Moran (2001).   64 (2001, 9).   65 (1994, chapters 11 and 12). 
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ends.  On this account, practical reasoning is excellent when it arrives at true propositions about 
human goods and ends. On that point, Quinn is especially clear.  He writes: 
Practical thought, like any other thought, requires a subject matter.  
And for human beings the subject matter that distinguishes thought 
as practical is, in the first instance, human ends and action insofar 
as   they   are   good   or   bad   in   themselves[…]An   objectivism of the 
kind I wish to defend sees practical thought as deploying a master 
set of non-instrumental evaluative notions:  that of a good or bad 
human act, a good or bad human life, a good or bad human agent, 
and a good or bad human action.  Practical reason is, on this view, 
the faculty that applies these fundamental evaluative concepts.66 
On  Quinn’s  account  of  practical  rationality,  its  primary  goal  is  to  make  correct  use  of  evaluative  
concepts about a certain subject matter.  Practical rationality is, by definition, the capacity to 
deploy such concepts and to make correct evaluative judgments.  If I judge that some action is 
good, I thereby have given myself a reason to pursue it.67 
Foot accepts this account, and adds to it the thought that the notion of good it deploys is 
specifically natural goodness.  She writes: 
[T]he notion of practical rationality is correlative to that of 
goodness of action, so far as that consists in the proper following 
of   reasons.      What   is   ‘proper’   or   ‘good’   here   is   determined by 
human life and its necessities, analogously to the way in which 
good or (proper) sight or locomotion or memory is determined in 
both animals and men.  Thus practical rationality includes 
prudential self-interest, the weighing of advantages, the adoption 
of  means   to   the   securing  of   ends,   but   also   such   ‘other-regarding’  
matters as care for offspring, fidelity to contracts, and mutual aid.68  
What we might call the Foot-Quinn account of practical reason is one variant of what Berys Gaut 
has called the recognitional model.69  Gaut defines this conception of practical reason as a 
capacity to recognize the goodness of certain actions independently of those actions being 
                                                 66 (1994, 233) 
67 Quinn also argues that we need an account of the will which would make it clear   that   it   is  “the  part  of  human  
reason  whose  function  it  is  to  choose  for  the  best,”  though  he  leaves  this  “part”  of  reason  basically  un-theorized.  He 
seems to think it will naturally fall out of an account of practical reason.  See Quinn (1994, 240).  68 (2002(b), 173). 69 Gaut (1997, 161-162). 
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objects of choice, and through that very recognition, bringing it about that such actions are 
performed.70  What makes the performance rational is the recognition that the action is really 
good, and this is primarily what explains how we are motivated to act as well.   And this seems 
to  fit  Foot’s  own  characterization  of  her  account  rather  well.  She writes 
Recognition of a [practical] reason gives the rational person a goal; 
and   this   recognition   is[…   ]based   on   facts   and   concepts,   not   on  
prior attitudes, feelings, or goals.  The only fact about the 
individual’s  state  of  mind  that  is  required  of  the explanatory force 
of the proposition about the requirement of rationality is that he 
does not (for some bizarre reason) deny its truth.71 
On this account, the recognition of a reason to act, which is a recognition that some action is 
good independent of any subjective attitude anyone has towards it, gives a rational agent a goal 
to realize it.  Consequently, so long as one affirms the truth of a proposition, the content of which 
involves a reference to the goodness of the action, then one will be motivated to realize that 
content  through  one’s  own  activities.     
Obviously knowledge of human goods is doing all the heavy lifting on this account.  
Take   Foot’s   example   of   the   burglar   who   sits   down   to   watch   television   in   the   house   he   is  
burgling, and is subsequently apprehended by the authorities.  Foot identifies two faults in this 
man’s  practical   reasoning:   (1)  he  failed   to  see   the  fact   that  he  had  a   reason  not   to  steal;;   (2)  he  
failed to see the fact that he had a reason not to risk imprisonment for a few moments of 
compelling TV.72  Practical failure for Foot is nothing more or less than failing to see that you 
have reason to do what you truly have  reason  to  do.    And  this  fits  with  Foot’s  idea  that  the  will  is  
nothing more than practical reason.  If you truly recognize the right reasons to act, and are truly 
                                                 
70 For other variants of recognitionalism, see Shafer-Landau (2003), Nagel (1970), (1986), and Dworkin (1996). 
71 (2001, 23).  
72 (2002, 172). 
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rational,   then   you  will   act   on   your   reasons.      Because,   Foot   assures   us,   “the understanding of 
reasons can do that.”73   
Since practical reason is a recognitional faculty that sees what is really good for human 
beings, we need an account of the ground of these perceptions.  For Foot, that is supposed to be 
knowledge  of  the  facts  of  human  life,  where  these  are  the  “facts”  of  the  life  cycle.74  
When we put this characterization of what it is to have a reason for action together with 
her account of the sort of facts about human nature that interest her, we arrive at the following 
picture of moral judgment within the schema of natural goodness and normativity.  The virtuous 
person is one who makes true judgments about what is choice-worthy for human beings (the one 
who perceives the right reasons to act), and she is able to do this because she knows the facts 
about  human  nature,  including,  for  example,  that  it  is  good  to  keep  one’s  promises.    Supposing  
that the world does not conspire against her, this sort of person will live well.    
Let us call this view recognitional naturalism, as it weds recognitional realism about 
practical reasons with a naturalistic account of the human good that is recognized.  On such a 
picture, moral judgments are simultaneously judgments of natural normativity and practical 
normativity; they are judgments of natural normativity because they are judgments about what is 
good or bad for our life form, and they are practical judgments because they function to produce 
                                                 
73 (2001, 18).  Though   she   says   these   perceptions   are   intrinsically   motivating   because   they   have   an   “essential  
connection  to  the  will,”  Foot  also  wants  to  allow  for  weakness  of  will  and  shamelessness.    But  if  the  will  is  practical  
reason, then what explains the cases when a reason fails to motivate the will, and not by interference on account of 
some passion, but because of utter disregard for the reason itself, as must be the case with the shameless person?  I 
do not see how Foot can account for this.    
74 Thus Foot is not giving us a kind of reductive naturalistic realism along the lines of Railton (1986), Boyd (1988), 
or Sturgeon (1988).  Though these facts about human goodness are known through practical reason, they are not 
known by being constructed through some idealized process of rational deliberation.  Foot would reject 
constructivism, because she argues that facts about human goodness are not objects of choice and deliberation, but 
rather necessary constraints upon good choice and deliberation. 
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or prevent voluntary actions.  Thus knowledge of how to live is knowledge of how human beings 
ought to live. 
On this account, reference to the human life form is built into the theory of practical 
reasons as its specific content: the goods of specifically human life are what practical thought 
reasons about.  Practical thought is true if we get to what is true about human life.  There is no 
question,  on  this  account,  of  the  norms  of  practical  reason  being  “species  transcendent.”    What  
practical  reason  grasps  is  not  “the  good”  or  the  “rational  good”—there  is  no  such  thing  by  Foot’s  
lights—but the goods of specifically human life.  Action springs from insight into human 
goodness, insight that is efficacious in itself and not because it is useful for the sake of something 
else.  The virtuous person keeps her promises not because this will help her in some way, or 
because it contributes to the continuation of the species, but just because she sees that it is a 
human good. 
3.4 A SECOND ARGUMENT FROM IRRELEVANCY 
Foot’s  account  of  practical  rationality  blocks  the  argument  from  irrelevancy  from  going  through  
by defining practical rationality as an efficacious recognitional capacity whose proper exercise 
tracks the goods of human life.  This blocks the first argument from irrelevancy by showing that 
practical norms are species specific, because practical reason is the capacity in us that recognizes 
the norms of the good human life.  By solving the problem this way, however, it is unclear how it 
can meet a second argument from irrelevancy, which runs as follows.   
1. Moral judgments must be practical judgments.  
2. A  practical  judgment  must  satisfy  “Hume’s  practicality  requirement.” 
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3. Hume’s   practicality   requirement   states   that   moral   judgments   function   so as to 
produce or prevent voluntary action.  
4. Natural historical judgments pertaining to the human life form do not have the 
function of producing and preventing voluntary actions. 
5. Therefore, natural historical judgments are not moral judgments. 
6. Moral theory concerns moral judgments. 
7. Therefore, natural historical judgments are irrelevant to moral theory.   
In order to block this argument, Foot clearly has to deny the fourth premise.  But it is hard to see 
how she can.  
Remember that Foot tries to  meet  “Hume’s  practicality   requirement”  with   the   idea   that  
our thought is practical when it is thought about human goodness.  This suggests that the 
difference  in  my  evaluation  of  an  oak  tree’s  roots  and  a  human  being’s  action  is  a  matter  of  the  
propositional content one considers.  Practical reasoning is right reasoning about a certain thing: 
the very thing I am.  It is life thought that is practical because it is thought about my own form of 
life. 
Foot seems to take it for granted that thought about our own life form is practical because 
it is thought about us.  Though my thoughts about norway rats, sago palms, and Alpha-
Centaurians have no obvious motivational grip on human beings, we are necessarily interested in 
the goods of our own form of life!  After all, we are all necessarily in the business of living 
human lives every day, and so we are necessarily invested in what is good for such a life to go 
well.   
While it may be necessarily true that we are interested in human goods, it is not true that 
we are interested in them because we recognize that they are human goods—i.e., because we 
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have beliefs about them whose propositional contents reference human goodness or badness.  
That it is to say, it does not seem true that their goodness enters into my practical thought as its 
content. 
I can think of at least three reasons we should reject this view.  First, thinking that we can 
make a theoretical kind of judgment practical by slotting in the right content strikes me as not 
better than thinking that we can explain how we know our own minds by taking our visual 
capacity and turning it around so that it is directed back upon ourselves, so that we see the inner 
through  the  mind’s  eye.    The  correct  response  to  this  sort  of  view  is  to  point  out  that  the  way  I  
know my own mind is formally quite different from the way I perceive objects in the world.   
Second, it makes no sense to divide a power of thought (and thus judgment and 
inference) by virtue of some special content.  If this method of division were properly 
philosophical,   then   there   would   be   no   principled   objection   to   speaking   about   “a   mince   pie  
syllogism,”   which   supposedly   displayed   the   special   form   of   reasoning   that   occurs   when   our  
thoughts turn to mince pies.75     
Third, it is implausible to think that recognizing the truth of certain facts about human 
goods is the same as having a goal to realize them.  This might be true for a theory that takes the 
explanation of action to come by way of appeal to subjective attitudes whose causal powers—the 
attitude’s   “direction  of   fit,”   for   instance—can explain how an event under the description that 
matches the conceptual content comes to be.76  But Foot does not seem to want to go in for either 
sort   of   view,   especially   not   a   Humean   version   that   would   appeal   to   the   “direction   of   fit”   of  
conative states.  But then how do we explain the fact that an alien anthropologist could come to 
form true Aristotelian categoricals about human life and not be motivated by them?  In fact, it 
                                                 
75 See Anscombe (2000, 58). 
76 For an especially clear exposition of the direction of fit view, see Smith (1987), and Velleman (1992).    
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seems that the alien anthropologist could come to formulate true Aristotelian categoricals about 
human life, and to see who has reason to do what when down there on earth, and yet not take 
itself to be making moral judgments at all.  Foot would appear unable to explain how this can be 
so.  
The point is perhaps easier to see if we consider a more down to earth case.  Suppose that 
I know it is good for human beings to consume antioxidants, because conducive to human health.  
Suppose further that I judge it is good for me to consume antioxidants, because it would be good 
for my health.  Suppose I even judge that this gives me a reason to consume antioxidants.  
Nothing about action follows from this—I have merely had three true thoughts.  We do not need 
to say that I lack prudence, am weak-willed, or that I am a Mafioso or a nihilist, or that I am 
alienated from my species being in order to explain why no action follows from my putting these 
two thoughts together.  The explanation may just be that I am not thinking with a view to action 
at all.  This already shows that thought is not practical in virtue of its being thought about a 
certain subject matter. Taking a proposition about reasons to be true, is not the same as having a 
reason to act, not even when the proposition expresses a thought about human goods that are 
intrinsically valuable, and you yourself recognize this.   
Now suppose that I am thinking with a view to action.  How would my reasoning go?  
Surely not like this:  
Human beings need antioxidants 
I am a human being 
So I should eat antioxidants  
Let   us   call   this   form   of   reasoning   the   “anthropological   inference.”      First,   notice   that   the  
conclusion that follows from it is not an action or an intention, but just another true proposition.  
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Therefore it is a bit of theoretical, not practical reasoning.  As a bit of theoretical reasoning, it 
looks to be both valid and sound.  That is, there is no problem moving from human needs to the 
conclusion that something should be done.  But this does not make the reasoning itself practical.  
Thought about action does not explain action.   
Second, suppose for the sake of argument that I actually want health.  Is this enough to 
make the anthropological inference efficacious?  Consider the following syllogism: 
I want health.   
Consuming antioxidants are healthy for a man.   
I am a man  
Does an action follow from this?  It would appear not.  At best what follows is the thought that I 
should  want  to  consume  some  antioxidants.    But  it  isn’t  even  clear  that  this  follows,  since  there  
are plenty of ways for a man to attain health other than this.  Appeals to human nature might get 
me to the thought that I ought to want something, or that wanting it or getting it makes a certain 
kind of sense.  While this might be a necessary condition for action, it is certainly not sufficient.  
We still do not have practical reasoning. 
Conversely,  consider  a  young  man  who  doesn’t  give  one  whit  about  his  health.    This  is  
quite  common.    Indeed,  let’s  suppose  that  some  he  abuses  drugs  wantonly,  because  he  wants  to  
live  free  and  he  doesn’t  care  if  he  dies  young.    Would  an  “anthropological  inference”  about  what  
is good for the species help him to change his mind?  This appears highly doubtful.  The problem 
is that when one thinks about how to live, one is plainly not thinking about what human beings in 
general need. 
This is no accident.  Practical thought is essentially first personal, and so what enters into 
it must take on that form.  Thus, I can only come to see that I need health insofar as it fits in 
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squarely with the other ends that make up my general sense of how to go on.77  But that 
conception itself is not captured in true Aristotelian categoricals, which are necessarily general.  
If   you  ask   a   reckless   youth  how  humans   in  general   ought   to   live,   it’s  quite  possible   that  he’ll  
agree with a general  account  about   the  species  that  he  doesn’t  apply  to  himself.     He  can  admit  
that not everyone can go on in this way, and that not everyone wants the same things in life as he 
does.  But, so what?   
The trouble the ethical naturalist faces at this point is pretty straightforward.   Third 
personal facts about what is good for the species have their natural home in theoretical, rather 
than practical, thought.  And it is mysterious how such facts are supposed to make an appearance 
in practical thought.  The thoughts,  “we  are  social  animals”  or  “how  could  we  get  along  without  
justice”  or  “human  beings  need  justice”  look  out  of  place  from  a  practical  point  of  view  for  at  
least two reasons: (1) Even if they were motivating, they look like the wrong kind of reason to be 
just; (2) It looks pretty implausible that they would be motivating, since (a) there is no essential 
connection between thinking thoughts of this general content and being motivated to realize 
those contents in particular actions, and (b) practical thought is essentially first personal, and life 
thought is not. 
I hope these considerations suffice to show that however thoughts about the human life 
form are related to right practical reasoning, it simply cannot enter into the picture at the level of 
content, that is, it cannot enter into the structure of practical reasoning as a premise.  So long as 
that is the picture, then natural norms are plainly irrelevant to ethical theory.  The ethical 
                                                 
77 To   acknowledge   this   is   not   to   espouse   a   kind   of   “internalism”   about   practical   reason,   as   one   finds   in  Bernard  
Williams (1981).  It is just to register that practical reasoning occurs from a first person perspective, and begins from 
something  that  is  wanted  as  an  object  of  will.    This  is,  I  take  it,  Williams’s  essential  insight.    Saying  that  practical  
reasoning is a first personal act is compatible with saying that it can be exercised poorly in that one takes something 
to be a reason which is not a true or good reason.  Williams goes wrong in denying that.  He goes wrong because he 
does not see a way to say that the reasoning is valid but not sound, because its inputs involve false goods.  This is 
discussed in much further detail in subsequent chapters. 
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naturalist has not given us any way to see how to get around the objection with which this 
chapter began. 
We  can  end  here  with  a  very  provisional  conclusion.    Insofar  as  Foot’s  ethical  naturalism  
rests upon a conception of human nature that is primarily an object of theoretical knowledge, it 
must be abandoned.  For there is no way to answer the argument from irrelevancy if our account 
of good deliberation is just one in which knowledge of human nature is supposed to figure 
somehow as a premise.  In order for ethical naturalism to be a plausible moral theory, the ethical 
naturalist must be able to show that our knowledge of our own life form is practical knowledge.  
Such knowledge will be essentially first personal knowledge of human goods.  It will also be, as 
Anscombe  says,  “the  cause  of  what  it  understands.”78   
It remains to be seen whether ethical naturalism is a plausible view, because it remains to 
be seen whether knowledge of life, and thus what is  naturally good, can be practical.  The 
ethical naturalist has not shown us how this is possible.  
                                                 
78 Anscombe (2000, 87). 
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4.0  HOW TO BE AN ETHICAL NATURALIST 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Philosophical ethics is, at its best, an attempt to understand why certain goods have intrinsic 
value for us.  Ethical naturalism looks like a promising approach to this enterprise insofar as the 
theory of natural normativity upon which it rests shows that intrinsic value is not unique to us, 
since the entire animate world is shot through with activity that is good for the sake of nothing 
more than its being an exemplification of a specific form of life.  In the previous chapter, 
however, we ran into a problem seeing how this schema of natural normativity could be salient 
from  a  practical  point  of  view,  and  therefore  relevant  to  moral  theory  by  the  ethical  naturalist’s  
own lights.    
We  have  seen  that  Foot’s  attempt  to  show  how  norms of the species are practical failed, 
because she put forward a model of practical reason that looks too theoretical.  It was for this 
reason mysterious how natural historical judgments could play any role in a theory of good 
practical reasoning, deliberation, and choice.  This shows we do not yet know how a natural 
historical judgment about the self-maintenance of human life can be a practical judgment.  We 
only know that the practicality cannot come just by shifting the subject matter to our own life 
form, as Foot suggests.   
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We might think that it remains open to Foot to say that we can only have knowledge of 
human form through the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom.79  Then she could say that to 
possess practical wisdom is to know how a human being should live, and to be able to see that 
general   conception  of  how   to   live   in   the  particulars  of  one’s  own   life.      Since  we  cannot  have  
practical wisdom without moral virtue, we cannot separate knowledge of the human life form 
from being inclined to the ends that make up a human life.  On this picture, knowledge of the 
facts of human life, and the ability to specify those facts in true Aristotelian categoricals, only 
comes on the scene once one has come to have a well-formed  “second  nature.”80  Man’s   sub-
rational first nature is, on this account, irrelevant to a theory of natural norms.  Let us call this 
view, second nature naturalism. 
This sounds promising, but let us follow the thought through.  On this picture, one can 
only know human goods if one already values them, and thus is already strongly inclined to seek 
those goods.  Coming to possess virtue is coming to see and take enjoyment in doing certain 
things, which is coming into possession of a human life, truly and properly so called.  The 
virtuous person knows which actions accord with virtue and which do not, and because the 
virtues characterize what goodness of human action is, the virtuous person knows what counts as 
living and acting well.  This is knowledge of the human life form, and it comes through practical 
wisdom.   
One thing to notice straightaway about this account is that an alien anthropologist who 
came to study human life could presumably not come to make such judgments, as presumably it 
will, by definition, lack the virtues necessary for practical wisdom, which is necessary to have 
                                                 79 See Lott (2012) for a recent attempt to characterize ethical naturalism in this way.  It is also, I take it, the view that 
John  McDowell  puts  forward  in  “Two  Sorts  of  Naturalism.”    McDowell  (1998).   80 For the full development of  the  idea  of  “second  nature,”  see McDowell (1994) and (1998).  For a critique of this 
idea from an Aristotelian-Thomist perspective, see O’Callaghan (2003, 275-298). 
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knowledge of human form.  Thus the alien anthropologist cannot know the human good any 
more than a human being can see the world in hyperspectral color by studying the lives of certain 
shrimp.   
This is a strange result because on a theory of natural normativity, though the good of the 
life form is internal to itself, knowledge of the good of the life form is obviously not.  I can know 
the good of a sunflower, or a wolf, just by knowing what it is.  I do not, as it were, have to step 
inside that form of life, or to have the dispositions or tendencies of that life to gain this 
knowledge.  Similarly, we should expect an alien anthropologist would be able to come to make 
true natural historical judgments about human beings.  Of course, it cannot come to know the 
subjective  character  of  human  consciousness,  any  more  than  we  can  know  “what  it  is  like  to  be  a  
bat.”81  But an alien anthropologist should be able to formulate true Aristotelian categoricals 
about human life—the very same ones that the virtuous person could formulate if he were called 
upon to do so in a theoretical context.82  If knowledge of human life is just knowledge through 
virtue, however, then it is difficult to know how this is possible.  
Notice that this is not just a problem for rational aliens.  If only the virtuous know human 
nature through virtue, then the non-virtuous also do not have knowledge of their own form 
either.    Perhaps  one  could  come  to  discover  one’s  own  form,  should  one  happen upon a virtuous 
community like the men of Athens and be suitably instructed; or perhaps there is simply no hope 
for those who are not raised in the right way to begin with, as they are completely outside the 
                                                 
81 Nagel (1979). 
82 It is this aspect of the theory that is supposed to differentiate it from constructivism.  The constructivist argues that 
true normative judgments represent a normative reality, but denies that the reality represented is in anyway 
independent of the normative judgment itself.  I take it that if ethical naturalism is supposed to be a meaningful 
alternative to constructivism, it must deny that the normative reality it is concerned with is a reality that is entirely 
constructed from acts of practical judgment and nothing more.  For more on this structural feature of the 
constructivist project of explaining practical norms, see LeBar (2008) and Street (2009). 
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sphere of practical wisdom.  It seems as though Aristotle thought many humans were like this: 
slaves, women, and Barbarians.83  
Though it would make sense of her confidence in the motivating power of the perception 
of facts about human nature, Foot does not give any indication that the knowledge she speaks of 
is mediated through virtue quite so thoroughly.  At any rate, if this is her view, then the 
irrelevancy objection clearly defeats it.  After all, the stated purpose of ethical naturalism is to 
show  how  “the   status   of   certain   dispositions   as  virtues should be determined by quite general 
facts  about  human  beings.”84  But if her idea is that the virtuous alone have epistemic access to 
these facts, then it becomes difficult once again to see how any appeal to them is supposed to be 
relevant to the determination in question.  On the one hand, if you are already virtuous, then from 
your own perspective there is nothing to be determined.  On the other hand, if you have been 
raised to be non-virtuous, you have no epistemic access to these facts, and then they cannot enter 
into your reflection and deliberation.  Moreover, once you come to know them, they immediately 
become superfluous to you. As for the alien anthropologist, human life and action will, from its 
point of view, remain shrouded in mystery, as it cannot ever come to know these general facts, as 
it presumably cannot come to acquire human virtues.   
On this new theory, there is absolutely no work for natural norms to do.  Everything is 
known through dispositions of right practical reason, which any human being may or may not 
                                                 
83 It is also unclear how this person is truly responsible for his bad action.  I find this view strange in that it makes it 
seem  as  though  being  good  is,  to  a  large  extent,  being  lucky  that  one  was  raised  in  “the  right  way.”    Supposing  that  
one is raised poorly, perhaps within a political community that is not governed by just laws, such a person will 
forever   remain   shrouded   in   blindness   about   its   own   nature.      This   may   be   Aristotle’s   view   (though   I   am   not  
convinced of this interpretation), but it is certainly not the view of Aquinas, who thought that all human beings not 
only  can,  but  basically  do  know  what’s  good  for  them  in  a  very  general  and  abstract  way.    Aquinas  does  not  think  
we have a merely passive capacity for virtue, which may or may not be actualized by other members of a privileged 
community who know the right way to go on. He thinks we are actively ordered to our own good, just as anything 
else is.  This is compatible with the thought (which seems obviously true) that we need proper training in order to 
achieve the good to which we are antecedently ordered.     
84 (2001, 45). 
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have, depending on whether he happened to be raised in the right community.85  This is an 
unsatisfying result.     
4.2 A DILEMMA FOR ETHICAL NATURALISTS 
In thinking through the claims of ethical naturalism, we have come to see that, so far at least, we 
do not know how natural norms can be practical.  We can put our problem in the form of a 
dilemma for the ethical naturalist.  If she takes the first horn and stresses that ethical naturalism 
provides objective, natural norms of the species as the ground of our moral beliefs and 
judgments,   then   she   fails   to   meet   Hume’s   practicality   requirement,   because   judgments   about  
what is true of our own species are not necessarily practical.  But moral judgment must meet this 
requirement, so the theory is inadequate.  If she takes the second horn and stresses how ethical 
naturalism yields a picture of knowledge of human life that is practical because it comes through 
the virtues, then we lose our grip on how the knowledge is based on natural, objective facts about 
the species that are potentially accessible from the third personal standpoint of the alien 
anthropologist.  And then the theory fails because the norms no longer appear to be natural—i.e., 
(at least potentially) accessible from the outside.  
The problem our dilemma poses is how we can reconcile what on the surface appear to be 
quite different sorts of teleology: natural and practical.  As we saw in the previous chapter, 
natural teleology is a form of explanation that describes the way things are independently of 
anyone’s  thought  about  them.    What  was  supposed  to  be  useful  about  adopting  this  model  is  that  
                                                 
85 Of course, this is not to deny that human beings need to be raised in some kind of community.  This is necessary 
for any rational animal, which is necessarily a linguistic animal.  The trouble is that, according to second nature 
naturalism, he must be raised by the practically wise community.  It is not enough to come into language and certain 
practices to have knowledge of human nature.  One must come into just the right sort. 
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it provides a form of explanation that registers what is objective and intrinsically valuable for 
something.  Anyone can come to see what is intrinsically good for some living thing just by 
coming to know the species or life form it bears.  But what is good here is an object of 
theoretical knowledge, known through observation and discovery.  From the perspective of 
theoretical thought and judgment, the facts about the life form are prior and provide its 
measure.86  This implies that the facts about what is good are independent of the judgment that 
registers that good.  And whatever the subject desires is irrelevant to the truth of the judgment of 
what is good.   
But  it   is   this  feature  of  theoretical  knowledge’s  objects,   that   their   truth  making  features  
are independent of the thoughts and desires of the subject that registers them, that is so difficult 
to map onto the teleology of practical deliberation and reflection about action.  In practical 
deliberation, one is concerned in the main not with how things are, but with how one might make 
them, given what one is after or what is wanted as an object of will.  This is why Aristotle says 
that practical thought differs from theoretical thought in its end. Practical thought and practical 
reason is thought and reason aimed at action, not merely thought about action, and thus it is not 
finished until an action is completed.  Consequently, practical thought considers potential actions 
insofar  as  they  are,  given  one’s  ends,  suitable  or  befitting.    This  is  why  practical  thought  cannot  
operate unless something is already wanted.87  Practical thought does not consider things as they 
are, simpliciter.  In this way, our practical judgments about what to do are very different from 
our theoretical judgments about the natural world.  In practical judgment one creates facts, rather 
than tracks them.  This explains, I take it, why Aristotle says that practical truth is not truth, 
                                                 
86 This  fits  with  Anscombe’s famous account of theoretical knowledge in Intention.  See Anscombe (2000, 57). 
87 This fact is shown very convincingly by Mueller (1979).  See also Aquinas, ST I-II q. 8, a. 1, c. 
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simpliciter, but truth in agreement with right desire.  This is why action cannot be explained in 
terms of applied theoretical knowledge.88   
Here  we  notice  a  change  in  the  word  ‘good’  that  Foot  simply  does  not  account  for.    This  
is the change that we mark when we go from thinking of good as an object of the intellect to 
thinking of good as the formal object  of  the  will.    This  sense  of  the  word  ‘good’,  as  what  marks  
the formality of the relation between an object and a power of will, does not appear in the 
schema of natural normativity as it has been outlined thus far.89  We need to try to find 
conceptual space for it.   
In order to resolve the dilemma she faces, the ethical naturalist must be able to show how 
these two seemingly opposed teleologies (the natural teleology of life and the practical teleology 
of action) and these two seemingly different senses of good (the good we can derive from an 
account of what simply is and the good as practical goal) can be unified into one and the same 
account.  That is, we need an account of natural normativity that will show us how the relation 
between a general judgment articulating some fact about a life form (a judgment about a fact that 
is potentially known from the outside) and a judgment concerning a particular bearer of that form 
in a particular situation, can take the form of a practical inference whose conclusion is an action 
that exemplifies that very same form of life.90  To comprehend this, I take it, would be to 
comprehend the unity of the power of reason in a life form.  But that unity is only displayed 
when the very same material reality—say, the human life form—can be shown to be 
apprehended in two fundamentally different ways.  
                                                 
88 This is different from the highly influential critique of applied theoretical knowledge given by Christine 
Korsgaard.  See Korsgaard (1996), (2009b).  
89 Michael Thompson is aware of this.  He writes,  “We  are  thus,  I  think,  as  far  as  can  possibly  be  imagined  from  the  
category  of  intention  or  psychical  teleology…”  (2008,  78).    Foot denies that we are quite so far, I take it, when she 
says  there  is  no  change  in  the  meaning  of  ‘good’  when  it  is  used  in  ‘good  roots’  and  ‘good  dispositions  of  the  will’.  
(2001, 39).   
90 I am indebted to Matthias Haase for coming to see the point in precisely  these  terms.    See  his  (“Practically  Self-
Conscious  Life,”  unpublished  manuscript,  p.  10).   
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So far, such an account has not been forthcoming from any ethical naturalist.  A unified 
account can be found, however, in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas.  For this reason, it makes 
sense to turn to Aquinas to see what we might learn from him.  In the remaining parts of this 
chapter, I do just that.  I argue that Aquinas provides an account of the teleology of practical 
reasoning according to which its starting points are basic human goods, which the human will is 
naturally inclined to seek.  In this way, Aquinas thinks that all practical reasoning is ultimately 
reasoning for the sake of attaining or maintaining these ends. Consequently, all practical 
reasoning is ultimately for the sake of living the sort of life that pertains to man.  Indeed for 
Aquinas, there could be no practical teleology without natural teleology, since there would be 
nothing to reason towards if the will were not by nature inclined towards the exemplification of 
human form.      
Aquinas’s  theory  shows  how  natural  norms  (the  basic  human  goods  the  will  is  naturally  
inclined to seek) can govern right practical reasoning.  Such norms apply only to human beings, 
and   are   practical   in   that   they   are   “essentially   related   to   the   will”   as   the   ends   to   which   it   is  
naturally ordered.91  Because these norms belong to the life form of man, they are norms that 
govern every human community, and can in principle be discovered by some other rational form 
of life.  
4.3 AQUINAS’S  THEORY  OF  WILL 
In the previous chapter, we saw that Foot was not entitled to say that moral evaluations were 
evaluations of the capacity of the rational will alone, in isolation from the rest of the life form.  It 
                                                 
91 (2001, 34). 
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was unclear, however, how she was going to conduct an evaluation of the will in any other terms.  
Aquinas  shows  us  one  way  this  might  be  possible.     On  his  account,   the  will   is  a  “natural,  vital  
power,”   and   as   such   tends   to   the   integrated,   complete   good   of   the   human   animal,   taken   as   a  
whole.92  He  writes,  “Since  it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we have, the human 
person  is  said  to  be  good,  not  by  his  good  understanding,  but  by  his  good  will.”93   
There are many powers that make up human life: powers of reproduction, growth, 
perception, and judgment.  The will is the power through which a person naturally tends to the 
goods of all these powers, in accordance with a rational conception of how they ought to be 
integrated  into  a  whole.    Aquinas  calls  this  integrated  conception  of  man’s  good  his  happiness  or 
final end.  The will is the power that naturally seeks this end.  In order to understand this view, 
which is in its essence Aristotelian but quite foreign to us, we have to see how it is situated 
within a much broader, explanatory nexus that relates form, inclination, and good.    
4.3.1 Appetite: Natural, Sensitive, Rational 
Aquinas, like Aristotle, understands inclination or tendency in terms of form.  As we move up 
the Aristotelian scala naturae, we find more perfect forms of inclination, and thus more perfect 
forms   of   existence.      Rational   animals   are   not   at   the   top   of   Aquinas’s   great   chain   of   being.    
Rather, they occupy a middle position between purely intellectual creatures (Angels) and mere 
brutes.  For our purposes, we do not need to follow the links, either all the way up to the Divine, 
                                                 92 (2001, 11). 93 ST, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 3. 
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or all the way down to the elementary particles that comprise all physical things.  Our task is far 
more narrow, and so we, like the ethical naturalist, can stick to the topic of life.94 
Aquinas argues that all living things are a self-sustaining system of powers that functions 
to bring the living thing into being and to sustain its being.  The movement of any part of a living 
thing, at any particular moment, is necessarily explained by reference to the movement of the 
whole thing towards a single end: the coming to be, maintenance, or reproduction of that very 
form of life. 
To  see  this,  we  can  make  use  of  an  illustrative  example  from  Michael  Thompson’s  work  
on life, which is in many ways in keeping with the sort of view Aquinas holds.  About the 
material process of mitosis in living things, Thompson writes, 
It may be happening here, under the microscope, in an amoeba; 
and there in a human being.  In the first case, an event of this type 
will of course be a phase in a  process of reproduction—one of the 
forms of generation available to that kind of thing.  But in the case 
of the human it will rather be a part of growth or self-maintenance; 
reproduction is another matter, and has another matter, among 
humans.  The distinction between the two cases of mitosis is not 
discovered by a more careful scrutiny of the particular cells at 
issue[…]95 
Thompson’s  point  is  that  if  we  stay  at  the  level  of  mere matter and do not take into account that 
for the sake of which the process itself unfolds, then we will not really know what sort of 
movement is taking place, because we will not know the end towards which it is currently 
                                                 
94 For instance, if Aquinas had rudimentary knowledge of chemistry he would no doubt say that acids have a 
tendency to donate protons.  For justification, he would point to the fact that this is what acids typically do when in 
appropriate conditions (in aqueous solution, in contact with zinc, etc.), and so long as nothing interferes with them.  
Furthermore, if an acid does not donate protons, this fact will demand some kind of explanation (say, its being 
placed in a sealed bottle by someone) that involves an external force acting on it.  See ST I-II, q. 76, a. 1, c.  It seems 
that Aquinas is wrong about the innocence of this way of speaking, and there are good reasons to avoid speaking of 
a tendency in the acid.  But that is only because there is good reason to hesitate to attribute the notion of form to an 
acid.  And for our purposes, it certainly does seem like  a  strain   to   talk  of   the  acid’s  good,  and  relatedly,   it  seems  
wrong to say of an acid that is in a sealed bottle that it should be doing anything other than what it is doing.  We do 
not need to follow Aquinas (or Aristotle) in attributing form to basic elements, though it has been attempted.  For a 
recent attempt, see Makin (1989). 
95 Thompson (2008, 55). 
69 
progressing.  In a living thing, the end determines what any presently occurring movement is.  
For this reason, we say that everything the plant does—every operation of every one of its 
powers—is for the sake of a single end, the exemplification of its own form.  When the 
sunflower grows towards the sun, when it sinks its roots into the earth, when its cells split up and 
divide in such-and-such a way, all of these activities occur for the sake of a sunflower life 
coming to be and remaining in being.  
Aquinas calls this system of powers each tending to their own ends for the sake of the 
whole  the  plant’s  nature, and thus he speaks of there being a natural inclination in the plant that 
explains  each  of  the  plant’s  movements  in  terms  of  the  single,  unitary  end  for  the  sake  of  which  
they come to be and operate towards.96   
It is important to note that this natural inclination or appetite is not itself a regulating 
power we can ascribe to the plant—it is not a kind of inner manager that oversees the whole 
operation.  Rather, natural appetite is simply the name Aquinas gives to the system of essentially 
inter-related powers as a whole, the life form or nature.  We might call it a principle of 
explanation, given that its role is to explain the movement and changes we see in the living thing 
itself.  Aquinas thinks it is necessary to avert to this principle or tendency, because again, 
without it we simply cannot grasp what any movement of a living thing is.   
In one sense, this talk of natural appetite is deeply misleading, since a plant obviously 
does not have desires for  its  end.    But  the  fact  that  we  can  only  hear  words  like  ‘inclination’  and  
‘appetite’  in  a  psychological  key  is  not  Aquinas’s  fault,  and  I  think  it  is  a  prejudice  we  would  do  
well to reconsider.  Aquinas would agree with us that it is a category mistake to say that a 
sunflower wants to grow towards the light, if by this we mean that the flower somehow registers 
                                                 
96 DV Q 22.a.4 Natura igitur insensibilis, quae ratione suae materialitatis est maxime a Deo remota, inclinatur 
quidem in aliquem finem, non tamen est in ea aliquid inclinans, sed solummodo inclinationis principium, ut ex 
praedictis patet. 
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a  positive  feeling  or  has  an  inner  impression  towards  the  light,  which  “causes”  it  to  move  toward  
the light.  The plant does not apprehend or desire anything; thus Aquinas is very careful to say 
that it does not have a power of appetite.  In fact, Aquinas is at pains to note that a plant has no 
window onto the world at all—it just has conditions in which it characteristically comes into 
being, maintains, and reproduces itself.   
This  shows  that  the  term  ‘appetite’,  for Aquinas, has nothing in the main to do with some 
feelings or sense impressions of any kind, and everything to do with  a principle that explains 
movement and change in a naturally organized being.   
Of course, animals do have feelings and desires, and for this reason Aquinas says they 
have  a  “more  perfect  mode  of  inclination.”97  Because the animal itself has appetites for specific 
things, unlike a plant, Aquinas attributes to animals appetitive powers, and he speaks of an 
animal’s   sensitive appetite.  Indeed, the hallmark of animality is the possession of perceptual 
powers, which can be further divided into two parts, cognitive and appetitive.  The reason for the 
division between cognition and appetite is that an animal is more than just an integrated system 
of powers that operates for the sake of its own existence.  An animal has external and internal 
senses, and so it perceives the world and reacts to what it perceives through these senses by 
moving itself through the world, in order to pursue some things and avoid others.  Consequently, 
animals have a conscious form of life.   
Aquinas recognizes that an animal is not neutral with respect to what it apprehends, but 
reacts in accordance with what it perceives in a way that is good for the whole animal.  An 
animal perceives particulars and is inclined either to seek or avoid them insofar as they are 
                                                 
97 DV, Q22.a.4 Dicendum, quod voluntas est alia potentia ab appetitu sensitivo. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, 
quod sicut appetitus sensitivus distinguitur ab appetitu naturali propter perfectiorem modum appetendi, ita etiam 
appetitus rationalis ab appetitu sensitivo 
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suitable to itself.  Thus an animal has a power of desire—its sensitive appetite—that tends to 
those objects that are good for the animal as a whole.98  Plants do not.       
So Aquinas, following Aristotle, marks a division within the powers that make up animal 
life:  In the first group are the powers that animals have in common with plants, which pertain to 
growth and reproduction, and in the second group are the powers that pertain to it as an animal.  
This second group can be further divided into cognitive and appetitive powers.  Aquinas draws 
this latter division in terms of a difference in formal objects, or aspects under which one and the 
same thing is apprehended qua object of that power.  Aquinas writes, 
What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, 
but differ in aspect (ratio).  For a thing is apprehended as 
something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable 
(conveniens) or good (bonum).  Now it is diversity of aspect in the 
objects, and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of 
powers.99      
The division between cognition and appetite is not material, but formal; that is to say, it is 
attributed to the power itself and defines its act.    
To understand his claims here, we must return to his understanding of a power.  Again 
following Aristotle, Aquinas speaks of powers in terms of their acts and objects.  The act of a 
power is defined by its object.  For instance, the power of sight is defined by the object of its act, 
the visible (or colored).  The basic idea is that material things are cognized (or wanted) under 
some specific formal aspect.  For instance, the same material thing in the world, say a cardinal 
perched on a tree, can be cognized by different perceptual powers.  Insofar as I see that it is red, 
                                                 
98 Aquinas  entertains  the  idea  that  we  needn’t  attribute  an  appetitive  power  to  animals,  since  each  individual  power  
can be said to be a tendency to its own end that comes to be for the sake of the whole.  Aquinas responds that while 
it is true that each power, being of a certain form or nature, has an inclination to its own object, there is still the need 
for an appetite following upon apprehension by which the animal tends towards objects not just as suitable to a 
particular power, but as suitable to the animal simply or as a whole.  See ST I q. 80, a. 1, ad 3.   
99 ST I Q. 80, a.1, ad.2 quod id quod apprehenditur et appetitur, est idem subiecto, sed differt ratione, apprehenditur 
enim ut est ens sensibile vel intelligibile; appetitur vero ut est conveniens aut bonum. Diversitas autem rationum in 
obiectis requiritur ad diversitatem potentiarum; non autem materialis diversitas. 
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it is an object of my visual power, which registers its visible properties.  Insofar as I hear its 
distinctive call, it is an object of my power of hearing, which registers its audible properties.  I 
cannot know that the bird is soft through my power of hearing, or that it is red through my power 
for touch.100   
This diversity of formal objects is a diversity of genus, as these are all objects of sensory 
powers.  But the diversity between objects of cognition and desire is of a higher order.  
Cognition and desire belong to diverse genera of powers.101  In this case, the differences divide 
according to the very idea of an object, or the formal relation in which something stands to a 
power qua power of a living thing.  Appetitive powers are unified in virtue of their formal 
relation to the good (universal or particular). Cognitive powers, on the other hand, are unified in 
virtue of their formal relation to truth (universal or particular).   
This  explains  why  Aristotle  and  Aquinas  both  speak  of  “parts”  of  the  soul.    There  is  the  
cognitive  “part”  wherein  the  powers  can  be  grouped  together  under  the  formality  of  truth,  and  the  
desiring   “part”  where   the   powers   can   be   grouped together under the formality of good.  The 
division marks two fundamentally different orientations that an animal can take to the world.  
There is no need to mark such a division in plants, as a plant is not related to the world at all. 
For Aquinas, truth just is the name of the formal relation things (being) stand in with 
respect to a cognitive power (perceptual or intellectual).  Cognitive powers are said to receive 
things, not in the manner they exist in themselves (in their own material being), but rather 
according to the mode of the knower (sensible or intellectual being).  Setting all manner of 
complicated details aside, Aquinas would say that truth is ascribed to the act of the cognitive 
                                                 
100 A deaf person who claims to hear music through touch is not a counterexample to this claim.  Rather, I take it to 
prove the point.  A bit of music is always a material reality (vibrations in a medium) that can be accessible through 
other sense modalities.  In the case of a deaf person who can feel the vibrations and process that information in order 
to  create  music  can  be  said  to  “hear”  it  metaphorically.    But  her  touch  is  not  an  act  of  hearing,  it  is  an  act  of  touch.     
101 See Dewan (2008). 
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power directly, not to the object of the power, because in apprehending something the thing is 
brought into conformity with the cognitive power according to its own mode.  It is therefore 
proper to speak of a true perception or a true judgment, not a true object of perception or 
judgment. 
The other way for an animal to be related to something in the world is to seek or to tend 
towards it.  Appetite is the power by which the subject is ordered and inclined towards external, 
particular things.  When an animal desires something, it is inclined or ordered towards it, in 
accordance with how it is in itself, in its particularity and materiality.  Here the goodness is not 
ascribed to the relation—it is not a good wanting—but rather the thing is wanted as good.102  In 
this act, the animal is directed away from itself toward the object of its desire, the particular thing 
as it is.  For Aquinas, this is the essential meaning of good, as that which provides the terminus 
or end of a motion of appetite or inclination.103  When we speak of the good, we mean something 
considered as an object of appetite primarily, and only secondarily good as an object of intellect 
(i.e., considered under the formality of truth).    
Whereas in apprehension or cognition an animal brings specific things in the world to 
itself, in desire the animal brings itself out to specific things in the world. We separate these two 
for the sake of distinguishing them and noting the formal difference, but in actuality they are 
inseparable.   For Aquinas, like Aristotle, thinks that an animal does not apprehend anything 
without being inclined towards or away from what it has apprehended, because an animal cannot 
                                                 102 Anscombe has a brief discussion of the distinction between intellect and appetite in Intention, §40.  I take her to 
be following Aquinas there.  Though it is true that we sometimes speak of a good desire (as when we say that the 
desire was good though what came of it was bad), we say this only insofar as the object of the desire is truly good.  
But now we are making a judgment about some object of desire, instead of actually desiring it! 
103 SG 3.3. 
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be inclined to anything in particular without first having some kind of cognitive apprehension of 
it.104 
It is because an animal goes after what it senses or perceives as good for itself on the 
whole that Aquinas says it has a sensitive appetite; and it is because we can attribute this appetite 
to an animal that we can say its actions are voluntary.  But only imperfectly so, as mere animals 
do not apprehend things universally (i.e., through the use of concepts) but as particulars.  So, 
while an animal can regulate its behavior in terms of what is good for itself on the whole, it is not 
up to the animal to decide how things should be regulated, because it is not up to the animal 
whether it perceives any particular thing in a positive or negative light.   
For instance, if a sheep comes across a patch of grass, she will be inclined to seek it, as a 
source of pleasure for itself (a relief of hunger).  The sheep has a standing disposition to seek 
grass as a source of nourishment for herself, which directs her appetitive powers towards what is 
good for it.  Now, suppose on the way to munch some grass, the sheep also perceives a wolf.  
Now she will be inclined to flee, as she will perceive the wolf as a danger or threat to herself.  
The sheep cannot question whether she ought to flee the wolf, and she cannot decide to be brave 
and face down the wolf.  That is simply not an option available to her.  The reason is that  she 
cannot think of the particular harm (the wolf) in light of a general conception of what is good for 
her (the good sheep life).105  Though there is such a thing as a good sheep life, the sheep herself 
                                                 
104 This  may  at  first  seem  like  an  extreme  position.    Can’t  I  just  think  of  things  without  being  inclined to act?  We 
can only understand the Aristotelian position if we have a suitably broad notion of act.  Of course, we can think 
about things without a view to action, if by this we mean moving ourselves about the world for the sake of some 
specific purpose.  I might, for example, just be sitting around thinking, without a view to anything at all.  But I think 
Aquinas would say that whatever I contemplate, I am moved either to continue and rest in that object of 
contemplation (say, the Divine) or I am moved to contemplate something else, or to do something else altogether.    
105 Aquinas has fairly sophisticated explanation of animal movement and sensitive appetite, both in us and in lower 
animals.  To get into this would be to wade in deeper waters than I can currently manage, having to do with the 
passions and animal movement in general.  For further discussion, see Pasnau (2002, chapters 6-7), and Miner 
(2009, chapter 1).  
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neither knows it nor is essentially guided by such knowledge in what she does.  The sheep cannot 
think generally, but can only cognize and remember particulars as this is regulated by instinct.   
Because an animal can only apprehend and react to particulars as particulars, Aquinas 
argues that whether its life goes well is not really up to it.  Everything depends on the particulars 
it encounters.  No decisions are available to it, because the animal is not able to develop the 
consciousness that other alternative ways of going on are open to it, which is necessary in order 
for a decision to be made.  For to develop that kind of consciousness requires  powers of 
conceptual cognition and inference, which a mere animal lacks.    
A   rational   animal,   Aquinas   argues,   has   an   even   “more   perfect   form   of   inclination.”    
Rational animals, like any animal, have a natural inclination towards their good as a whole, and 
like lower animals this power is actualized through their apprehension of things in the world.  
But Aquinas argues that a rational animal relates to the world through the application of 
universal concepts, and thus it is inclined to pursue or avoid things under an intellectual, 
universal apprehension of them.  Thus, Aquinas says that the will is inclined towards its objects 
under  the  formality  of  the  “universal  good,”  rather than the particular good.106 
This means that a rational animal does not merely act on instinct.  The perception of 
something as dangerous (as an object of fear), though it may automatically incline a rational 
creature to avoid it, does not determine it to flee what it perceives.  A rational animal can stand 
in the face of certain death if he judges that a greater good than his own preservation is at stake.  
And that is because a rational animal can put a certain distance between itself and and its 
judgments and desires.  Its decisions and its inclinations can become objects of rational 
reflection, and thus it can reflect on its own acts.  For instance, though I might immediately 
                                                 
106 ST I-II, q. 1. a. 7.  This is the parallel to the intellect regarding its object under the formality of the universal 
truth, rather than particular, sensible truth. 
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desire to eat the cake upon perceiving it, I can always ask myself if the anticipated pleasure I 
perceive is a reason to eat it.  Because a rational animal can separate himself from his immediate 
perceptions and inclinations in this way, its life is self-determined and free.107   
What explains this is the fact that a rational animal apprehends particulars universally, or 
through concepts, and thus under different descriptions that can be inferentially related to other 
things he knows and desires.  For instance, whereas a dog can only see a bit of meat on the table 
as food, and he is automatically inclined to pursue it as such,108 a rational animal might see a bit 
of meat on the table in a number of different ways: as a potential meal, as a gift and expression 
of gratitude to someone else, as a manifestation of injustice, as a part of a science project, as a 
suitable vehicle of poison, and so on ad infinitum.  Any particular thing a rational animal 
perceives is potentially inferentially related to his other ends, and is immediately perceived as so 
related.  Therefore a rational animal is not inclined towards any particular thing in any one pre-
determined way.  Therefore, a rational animal needs a reason to be inclined towards or away 
from any particular it perceives.  Consequently the principle of inclination in a rational animal, 
the will, requires an act of reason in order to be determined to act.  That is, any particular object 
of will must be given to it by an act of practical reason (a practical judgment that some end is to 
be pursued through some determinate means).    
Because the object of a power of will comes through an act of reason, we can say that a 
rational animal determinse itself to move, in accordance with its conceptual understanding of 
what is to be pursued for the sake of what.  That is to say, a rational animal must act according to 
its  reasons  for  so  acting.  And  so  a  ‘Why?’  question  regarding  the  acts  of  a  rational  animal  can  be  
                                                 
107 Christine Korsgaard brings this sort of critical self-distance into relief convincingly.  See (1996, chapter 1).  
108 Of course, a dog can be trained to avoid the food, against his instinct.  Aquinas thinks this is because the dog can 
remember the pain he associates with doing certain actions if he is repeatedly punished for them.  But the instinct to 
go after the food is still there, and its motive force still very powerful.  The impetus for food can only be overcome 
by memory of something painful and to be avoided, such as bodily harm.   
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directly addressed to it, and an answer can be expected that will appeal, not to some brute 
disposition  to  act  in  certain  ways,  but  to  the  agent’s own sense of his or her reasons for thinking, 
desiring, or acting as she does.  Thus Aquinas says that a rational animal determines its own 
inclinations, and is free.109  This   is   why   he   also   affirms   that,   “goodness   of   will   depends   on  
reason.”110  
4.3.2 The Will and the Good 
We have seen, at least for living things, how Aquinas understands the scholastic dictum, bonum 
est quod omnia appetunt,    or  “all  things  seek  the  good.”    We  have  seen  how  animals  are  related  
to their own good in a sense that cannot be attributed to plants.  Rational animals have an even 
“more  perfect   form  of   existence”   and   a   “more  perfect   form  of   inclination”   to   their  own  good,  
because a rational animal can determine for itself what to pursue or avoid under the universal 
formality of good.  But more careful attention needs to be paid to this notion of rationally 
apprehending the good, and acting on reasons. 
Aquinas argues that a rational animal acts on reasons because only a rational animal 
knows its ends qua end.111  A mere animal knows its ends and knows the means to pursue them, 
but it does not know its end as an end, and it does not know the means in relation to the end.   To 
know an end qua end  is  to  know  it  in  light  of  one’s  (at  least  implicit)  understanding  that  there  is  a  
potentially infinite number of things one might do in relation to the particulars one encounters in 
                                                 109 DV Q22.a4, ad 1 voluntas ab appetitu sensibili non distinguitur directe per hoc quod est sequi apprehensionem 
hanc vel illam; sed ex hoc quod determinare sibi inclinationem, vel habere inclinationem determinatam ab alio: quae 
duo exigunt potentiam non unius modi. Sed talis diversitas requirit diversitatem apprehensionum ut ex praedictis 
patet. Unde quasi ex consequenti accipitur distinctio appetitivarum virium penes distinctionem apprehensivarum, et 
non principaliter.  See also ST I-II, q. 1, a. 2. 110 ST I-II q. 19, a. 3. 111 ST I-II, q. 6, a. 1. 
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the world, and that one must settle for oneself what one will actually do, and through what 
determinate means.  Whenever a rational animal seeks something, it knows that it is not 
absolutely determined to it; rather, it knows that it must determine itself.  And it knows this, not 
because it was taught this, or because it has the proper theory of itself, but because it is not pre-
disposed in any one way to react to particular things.  Now, in order to determine itself, a rational 
animal needs a ground.   It needs a reason for pursuing this rather than that.  An animal who only 
cognizes particulars neither needs nor can have any such ground.  This is why only a rational 
animal is free, because it must decide for itself how to go on.   
But how does it so decide?  How does it have a reason?  The search for a ground of 
action is never conducted in isolation from its other pursuits, many of which are habitual and 
unchanging.  This means that it must think through what it pursues, in light of what it is already 
pursuing (which will always be many different ends, and a variety of means to attaining or 
maintaining them).  Likewise, it must think through which means are the best ones to take, given 
its other ends.  This means, among other things, that rational creatures can weigh alternative 
means in light of an end, and weigh less ultimate ends in light of more ultimate ends (i.e., more 
specific ends versus more general ends). 
Consequently, we can say that rational animals have an understanding of different levels 
of ends, and at least a vague sense of how they are supposed to hang together as a whole.  This 
conception of how it all hangs together is what Aquinas calls the ultimate end—a rational 
animal’s   general,   conceptual   understanding   of   how   to   live   or   go   on.     Aquinas   thinks   that   any  
sane, mature adult will necessarily have cobbled together some such conception.  Aquinas calls 
this  conception  “the  universal  good”,  and  he  argues  that  it  is  the  will’s  proper  object.    Everything  
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that is willed is willed under this rational aspect of good, as to be pursued because in accord with 
my general conception of the good.  
In fact, Aquinas thinks there could be no reasons unless a rational animal has a general 
conception of its own good, and thus a general sense of how to live.  The will, as a rational 
capacity for desire, follows conceptual apprehension of things in the world.  Rational cognition 
sees the general in the particular, and there can be no rational grasp of the particular without the 
general.  The will must be understood in the same way.  Whatever is an object of will, that is, 
whatever particular thing is wanted, is only wanted because it stands in relation to something 
general—that the particular  thing  can  be  brought  under  one’s  general  conception  of  the  good. 
We cannot understand what Aquinas is saying so long as we think of it in terms of having 
an  evaluative  belief  about  action  (prospective  or  actual).    This  is  not  Aquinas’s  point.    In  fact, his 
position has nothing to do with moral psychology at all and everything to do with the 
metaphysics of motion and tendency laid out in the previous section.  Just like any living thing, 
Aquinas argues that we cannot explain the voluntary movements of a man (i.e., the movements 
that are explained by appeal to his will), without an appeal to the end for the sake of which they 
come to be; and since man is a living thing, and the will is a vital power of a living thing, then 
that end is the complete exemplification of its own form.  Aquinas calls this end happiness, or 
beatitudo.  And he argues that will is naturally inclined to it.  But the will is a rational power, 
and so although it can be naturally inclined to the end of man it cannot be blindly inclined to this 
end.  It has to be inclined by acts of practical judgment, which involves the grasping of practical 
reasons for acting in some ways to the exclusion of others.  
Of course, Aquinas is not claiming that we are always thinking about our happiness, or 
even that for everything we do we can make a case that it contributes to our happiness.  Rather, 
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it’s  that  we  have  a  general  conception  of  what  happiness  is  (though  we  may  not  call  it  that) and 
we pursue particular things in light of this general conception.  Consequently, we can ask a 
rational animal why it does what it does, and it will in principle we able to give an answer that 
locates what it does within its general conception of what is to be done and what is to be avoided.  
If we did not pursue particular things in light of a general conception of what to pursue and avoid 
(i.e.,  how  to  live),  then  this  practice  of  asking  the  ‘Why?’  question  would  make  no  sense.    It  is  
for  this  reason  that  Aquinas  says  that  the  movements  of  human  beings  are  “perfectly  voluntary,”  
because in every such movement, the human being knows its end qua end, that is, in light of its 
general conception of what is good.112    
Another sense in which a rational animal knows its end as an end, is because it can reflect 
on its reasons for acting in any particular instance.  Suppose, for instance, that I am drawn to the 
bright bags of candy in aisle three, and I start to walk in that general direction with a mind to 
getting one of them. I can question this decision at any moment, even before I start to move.  I 
can, as it were, hold it in abeyance in order to criticize it.  I can ask myself whether the action 
conflicts with my other ends, more general (health), and more specific (goal of losing weight for 
a special event), and decide whether the satisfaction I seek in the candy is worth its known costs.  
I can question whether candy is really the best way to spend my limited funds, or whether it 
wouldn’t  be  better   to  hold  off  on   food  all   together  until  dinner.     Or   I   can  shrug  all   that  off as 
basically not important, and go for it.   
Now if I settle on the candy, purchase it, and eat it, then there will be some reason that 
explains this.  The reason may just be that nothing occurring to me at the time spoke against it.  
The reason need not be that it was a means to something else I wanted, or that it played some 
role in a larger plan.  It may have just immediately appeared enjoyable (most pleasant things do). 
                                                 
112 On  the  “perfect  voluntary”,  see  ST  I-II, q. 6, a. 2.   
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113   Being a rational animal does not mean that every moment of life is burdened by some finely 
tuned deliberative calculus.  It merely means that what is pursued comes under the formal aspect 
of the universal good, some ratio appetibilitatis that  can  explain  the  agent’s  intentional  pursuit  of  
it.  
Of course, Aquinas also recognizes there are lower appetites in us.  We are driven by 
bodily needs that are often quite urgent, and we too have instinctual drives for sex, nourishment, 
and the like, and we have primitive impulses to flee and avoid what is naturally perceived as 
dangerous or repulsive, and to seek what is naturally perceived as pleasant or suitable.  And these 
different forms of desire can come into conflict with one another.  For instance, I might know 
that traveling by plane is safer than traveling by car.  But I may also have a primitive and 
desperate fear of being suspended 30,000 feet in the air.  And yet I can get on a plane despite this 
fear.  I can argue myself out of acting on it, and engage in useful distractions on the flight so as 
to keep it far from my consciousness (I can cover the windows, avoid looking at the monitor that 
shows the plane flying over the Atlantic ocean, keep my mind deeply engaged in a novel, etc).  
An animal with merely sensory cognition and appetite could not do this.  Even the most 
sophisticated brutes would have to be drugged or otherwise unaware of something they were 
fearful of.  Only a rational animal can micro-manage its fears.   
Similarly, only a rational animal can be continent or incontinent.  Our ability to act 
against our general conception of the good presupposes two things: (1) that we do all have such a 
conception; and (2) that our typical way of carrying on is to act in accordance with it.  Thus 
                                                 
113 Whenever one talks about the deliberative character  of  all  action,   inevitably   two  objections  arise:   (1)  we  don’t  
always deliberate, and (2) oftentimes it is manifestly harmful to deliberate, as in activities that depend on skill, such 
as sports.  See Arpaly and Schroeder (2012).  Neither objection is a problem for Aquinas because he does not have a 
causal theory of action, according to which prior mental states explain actions as their effects.  His point is 
conceptual.  Insofar as an act is voluntary, it is potentially deliberative, not actually deliberative.  Aquinas 
recognizes that skill and virtue often drive out actual deliberation.    
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weakness of will is not a counter-example to the view that Aquinas puts forward.  Rather, it 
seems to prove the point rather well.  
4.3.3 Goodness of Will 
Aquinas argues that human goodness is goodness of will.  He does not think this is because our 
other powers are irrelevant to the assessment of human life, as Foot has suggested, but rather, 
because it   is   “through   the  will   that  we  employ  whatever  powers  we  have.”114  This claim will 
likely fall deaf on contemporary ears.  We do not think that we need to appeal to the will to 
explain the operation of a power of judgment, say, or perception.  What, then, are we to make of 
Aquinas’s  claim? 
Aquinas claims that properly human acts are voluntary acts.  Acts and processes that 
merely happen in a man, such as the regeneration of cells, the circulation of blood, and the 
production of saliva, are not properly human because they are essentially such as to be outside of 
the sphere of practical reason and will.  Properly human acts are voluntary insofar as they are 
potentially within this sphere. This needs to be explained.   
Aquinas does not think that the will operates on its own.  Obviously, I cannot walk 
upstairs  just  by  willing  it.    Thus  Aquinas  speaks  of  the  will  “using”  the  other  powers  of  a  human  
being in order to realize its objects.115  This is not a homunculi theory of the will.  To say that 
other powers come under the control of the will is just to say that their exercise is in accordance 
with what the will desires, and their form is provided by practical reason.116  In making a 
practical judgment and thus wanting to A, I thereby give all my other powers, as it were, the 
                                                 
114 ST, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 3. 
115 This is in line with what Anscombe says about writing on the blackboard with one’s eyes shut.  The essential 
thing, she says, I do without my eyes.  And the essential thing she clearly has in mind is the act of will.   
116 For his discussion of use as an act of will, see ST I-II, q. 16. 
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relevant practical context in which to operate: for the sake of A-ing.  The movements of these 
other powers can only be explained by the fact that they are for the sake of A-ing.  To register 
this,  Aquinas  would  say  that  I  am  “using”  them  for  the sake of A-ing.  And the extent to which I 
use them in accordance with what I rationally desire, is the extent to which their operation is 
voluntary and explained by an appeal to the will.   
Now, I obviously cannot use all of my parts or powers directly.  The heart, for instance, 
pumps blood, with or without my consent, and the explanation of this involves no appeal to my 
power of will.  But I can still use my heart for my own ends, albeit indirectly. Suppose I am 
plagued by nightmares and I rig a heart rate monitor so that it will trip a loud alarm on my 
computer, because I want to wake up when I am having a nightmare.  Then when my heart rate 
rises during a dream, the alarm is tripped and I wake up, thereby stopping my dream.  Here I am 
using my heart to do something else besides pump blood, thereby bringing it under the control of 
practical reason and will.  But still, the heart is just doing what the heart does.  My will obviously 
doesn’t  control  that.     
Similarly, though the eyes are the human organ of sight, human beings can and do put 
them to other purposes: to convey emotion, attract attention, make a point, and so on.  And 
though I cannot decide how my capacity for vision actually operates, I can decide (to a certain 
extent) upon what objects I direct them.  I can choose not to look at advertisements on TV, just 
as I can choose to avert my eyes when I encounter something grotesque, offensive, or otherwise 
displeasing.  The same is true even for my thoughts.  I can choose what to set my powers of 
contemplation and judgment towards, and I can even choose what I will allow myself to imagine 
and fantasize about.117 Similarly, though I cannot choose how my powers for digestion and 
                                                 
117 Consider the difference between the man who spends his time on the bus thinking about current evetns, versus the 
man who thinks about the latest gossip he read in a tabloid. 
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growth operate, I can choose to regulate them by taking certain medicines, by taking in certain 
nutrients and avoiding others, and by regulating my behaviors regarding the excretion of waste.  
This  is  the  sense  in  which  these  powers  are  under  what  Aquinas  calls  the  agent’s  dominium, or 
voluntary control: insofar as the exercise of these powers occurs because of a rational principle 
that plays an explanatory role in its operating in this way, here and now, and in accord with what 
the will desires. 
Of course, this kind of voluntary control comes in degrees.  It might be outside of my 
control whether I have certain inclinations, or whether I am prone to certain passions, some of 
which may be morally problematic, deeply vexing, or downright perplexing. But it is at least in 
principle within my control whether I act in some determinate way so as to satisfy their pull on 
me.118  It is up to me whether I rationally desire them—that is to say, whether I commit myself to 
searching around for the means to their pursuit.  And while it is often outside of my control what 
is placed within the domain of my sensory apprehension, it is up to me to seek to remove 
something that I have a reason to avoid.  
Because of the importance of the will in their exercise, Aquinas argues that voluntary acts 
are properly human or free acts.119 By this he means acts that are essentially such as to be 
brought under the control of practical reason and will.  Aquinas also calls them moral acts.  In 
fact, he argues that everything a man does voluntarily is done morally.  He does not mean that 
everything a man does voluntarily is moral in our modern sense—done out of duty, say, in 
contrast  to  what  is  merely  prudent  or  in  one’s  self-interest.120  Rather, his thought is that, because 
                                                 
118 Of   course,   in   cases   of   “compulsive”   action,   the   matter becomes quite difficult.  For now I want to set such 
complicated matters aside.   
119 Of course, this means that intentional actions themselves are also voluntary.  But that is just the result we should 
have expected.   
120 Aquinas had spent too much time in the confessional to be a Pollyanna about human beings and the extent to 
which  they  are  creatures  that  have  “fallen”  quite  far  from  any  ideal.    
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what we do voluntarily we do in accordance with what we will, and since our will desires things 
under the formal aspect of the universal good, everything we do voluntarily has a moral meaning 
or significance attached to it.  There is, for Aquinas, no morally neutral human act.  While a 
general act description can be morally neutral, if that description is a voluntary description of 
something that happens (or fails to happen), here and now, then it is bound up with a form of 
explanation that is moral through and through.  The form of explanation of voluntary 
descriptions—as in accord with what the will desires—just is moral explanation.  It is the kind of 
explanation that ultimately depends on my general sense of what I ought to do and what I ought 
to avoid.  The question of how to live just is the moral question, and a human life just is the 
moral domain.  Aquinas would not agree with contemporary philosophers that moral actions are 
a special kind of human action, partitioned off from the rest somehow.  Rather, he argues that 
every human action is moral—either good or bad.      
Even acts of twirling my hair, twiddling my thumbs, or counting blades of grass, which 
seem morally neutral from the perspective of their content, are fraught with moral significance 
and meaning just in virtue of the fact that they are voluntary acts. Suppose that I twiddle my 
thumbs while   listening   to  a   lecture.     Well,   that’s  a  good  human  action  by  Aquinas’s   lights   (an  
action  is  good  if  it  is  in  no  way  bad).    But  suppose  that  I’m  twiddling  my  thumbs  when  I  ought  to  
be taking notes, since I need to write a report on the lecture for the school paper. Then the action 
is bad, because I could and should have been making better use of my hands!  Likewise, while 
drumming my fingers on the table seems to be neither here nor there when considered generally, 
the evaluation of human acts as good or bad is always in reference to the particular act itself.  
Perhaps I ought not to drum my fingers on the kitchen table while drinking my morning coffee—
I know that it drives my husband crazy!  Or perhaps I ought not to do it when taking an exam so 
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as not to disturb others.  These judgments can only be made within the context of a particular 
human life.   
So while we can say there are morally neutral act descriptions, we must still affirm that 
no particular human act or action is morally neutral, because everything a human being does 
voluntarily is done (or could be done) in accordance with his general sense of how to go on.  We 
might put it this way: Every human act is moral because every human act exemplifies a human 
life, which is the moral domain.  At any moment, a human being is either living well or badly.  
Thus   the   “moral”   character   of   voluntary   acts   has   nothing   to   do   with   particular  
propositional contents—moral content, we might say—but in whether an act can is in accordance 
with what the will desires, the universal good.  Voluntary acts, then, can always be explained by 
a practical judgment that this is the way to be going on, here and now.  Such judgments are 
always   made   (at   least   implicitly)   within   the   context   of   one’s   life:   one’s   other   ends,   one’s  
circumstances,   one’s   powers,   one’s   commitments,   one’s   duties, the norms of the society and 
institution to which one belongs, etc.  Thus making such judgments is always, at least 
potentially,  a  matter  of  fitting  what  one  does,  here  and  now,  into  one’s  life  as  a  whole.   
The  above   reflections  on  Aquinas’s   theory  of will are enough, I hope, to show how he 
thinks of the will as a power that is naturally inclined to the human good in such a way that fits 
into  the  framework  of  natural  normativity.    But  since  man’s  end  can  only  guide  action  through  a  
rational conception of it, we may still be inclined to think that such a conception could be 
constructed out of purely formal principles.  And so long as that remains a possibility, ethical 
naturalism will not be a meaningful alternative in moral theory.  But Aquinas does not think that 
this general conception of the end is either wholly constructed, or wholly a matter of second 
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nature in a more Aristotelian sense.  In order to see this, we must turn to his understanding of the 
first principles of practical reason. 
4.4 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICAL REASON 
Aquinas argues that the will is a natural tendency towards the final end of man—the fullest 
exemplification of human life.  But since appetite follows cognition, the will can only be moved 
by a general conception of this end.   He argues that no human action is intelligible without 
attributing to the agent herself some conception of this end, no matter how inarticulate, 
unsystematic, or unreflective it might be.  Aquinas takes it for granted that in coming to be a 
human being—i.e., being raised in a community of other human beings, coming into the 
possession of concepts, a language, and coming to have a world—one comes into some such 
conception, and thus comes to act voluntarily. 
Now, having a general sense of how to go on, and bringing this general sense to bear on 
this particular moment within the context of the rest of her life—all her other ends, 
commitments, and so on—implies that the agent is able to order her ends and to adjust her 
actions in accordance with those ends she gives priority.  If she chooses to eat the cake because 
she’s  hungry,  even  though  she  knows  that  it  is  someone  else’s  piece,  then  we  can  say  that  she  is  
ordering her life incorrectly, since she ought to value fairness over fleeting pleasures of the belly.  
This very idea of action (the idea of ordering things to an end, and ordering these ends in 
light of an overall conception of the good) through acts of practical judgment and choice, implies 
that  general  principles  guide  an  agent’s  determination  of  what  is  to be pursued and what avoided.   
Aquinas does think that practical reasoning takes place in accordance with general principles.  
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For   our   purposes,   we   don’t   need   to   understand   what   these   principles   are,   but   only   that   from  
which he thinks they must be derived—viz., the first principles of practical reason, which 
correspond to the natural inclinations of the will.  These first principles and natural inclinations, 
Aquinas argues, are common to all human beings, and do not come about through explicit 
training or instruction.  In fact, Aquinas says we are naturally apt to know and want them.   
Before we can explain this, we must first note that Aquinas has a very different 
conception of principle (archê) than modern or contemporary moral philosophers.  One finds in 
Aquinas no merely formal principles of right reasoning (nothing remotely approaching the so-
called  instrumental  principle,  the  supposed  “sine  qua  non  of  having  reasons  at  all”121), nor does 
he think of principles as yielding some kind of explicit decision procedure. Aquinas does not 
think of first principles (from which all principles are ultimately derived) as imperatives or 
commands.  Aquinas, following Aristotle once again, thinks of first principles of practical reason 
as   its   “starting  points.”     For  practical reason, the starting points are the most primitive human 
goods that the will is naturally inclined to seek: life, knowledge, family, friendship, play, 
political community, and so on.  These are the ends that all human beings want for their own 
sake, as intrinsically valuable to them.  And they want these things in a rational way—viz., 
because they have a conceptual apprehension that they are constitutive of their general good.122       
Although natural inclinations depend upon conceptual apprehension, we should not be 
tempted to think that they are objects of contemplation.  These goods, as first principles of 
practical reason, are apprehended as ends—as objects of pursuit rather than as objects of 
contemplative knowledge.  Aquinas thinks that we are naturally apt to know and thus naturally 
inclined to them.  We should not be tempted, however, to think that we know them because we 
                                                 
121 This is how Dreier famously describes it (1997, 99). 
122 It is a mistake, then, to think of natural inclinations as some kind of animal instinct. 
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are inclined to them; to think that would be to get the order of explanation backwards.123 Rather, 
we are inclined or oriented towards these goods because we are apt to know them, through a 
natural habit of practical reason.     
There is much to unpack here.  To begin with, we need to understand the first principle of 
practical reason: 
(FPPR)  Good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided.124 
This principle lays out the intelligibility of goodness as such, as object of appetite, or what is to 
be done and pursued.  Although as stated, the principle is formal, it is not merely formal, because 
Aquinas argues that contained within  it  are  all   the  “precepts  of   the  natural   law,”  which  are  the  
basic human goods that, taken as a well-ordered totality, constitute the complete fulfillment of 
man’s  nature.125  Thus, what the first principle of practical reason points to is the natural end of 
the human will: the exemplification of human form, which is the integrated human good or 
happiness.126   
In understanding the first principle of practical reason in this way, we thereby understand 
the intelligibility of practical reasoning and practical inference. Practical reasoning is always the 
task  of  preserving  the  human  good  through  one’s  one  activity,  and  avoiding  what  is  harmful  to  
any aspect of this good.  Practical reasoning is, by its very structure and nature, goodness 
preserving, rather than truth preserving.127  This is why its conclusion is an action ordered to 
some end (i.e., some good), rather than a true proposition.   
We can usefully compare the FPPR to the first principle of theoretical reason: 
                                                 
123 This is the position of the famous Thomist, Jacques Maritain.  See Maritain (1951). 
124 ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2, c.  bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum. 
125 ST I, II, q. 94, a. 2   
126 ST I-II, q. 90, a. 2 
127 For a contemporary defense of this view, see Anscombe (1989/2005).  
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(PNC)   It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to 
belong to the same thing, at the same time, and in the same 
respect.128   
This is the principle of non-contradiction.  For Aquinas, this is a claim about the intelligibility of 
being, rather than the good.129 
Aquinas does not think that either principle can be proven, but he also does not think that 
either can seriously be doubted when applied to particular cases.  For example, in order to doubt 
the PNC, or to take it to be false, one would have to be able to conceive of a particular instance 
in which the same attribute might, at the same time, both belong and not belong to the same 
subject in the same respect.130  But one cannot do this because the world itself (being) cannot be 
this way.  I cannot truthfully judge or assert that Socrates is both sitting and not sitting in the 
same moment, for the simple reason that Socrates cannot be that way.  Thus no one needs to be 
told to follow the principle of non-contradiction;;  rather,  one  can’t  help  but  follow  it,  because  in  
applying the concept sitting, here and now, I am ruling out not-sitting.  And that is not because of 
a funny fact about the concept, but again, because our concepts are supposed to bear upon what 
can be, in fact.  Thus, PNC is not primarily a claim about language or thoughts, but about the 
nature of reality or being.  
Of course, the world is not unrelated to our thought about it.  The acknowledgement of 
PNC in particular cases just is the acknowledgement of it as articulating the limit of possible 
thought about the world. Whatever can be a thought must be in line with this principle (i.e., 
every thought must exclude its contradiction) because whatever is thought is ordered to truth, 
and truth is a relation between judgment and some being.  The principle of non-contradiction 
                                                 
128 The formulation comes from Aristotle.  See Metaph. Iv, 6, 1001b13-14.   
129 My discussion of these principles is heavily indebted to the work of Kevin L. Flannery, S.J., and to private 
discussion with him on this topic.  See Flannery (2001, chapter 6). 
130 Metaph. Iv, 3, 1005b19-20. 
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defines theoretical intelligibility in this sense: we do not have any hold on the nature of thought 
without it. 
Likewise, the first principle of practical reason is not something that can be demonstrated 
or proven in general, but only seen in light of its truth in particular cases.   This principle is 
meant to express the intelligibility of the good, or the intelligibility of action.  Just as one cannot 
judge contradictory claims to both hold true, one cannot pursue what one considers, at one and 
the same time and in the same respect, to be good and bad.  Just as thought is not intelligible 
without PNC, so action is not intelligible without FPPR.  So, just as Socrates cannot both be 
sitting and be standing at one and the same time, and so no one can have a particular belief that 
he is; so also, it is impossible that something can both be an object of will and not be an object of 
will at one and the same time, while considered in the same respect.  That is, one cannot 
apprehend a goal as something that should be pursued and be avoided at one and the same time.  
In one moment I might see it as good in some way, at another moment as bad in some way, but 
only insofar as I attend to different aspects of the prospective action at different times.  I cannot 
at the same time will to go to the store because I need food while I will not to go there because I 
am tired.  Practical reasons exclude their practical contradictories just as theoretical reasons 
exclude their contradictories.  This has to do with the nature of what can be done, or the good.   
It follows from these principles that some thoughts must never be formulated (because 
they are incompatible with the way the world actually is) and some actions must never be done 
(because they are incompatible with what is actually good).131  
The first principle of practical reason gives a determinate sense to practical 
intelligibility.132  Something is a good if it is to be pursued by that which apprehends it.  
                                                 
131 Hence the very idea of moral prohibitions flows from the logic of practical reason and the intelligibility of the 
good.  For more on this aspect of the Aristotelian picture, see Inciarte (1994). 
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Something is a human good if human beings are naturally inclined to pursue them, given what 
they are.  Practical reasoning is a matter of getting what ought to be pursued, and is goodness 
preserving.  This distinguishes it from theoretical reasoning.  This shows that the FPPR is formal, 
but not merely formal.  Any rational animal would direct his own activity in accordance with it, 
but what it would thereby direct would depend upon its own nature, and the goods internal to that 
nature.  This also has to do with the intelligibility of the good on something like a schema of 
natural normativity.   
Practical reasoning is not formal, as its principles are the good intrinsic to human life.  
These goods set definite limits upon right practical reasoning.  Moreover, Aquinas tells us that 
these  principles  are  “naturally  known  to  us”  and  “every desire for things that are ordered to an 
end stems from a natural desire for the ultimate end.”133   
Aquinas says that the apprehension of these goods qua good—that is, as goals and 
general objects to which the will is inclined—is per se nota.  What he means is that the goodness 
is  grasped  spontaneously  upon  one’s  interactions  with  them.    One  does  not  grasp  them  through  
observation of human beings and then inferring what to do based on these observations.  Rather, 
his thought is that one knows them simply in virtue of being a human being.  In order to grasp 
each good, one must know the dimension of human life to which it pertains.  But human beings 
know these dimensions of life because they live them.  They know them, as it were, from the 
inside.  Thus, the grasp of these activities qua good does not require special instruction, theory, 
or even proper habituation because we are naturally apt to grasp them just by living a 
                                                                                                                                                             
132 It is sometimes complained that philosophers with deeply Aristotelian sympathies often argue by appeal to a 
notion of intelligibility that is itself not exactly transparent.  For a nice articulation of the worry, see Setiya (2007).  I 
take this sort of complaint to be legitimate.  However, the notion of intelligibility is well worked out in Aristotle and 
those (like Aquinas) who follow him, and it is far from indefensible.      133 ST I-II, q. 91, a. 2, emphasis added.  
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recognizably human life.  Aquinas calls this sort of knowledge connatural, noting that we are 
inclined to it by our very nature. 
It is a consequence of this view that we do not deliberate about whether to seek these 
ends in general; we only deliberate about whether to seek any one of them in any particular 
instance of action.  These ends are the fixed, unchanging limits of practical reasoning.     
It seems to me that something of this view can also be found in Aristotle.  Consider the 
opening of the Metaphysics, where Aristotle famously proclaims that   
All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the 
delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness 
they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of 
sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not 
going to do anything, we prefer sight to almost everything else. 
The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and 
brings to light many differences between things. (I.980a21)  
Aristotle recognizes that though they are obviously useful and we cannot get on without them, 
we revel in the exercise of our senses for its own sake, precisely because through them we attain 
knowledge, which we also value for its own sake and naturally desire.  Thus the delight we take 
in our senses is a kind of demonstration (for one who came somehow to doubt it) that knowledge 
is one of our basic ends or goods.   
Considerations such as these suggest that the knowledge we have of our own nature—
though imperfect and incomplete—is knowledge gained from the inside, just in virtue of being a 
man and living a human life. Aquinas argues that our knowledge of all the basic human goods is 
connatural in this way: we know these from the inside, just in virtue of being a man. 
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4.5 HOW TO BE AN ETHICAL NATURALIST 
Obviously, there is much more to be said about Aquinas on the will and practical reason.  I have 
only said enough to begin to resolve the dilemma with which we began.    
We began by admitting that we did not know how it was possible to be an ethical 
naturalist, because we did not understand how practical and natural normativity could possibly 
be reconciled.  We came to see that the ethical naturalist must be able to show how the natural 
teleology of life and the practical teleology of action, and the two senses of good that come out 
of them (the good that corresponds to what a thing is, and the good as goal or end) can be 
reconciled with one another.  We are now in a position to say how this is at least possible.  If 
Aquinas’s  view  can  be  made  defensible,  then  we  can say that there are goods that are objective 
because  it  pertains  to  man’s  nature  to  pursue  them,  in  light  of  a  conceptual  understanding  of  how  
they ought to be integrated as a whole.  At the same time, these goods are objects of a 
distinctively practical apprehension that is ordered to the will, which is, a natural tendency to 
seek those very goods as an integrated whole.  Such goods depend on what a human being is, but 
they are known by human beings as goals or ends, as their typical way of coming to mind is not 
in the form of some abstract list, but in the course of thinking about concrete situations of human 
life with a view to their fulfillment.  An alien anthropologist would not know them as ends or 
think of them with a view to realizing them, but nevertheless could come to know them by being 
acquainted with the characteristic activities of human beings, by observing minimally 
functioning human communities.     
In Aquinas, then, we find a theory of practical reason according to which we do not need 
to show how facts about human beings can enter its structure.  Rather, facts about human 
beings—spontaneous, non-observational knowledge of their most basic goods—define the 
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starting points and limit of that structure itself.  Consequently, we do not now have to show how 
knowledge of human life form enters into practical thought.  Practical thought itself is impossible 
without some general knowledge of human life.  We reason from our general conception of this 
life, which is an incomplete knowledge of our own nature, down to particular actions that are 
ordered to its more perfect attainment.  
It remains to be seen whether or not this account of the will and practical reason is true.  I 
will not argue that here.  For one thing, it would involve understanding the very idea of a natural 
habit of reason.  While we have explored the idea of a natural inclination, we have not yet 
understood the idea of connatural knowledge, or knowledge that is in accord with nature or 
natural inclination.  To do so, I take it, would involve an understanding of habit in general and 
virtue, and that would be a treatise in its own right.  What has been argued here is merely a 
propaedeutic to that inquiry.  But I will at least note the following, as I take it to be the crucial 
next step in advancing the argument for ethical naturalism.  Aquinas has a picture according to 
which we can speak of both an affective (per modum inclinationis) and a cognitive (per modum 
cognitionis) connaturality, as naturally tending towards its suitable (conveniens) objects.  And 
though he thinks that virtue perfects what we are by nature inclined to know, we are by nature 
inclined to know certain things even without virtue (intellectual or moral).  This sort of imperfect 
knowledge of our own nature, which we are by nature (per modum naturae) suited to grasp, is 
what Aquinas says is common to all men, and what makes human action possible.      
What I will attempt, in the next chapter, is to show how we can see our way into this sort 
of view by reflecting upon particular human actions as they are happening.  Aquinas articulates 
his theory from above, but I prefer to give an account of things in media res.  Thus, in the next 
chapter,   I  will   argue   that   intentional   action  depends  on   the  agent’s  practical   knowledge  of   the 
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end, which is the cause of what it understands.  In turn, that knowledge of the particular end of 
one’s   particular   action   depends   on   general   knowledge   of   the   final   end:   human   life   as   such.    
Knowledge of action depends, I argue, on knowledge of human form.   
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5.0  KNOWLEDGE OF ACTION AND KNOWLEDGE OF FORM 
Just as the species of natural things are constituted by their natural forms, so the species of 
human actions are constituted by forms as conceived by reason.  
Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 18, a. 10. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Two questions have recently exercised philosophers of action.  The first concerns the nature of 
the connection between acting intentionally and pursuing what one takes to be good, and the 
second concerns the nature of the connection between knowledge and action. Both questions 
concern the definition of action and its proper form of explanation.  Yet philosophers typically 
treat the two questions separately, as if one might understand an answer to the first without 
having to connect it to the second, and vice versa.  
In this chapter, I argue that these two inquiries are inextricably linked. When appreciated 
together, they point to the following conclusions: (1) actions are material events that are 
constituted by a rational form, which can only come to be through a power of knowledge that 
brings the material parts of an action together in accordance with this form; and (2) actions can 
therefore only be made intelligible by a form of explanation that, when understood abstractly, 
articulates a specifically practical sense of good.   
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5.1.1 The Problem with The Causal Approach 
At least since the publication of Intention, most philosophers of action have followed Anscombe 
in thinking that intentional actions are somehow explained by their connection to practical 
reasons.134  And at  least  since  the  publication  of  Davidson’s  seminal  essays  on  action,  most  have  
thought  that  having  a  reason  for  action,  or  taking  something  to  be  one’s  reason  for  action,  is  best  
understood in causal-psychological terms.  On a stronger reading of the causal theory, we must 
identify some mental state (or some combination of mental states) that stands on one side of the 
causal relation between agent and action; on a weaker view, while reasons might not be causes 
per se, action explanation is still a species of causal explanation in the standard sense.135  
Following convention, let us call this the causal theory of action. 
Setting the real disputes between them aside, all causal theorists agree that the real work 
of action theory is the explication of the true psychological or motivational causes of actions, 
which are metaphysically distinct existences from the events in the world they bring about. 
Kieran  Setiya  sums  up  the  causal  theory  well  when  he  writes  that,  “[T]he  intentionality  of  action  
consists in psychological   motivation…and   motivation   consists   in   a   certain   kind   of   efficient  
causation.”136 This explanation by motivation typically comes by way of detailing the causal 
properties that define the type of state in question, along with the relevant propositional content 
that can rationalize the bodily movements they bring about.137 
                                                 134 (2000, 9). 135 See Alvarez (2007, 105).   
136 Setiya (2003, 348). 
137 For our purposes here, it does not matter whether we think that reasons just are mental states, facts about mental 
states, or whether we think that what it is to act for a reason (i.e., to act intentionally) is a matter of having certain 
psychological states that must play a specific efficient causal role in the production of action in virtue of their 
propositional contents.  All three variations will fall under the scope of the present critique. 
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The causal theory is not without its problems, of course.138  But let us set these problems 
aside, since they are only the symptoms that reveal a much deeper problem.  Anscombe hinted at 
the deeper problem in several papers.  The basic thrust of her objection is methodological: 
I conjecture that a cause of this failure of percipience is the 
standard  approach  by  which  we  first  distinguish  between  “action”  
and what merely happens, and then specify that we are talking 
about  “actions.”    So  what  we  are  considering  is  already given as—
in a special sense—an action, and not just any old thing which we 
do, such as making an involuntary gesture.139    
The deep problem with the causal account, by Anscombe’s  lights,  is  that  it  presupposes  precisely  
what it is supposed to explain: the nature of intentional action.  The causal theorist takes it for 
granted  that  he  already  knows  the  difference  between  an  action  and  “what  merely  happens,”  and  
asserts that he is interested in explaining action.  The causal theorist takes some notion of action 
as primitive, and explains it in terms of its relation to reasons.140  But that leaves the action itself 
basically un-theorized.       
Though Anscombe would agree that we cannot understand what an intentional action is 
without knowing what a reason for action is, she does not think we can take either notion as 
primitive in our theory.  She plainly thinks we do not understand that notion of reason for action 
unless we understand what it is a reason for—actions.  Likewise, we do not understand what an 
action is unless we understand what a practical reason is.  The one reality is, on her account, only 
illuminated only insofar as the other is.141  This is why she says that her special sense of the 
question  ‘Why?’  defines  a  form  of  explanation.    An  action  is  something  to  which  this  question  
                                                 
138 High on the list of worries are that is that it reduces our understanding of mental agency to the causal interaction 
between states of mind, thereby leaving the agent herself either superfluous altogether, or excessively limited to 
some managerial role over the causal arena that is her mental life. And of course there is the notorious problem of 
deviant causation: sometimes mental states with the relevant causal properties and propositional contents cause 
actions completely by accident. 
139 Anscombe (2005, 111), emphasis added. 
140 The causal theorist also typically takes a notion of event and cause as primitive as well.   
141 For  arguments   that  Anscombe’s  reasoning  here   is   sound,  see  Boyle  and  Lavin  (2009,  170-174).   See also the 
main source of these arguments in Michael Thompson (2008, 120-128).    
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can be applied, because an action is something that is capable of being caught up in this form of 
explanation.  Or, as Anscombe sometimes puts it, this form of explanation, which is explanation 
that  reveals  one’s  practical  reason,  describes  “a  form  of  description  of  events.”142  
5.1.2 A Knowledge Requirement on Action Explanation 
Anscombe   argues   that   intentional   actions   are   events   “to which a certain sense of the question 
‘Why?’  is  given  application,”  where  a  positive  answer  to  this  question  reveals  an  agent’s  “reason  
for  acting.”143  But when is the question given application?  Anscombe says that the agent herself 
must give it application, and she begins her account by inquiring into the differences between the 
case where the question is and the case where the question is not given application.  Her thought 
seems to be that if we comprehend what the cases where the question is refused application lack, 
we might be in a better position to know what the positive cases must (at least partially) consist 
in. 
On   this   matter,   Anscombe   takes   it   to   be   obvious   that   the   ‘Why?’   question   is   always  
refused  application  when  the  agent’s  response  indicates a lack of knowledge of the description of 
her  action  under  which  the  question  is  posed  to  her.    Her  thought  is  that  if  you  don’t  know  what  
you’re  doing,  you  simply  can’t  be  doing  it  intentionally.    This  shows  that  she  sees  a  knowledge 
requirement on action as essential to understanding what it is.  An action is something that is 
essentially known by its agent.   
However obvious this seemed to Anscombe, many philosophers from Davidson to the 
present have found this knowledge requirement dubious.  Although they will happily grant that 
                                                 
142 (2000, 47). 
143 (2000, 9). 
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in a statistically significant number of cases an agent does know what she is doing when she acts 
intentionally, they contend there are obvious and easily multiplied counterexamples that vitiate 
any claim to their being a necessary requirement.144 Moreover, these philosophers wonder why 
an agent must know  what  she  is  doing.    Why  isn’t  it  enough  to  one  what  one  intends  to  be  doing,  
or is trying to do, whatever actually happens?  
Even those who are inclined to take the role of cognition in action more seriously tend to 
find  Anscombe’s  own  account  of  it  far  too  naïve.    For  not  only  does  Anscombe  argue  that  one  
must have knowledge of her own actions, she also claims that such knowledge must be non-
observational and non-inferential.  In fact, she goes so far as to say that it must have no 
evidential ground whatsoever.  But what sort of knowledge of actions—of material events that 
unfold in time, out there in the world—could have no evidential, observational, or inferential 
ground?  With what conceivable right would we call such a judgment of things outside oneself 
knowledge at all?  The consensus in the literature is that Anscombe is far too sanguine about our 
ability to know what we do.  Whatever epistemology of action we come up with, surely it should 
be far more modest.  We do not need to turn ourselves into omniscient beings just to explain 
action.145        
                                                 
144 See  Davidson  (1980,  50),  where  he  famously  argues  that  “A  man  may  be  making  ten  carbon  copies  as  he  writes,  
and  this  may  be  intentional;;  yet  he  may  not  know  that  he  is;;  all  he  knows  is  that  he  is  trying.”     Though Davidson 
thinks that an agent must know the description under which he acts, this description does not necessarily ick out the 
action itself, but rather that which the agent intends or is trying to do.  Others who deny any necessary connection 
between knowledge and action on similar grounds are Donnellan (1963), Searle (1983, 90), Bratman (1987, 37-8), 
Newstead (2006, 183-187), and Paul (2009, 4-9). 
145 Again,  Kieran  Setiya  nicely  sums  up  the  consensus  view.    He  writes,  “If  there  is  a  connection  between  doing  
intentionally and knowledge or belief that one is doing ,  it  cannot  be  as  simple  as  Anscombe  takes  it  to  be.”  (2011,  
172).  Setiya himself backs away from the necessity of knowledge claims, and settles upon the necessity of a certain 
kind of belief (this is somewhat straightforward for him, as on his account intentions just are motivating beliefs that 
cause actions).  Setiya also backs away from the claim that we know our actions, full stop.  Instead, he opts for 
necessary   belief   about   “basic   action descriptions.”      David   Velleman,   the   other   prominent   “cognitivist”   about  
intentional  actions,  settles  for  a  claim  with  the  form  of  a  statistical  generalization:  we  “almost  always”  know  what  
we are doing and why we are doing it.  See Velleman (1985, 36).  It might be wondered, though, if the connection 
between knowledge and action is nothing more than a contingent statistical correlation, why we should treat it is a 
topic for philosophical inquiry in the first place.         
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In what follows, I am going to defend the knowledge requirement.  I agree with 
Anscombe that so long as one does not know she is A-ing, she cannot be A-ing intentionally.  
But in order to defend this claim, it must be re-stated.  For it is not merely a knowledge 
requirement that Anscombe is after, but a practical knowledge requirement.  We are led down 
the wrong path if we think that the knowledge is specified because it is non-observational, non-
inferential, or non-evidential.146  The sort of knowledge that interests her cannot be specified in 
terms of some distinguishing mark.  For that cannot explain many other features of it, such as 
that (1) when it fails, the mistake is not in the judgment, but in the performance; (2) the 
contradiction of a statement of this knowledge is not a contrary statement of fact, but the doing 
of an action whose intention contradicts it; (3) that the knowledge is comprehended only to the 
extent  that  practical  reasoning  is;;  and  (4)  that  it  is  “the  cause  of  what  it  understands.”147    
So we should not be distracted by the supposedly special marks of knowledge of action.  
What generically divides the knowledge we have of our own actions is that it is practical 
knowledge.  It is because the knowledge is practical that it is non-observational, non-evidential, 
and much else besides.  But it is precisely this fact, that the knowledge is formally distinct that 
philosophers  of   action  have,  by  and   large,   failed   to  comprehend  about  her  view.     Anscombe’s  
diagnosis of the failure is disquieting.  She asks: 
Can it be that there is something that modern philosophy has 
blankly misunderstood: namely, what ancient and medieval 
philosophers meant by practical knowledge?  Certainly in modern 
philosophy we have an incorrigibly contemplative conception of 
knowledge.  Knowledge must be something that is judged as such 
                                                 
146 Rosalind Hursthouse (2009: 97) is  one  of  many  commentators  who  argues  that  Anscombe’s  notion  of  practical  
knowledge  is  “special  in  virtue  of  being  non-observational.”    Kieran  Setiya  (2008:  389)  and  Hannah  Pickard  (2004:  
218), meanwhile, argue that it is distinctive in being non-inferential.  Velleman (1989: 30-42) argues that both traits 
are distinctive of practical knowledge, whereas John Gibbons (2010) takes the real issue at stake in understanding 
practical knowledge to be our privileged access to its object.  All of these authors share the supposition that once we 
explain why this knowledge must be described in terms of one of these putatively special features, the knowledge 
we have of our own actions will thereby be explained.   147 (2000, 87). 
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by being in accordance with the facts.  The facts, reality, are prior, 
and dictate what is to be said, if it is knowledge.  And this is the 
explanation of the utter darkness in which we have found 
ourselves.148   
We  find  ourselves  in  “utter  darkness”  about  the  nature  of  action,  Anscombe  suggests,  because  we  
simply cannot fathom that there is any other way for an agent to know her own action—or 
anything else, for that matter—except by making a judgment about it that is in accordance with 
the facts, where the facts can be determined according to some measure wholly external to the 
agent’s  will.    This  assumes  that  we  can  apply  a  general  understanding  of  knowledge  to  a  special  
subject matter, actions.  This is not, Anscombe maintains, what ancient and medieval 
philosophers were talking about when they referred to practical knowledge.   
When we remain within this contemplative framework of knowledge, the mistake we 
make is to assume that there are some independently accessible facts about what an agent is 
doing   intentionally,   and   thus   a   ground,   completely   independent   of   the   agent’s   own will, for 
determining the proper specification of the action.  Anscombe denies that there could be any 
such independent ground, or any such independently accessible facts.  In order to see why she 
would deny this, we must return to the question that exercises Anscombe: What sort of event is 
an intentional action? 
5.2 A FORM OF DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS 
Anscombe says that an intentional action is an event to which a certain question is given 
application by the agent to whom it is posed.  If practical knowledge is essential to understanding 
the general form of this event, then we should expect that an account of it will be related to an 
                                                 148 (2000, 57). 
104 
understanding  of  this  question’s  sense,  and  thus  the  grounds  of  the  question’s  proper  application.    
And indeed, Anscombe connects the two in just this way.  She writes, 
In the case of practical knowledge, the exercise of the capacity is 
nothing but the doing or supervising of the operations of which a 
man has practical knowledge; but this is not just the coming about 
of certain effects  …  for  what he effects is formally characterized as 
subject  to  our  question  ‘Why?’  whose  application  displays  the  A-D 
order which we discovered.149 
Not just any event or effects are subject to this question, but only those that come to be through a 
capacity for practical knowledge.  And such an event is formally characterized as subject to the 
practical   reason   sense   of   the   ‘Why?’   question,   whose   application   to   the   event   manifests   the  
practical order that defines it.  
This is related to her remarks from the previous section, where she says it is wrong to 
think   that   ‘intentional’   describes   an   extra   property   or   feature   we   can   always   attribute   to  
intentional actions, thereby differentiating them from unintentional actions.  Instead, she argues 
that  “the  concept  ‘intentional’  has  reference  to  a  form  of  description of  events,”  whose  general  
characterization  is  that  of  the  “execution  of  intentions.”150  An action is an event whose general 
form is described as the execution of intentions.  But this raises the obvious question: What is a 
form of description of events?   
Anscombe has surprisingly little to say in the way of an explanation of this terminology.  
In   order   to   understand   what   she   means,   it   is   helpful   to   return   to   Anscombe’s   earlier,   more  
intuitive idea that when  we  act  intentionally,  we  necessarily  act  “under  a  description.”    Her  idea  
is that we act under particular, specifiable action descriptions, and further, that we accept or 
reject  the  ‘Why?’  question  under  those  same  descriptions.    This  means  that  the  ‘Why?’  question  
can only be posed when the questioner has some antecedent sense of what the agent she 
                                                 149 (2000, 88), emphasis added.   150 (2000, 86). 
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addresses is doing.  For if I have no idea that you are A-ing, then I obviously cannot ask you why 
you are A-ing.  So there must be some description of what you’re  up  to  that  I  can  articulate  in  
order  to  ask  you  why  it  is  you’re  up  to  that.  And this is how it is in the normal course of things, 
even if the only one of bodily movements like the raising of an arm.151     
So  the  ‘Why?’  question  is  posed  under  a  specific description, and it is granted or refused 
application under that very same description.  This is one way into seeing the importance of one 
of the central assumptions of Intention,  which  is  that  “to  call  an  action  intentional  is  to  say  it  is  
intentional  under  some  description  that  we  give  (or  could  give)  of  it.”152  For, in doing anything 
intentionally I am always doing many things at once,153 which means that one and the same 
action can have many descriptions that are true descriptions of what happens, though not all of 
them (or even most of them) will refer to what happens qua intentional action. 
For  example,  it  may  be  true  that  I  am  ‘sawing  a  plank’,  but  of  course  my  doing  this  will  
also   involve   my   doing   much   else   besides,   such   as:   ‘sawing   an   oak’,   ‘sawing   one   of   Smith’s  
planks’,   ‘making   a   squeaky   noise   with   the   saw’,   ‘creating   a   pile   of   sawdust   on   the   floor’,  
‘disturbing   the  cat’,   ‘wearing  down  the  blade’,   ‘moving  such-and-such  muscles’,  and  so  on  ad 
infinitum.  But amidst this whirl of effects I am clearly bringing about, there is something that I 
can legitimately pick out and call my intentional action, those effects that I bring about 
intentionally.   
                                                 151 Or   the   lack  of   such  movements.     Consider,   “Why  are   you   just   sitting there?”   asked  by   someone  who  clearly  
expects you to be doing something rather than nothing. 152 (2000, 29). 153 This is true even of so-called  “basic  actions,”  like  raising  my  arm.    For  it  is  true  of  the  man  who  raises  his  arm  
that  he  is  also,  at  the  same  time,  ‘flexing  such-and-such  muscles,’  ‘moving  such-and-such  particles  about,’  ‘causing  
his shirt sleeve to move  up  his  arm,’  and  so  on.    The  idea  that  there  is  one  description  that  is  the  privileged  “basic  
action description”  typically  depends  upon  an  unprincipled  specification  of  what  really  counts  as  “basic.” 
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The  ‘Why?’  question  is  supposed  to  be  the  device  that  reveals  “the  order  there  is  in  this  
chaos.”154  It reveals the order among all these effects by showing us which descriptions the 
agent is willing to accept as descriptions of what she is doing.  An agent might give a true 
response  to  “Why  are  you  sawing  a  plank?”  (I’m  making  a  tree  house  for  little  Suzy), while not 
having  a   true   response   to   the  question  posed  under  other  descriptions,   like   ‘making  a   squeaky  
noise’  or  ‘disturbing  the  cat.’    Of  course,  an  inability  to  apply  the  question  to  these  descriptions  
does not show that she is not doing those things, for anyone with eyes can see that she is.  It 
merely shows that she is not doing them intentionally.155   
I  think  what  Anscombe  is  trying  to  articulate  with  this  locution  “under  a  description”  is  
the distinctive intentionality of actions, or that formal aspect under which the agent grasps the 
manifold of what is happening before her as related to herself as an object of her own will.156  If 
intentional actions are objects of will, and are apprehended under the formal aspect that defines 
this power, then there is no explanation of an intentional action that does not appeal to that 
power.157  Moreover, any particular description of what happens will be an intentional 
description (i.e., will pick out what happens as the intentional action) if it can be brought under a 
                                                 154 (2000, 80). 155 Even Davidson argued that we must have knowledge of the intentional descriptions of our own bodily 
movements,  at  a  minimum.  (1980:  50)    Of  course,  he  also  famously  thinks  that  what  happens  beyond  the  body  is  “up  
to  nature”  and  we  could  not  necessarily  have  knowledge  of  that.  
156 To  speak  of  “intentionality”  here,  I  mean  to  refer  to  an  intentional  object,  or  object  of  a  specific  power.    This  in  in  
keeping  with  Anscombe’s remarks  at   the  beginning  of  a   later  paper,  “The  Intentionality  of  Sensation”,  where   she  
argues   that   her   “under   a   description”   locution is meant to characterize intentional objects as such.  She writes, 
“‘Intentional’  in  these  contexts  is  often  spelt  with  an  ‘s’.    This  was  an  idea  of  Sir  William  Hamilton’s;;  he  wanted  to  
turn  the  old  logical  word  ‘intention’ into one that looked more  like  ‘extension’.    I  prefer  to  keep  the  older  spelling  
with  two  t’s.    For  the  word  is  the  same  as  the  one  in  common  use  in  connection  with  action.”  (1981:  4).    While  the  
use  of  ‘intentionality’  here  is  common  to  actions  and  other  intentional  objects,  it is important to note that this use is 
distinct  from  that  when  we  say  ‘intentional’  action,  as  this  is  defined  in  particular  by  its  relationship  to  a  capacity  of  
practical reason and will, while the former, broader sense, clearly is not.        
157 Moran (2004: 54-55) comes fairly close to this view, it seems to me, though he will not draw the same 
conclusions as I will from it, in part because he does not take seriously enough the idea that a capacity for practical 
knowledge produces its own intentional objects (i.e., actions), which have no intelligibility independent of its 
exercise.       
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general form of description of events—viz., that form of events which can generally be 
characterized  as  an  object  of  the  agent’s  own  will.   
Anscombe’s  use  of  intentionality  is,  then,  closer  to  the  Scholastics  than  our  own.    As  an  
illustration of what she could mean, consider how the scholastics thought that an object of sight 
is intentionally related to our capacity of sight: something is an object of sight only insofar as it 
is cognized under the formal aspect of its being colored, and not in virtue of any of its other 
properties or qualities.  Therefore, some specific material object comes to be cognized through a 
capacity of sight, but not in virtue of its other, non-colored aspects.   
For example, suppose I see a red cardinal in my backyard.  I can see its color, shape, and 
size, among other things.  But I cannot see that it smells musky, or that it feels soft, or that the 
song it is singing sounds beautiful.158  And so, while there are many descriptions of the bird that 
are perfectly true of it, only some of these can be given as descriptions of what I can see.   
Likewise, what can be known as an object of will is known according to its own formal 
intentional character, and what can be an intentional object of this power is also related to it 
under this specific formal aspect.  On my reading of Intention, intentional descriptions of an 
action are those that are related to a power of will by being those descriptions that are known 
under the formal aspect of the universal good.159  It follows that intentional actions are the 
intentional objects of a power of will.  Indeed, this is what makes the notion of intentionality 
applicable to the concept of action in the first place.160  
                                                 158 I might be able to infer these things from what I see, if I have enough empirical knowledge about cardinals, but I 
am speaking about direct cognition of the object itself as an object of that power.   159 In the following sections, I argue that this formal aspect is that of the good. 
160 I  take  this  to  be  the  upshot  of  her  remark  that,  “The  very  same human proceedings may be questioned under the 
description  ‘X’  (‘Why are you X-ing?’)  and  under  the  description  ‘Y’  (‘Why  are  you  Y-ing?’),  and  the  first  question  
be admitted application while the second is refused it, so that the very same proceedings are intentional under one 
description and unintentional under another.  It is clear that a concept for which this does not hold is not a concept of 
intention.”  (2000,  30). And  again,  see  her  remarks  in    “The  Intentionality  of  Sensations.”(1981, 4)     
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With   this   understanding   of   Anscombe’s   terminology   in   place,   we   are   in   a   position   to 
articulate (at least in a general and provisional way), what an intentional action is.  An intentional 
action is an event that is formally distinctive in that it is susceptible to a certain form of 
explanation.  Let us call this explanation by practical knowledge.      The   ‘Why?’   question   is  
supposed to show us which particular descriptions of what happens can be characterized as 
objects of practical knowledge.  An object of practical knowledge is an object of will.   
This explains why Anscombe says that the term  ‘intentional’  does  not  pick  out  a  property  
or  condition  that  an  action  must  meet.    Rather,  it  characterizes  a  “form  of  description  of  events,”  
events  of  the  sort  that  can  only  be  explained  by  an  appeal  to  the  agent’s  own  practical  reason  and  
will, because they can only come to be through the joint exercise of our capacity for practical 
reason and will.  We do not understand what an intentional action is unless we understand how 
what happens can be brought under this special form of explanation by the same agent who 
brings that event into being.161  Then we can see that practical knowledge is necessary for 
intentional action explanation because without it, there simply is no intentional action at all.    
                                                 
161 If this account can work, then we will not explain actions by appealing to the propositional content of privileged 
mental states.  This is important, because the “guise  of  the  good”  thesis  is  typically  formulated  in  just  this  way,  and  
the arguments against it typically involve a denial that the propositional contents in question need to make any 
reference to the goodness of what is done.  This is what leads Stocker (1979, 738-53), Watson (1982, 205-20), 
Velleman (2000, 99-122), and Setiya (2010, 82-110) to suppose that the claim that in acting intentionally, we act 
“under  the  guise  of  the  good”,  is  meant  to  be  a  claim  about  the need for a positive evaluative judgment of or belief 
about  one’s action.  Specifically, that in taking something to be my reason for acting, I take it to be a good reason, 
where  “taking”  here  is  cashed  out in terms of the propositional content of one of my beliefs.  Raz (2009, 11-117), for 
example, appears to hold such a view.  This is not a view I wish to defend.    
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5.3 EXPLANATION BY PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE 
5.3.1 Actions Are Motions  
A careful reader of Intention will  notice  that  the  ‘Why?’  question  is  almost  always  posed  under  a  
description in the present progressive.162  This is no accident.  Action is motion.  Once begun, an 
action is in progress towards a specifiable term of completion.  Any action may be interrupted or 
interfered with, and remain incomplete or unfinished.  For any action we can speak of a term of 
completion that can mark the transition in our thought from imperfective to perfective—from 
doing A (or A-ing) to having done or completed a (A-ed) successfully.       
In   language  we  capture   this  sense  of   ‘being  under  way’   in   judgments   formulated   in   the  
present progressive. And so it is no accident that Anscombe formulates her action descriptions in 
just this way. On her account, the canonical form of a representation of an intentional action is of 
something in progress and so not yet complete: X is doing A (Michael is writing the word 
‘action’,  John  is  drinking  a  cup  of  tea,  Steve  is  riding  his  bike  to  the  Cathedral).163    
                                                 162 (2000, 11-12, 30, 35, 38-40, 84-85).  The philosophical importance of this is discussed at length in Thompson 
(2008, Part Two). 163 As  Michael  Thompson   has   noted   in   his   essay,   “Anscombe’s   Intention and  Practical  Knowledge”   (2011,   198-
210),  one  remarkable  difference  between  Anscombe  and  Davidson’s  theory  of  action  is  that  in  Anscombe  all  of  her  
examples are formulated in the present progressive, whereas Davidson prefers the past perfective.  This is no minor 
difference, and the implications of one choice over another are profound.  Davidson takes his topic to be things that 
are already done or completed; this is why he thought he could give a theory of actions that quantified over events, 
of things that were completed or finished.   For Anscombe, on the other hand, actions are things that are in progress 
or under way, and so they might be interrupted and remain incomplete.  But even if my action is interrupted, it is 
still true that I was doing an action of a specific kind, on a particular occasion, at a particular moment, and in a 
particular way.  I was still engaged in a particular act of walking to school, for example,  even if I never actually 
arrived there.   
Now, Michael Thompson argues that actions as individuals or particulars only properly applies to what has been 
completed; there was no particular action of walking to school, he argues, if Jones never actually made it there.  So 
Thompson denies that, qua particulars, we necessarily have knowledge of our own actions.  Rather, he argues that 
we necessarily have knowledge of what we are doing, and this is not knowledge of a particular, but knowledge of 
the general act type that is in the process of being realized by me on a particular occasion.  What motivates 
Thompson to say this is the simple truth that a particular action, in all its excruciating particular detail, cannot be 
known in that detail until the action has been completed in just that particular way, because there is, as yet, no 
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Its essentially progressive character distinguishes the representation of an action from the 
representation of something as being in a changeable state, whose canonical form is: X is F (the 
chalk is white, the tea is hot, the spokes are rusty).  In a judgment of stative predication one joins 
a subject under a contrast of past and present tense: a subject either is in/was in/or will be in a 
certain state at a certain time. By contrast, our judgments of actions display not only contrasts of 
tense but also aspect.  When something is represented in the progressive—that is, with 
imperfective aspect—it is represented as presently occurring and incomplete: X is A-ing.  A 
judgment with perfective aspect, on the other hand, represents its object as completed or 
finished: X A-ed (or X did A). 
As Anscombe herself noted, a progressive judgment (X is A-ing) may be true while the 
corresponding perfective judgment (X A-ed) is false.164  For instance, if there was a time when it 
was  true  to  say  that  ‘Steve  is  riding  his  bike  to  the  Cathedral  of  Learning’,  this  can  be  compatible  
with  the  corresponding  perfective  judgment’s  being  false  at  a   later  time—say, when the papers 
reveal that he never managed to get there, having been clipped by a bus on Fifth Avenue at 3pm.  
No matter  Steve’s  fate,  it  is  nevertheless  true  to  say  that  there  was  a  time  at  which  the  statement  
‘Steve  is  riding  to  the  Cathedral’  was  true,  and  so  true  quite  generally  that  ‘Steve  was  riding  to  
the  Cathedral’,  though  it  was  at  no  time  true  that  ‘Steve  rode  to  the  Cathedral.’     
                                                                                                                                                             
particular way that it has been completed.  And unless it has been completed, there is no determinate particular way 
that it has been done.  All this seems true,  but   I  don’t   think   it  should   lead  us   to  deny   that  practical  knowledge   is  
knowledge of a particular event that is under way, even if, qua particular, it is not yet complete.  Nor do I think we 
should deny that there was a particular action of walking to school if it happened to remain incomplete.  Just because 
an  action   is  interrupted  doesn’t  mean  that  it  can’t  be  a  particular  action   that   is   interrupted,  and  that  we  can’t  have  
knowledge of it as such.  Moreover, not every particular detail is relevant to the sort of knowledge that interests 
Anscombe,   nor   to   the   idea   of   intentional   descriptions   quite   generally.      For   example,   in   “The   Intentionality of 
Sensation”  she  writes,   “the  descriptions  under  which  you   intend  what  you  do  can  be  vague,   indeterminate.      (You  
mean to put the book down on the table all right, and you do so, but you do not mean to put it down anywhere in 
particular on the table—though you do put it down somewhere  in  particular).”  (1981,  4).  And this seems true of all 
things  we  know  as   intentional  objects.         Just  as  any  perceiver,   in  seeing   that   ‘it   is   snowing’,  does  not  necessarily  
know how many snowflakes she sees, or their exact size or shape, or all sorts of particular details that do not figure 
in her judgment of what she is seeing, here and now; likewise, all that an agent needs to know in order to know her 
own particular action as it unfolds are the general descriptions that specify what she is up to. 164 (2000, 37).   
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What this contrast between perfective and imperfective aspect shows is that the 
representation of action includes a principle of temporal unity—a principle that is supplied by the 
term of completion that is implicit in every progressive judgment.  This captures the simple truth 
that an action is either under way or already complete.  In either case, we must be able to specify 
a term of completion that can underwrite this transition in our thought from imperfective to 
perfective.  It follows that a notion of temporal duration is essential to the representation of 
action, as it is to any motion or change.165     
What is of most significant for our purposes here is the fact that in making a progressive 
judgment our thought necessarily reaches ahead into an already specified future: our 
representation   that   X   is   doing  A   depends   upon   a   corresponding   representation   of   X’s   having  
done A, and non-accidentally so.  It is my conception of the completion of the movement that 
governs my understanding of what is happening, here and now.  The representation of something 
in progress includes a principle of temporal unity that is supplied by a term of completion.166  
These (admittedly cursory) reflections upon the contrast between perfective and 
imperfective judgment show that it is a condition on the possibility of specifying a happening 
that is in progress as one particular instance of a general kind that one have knowledge of the 
point of completion or end towards which what is presently occurring is an instance of a non-
accidental progression towards. Knowledge of this limit is logically or conceptually prior to any 
                                                 
165 This is not true of stative predication.  Being in a changeable state does not imply a beginning, middle, or end.  
Of course, there may be degrees of being thirsty (I may be less thirsty after a sip of water), but there are not stages or 
parts of it, nor is there anything that counts as being done or finished with being thirsty, just as there is no sense to 
be made of being on the way to thirsty.  There is only being F or ceasing to be F.   
166 Contrast this with the representation of something as being in a changeable state. The representation of something 
as being F does not contain within itself this reference to a point of completion.  A mere representation of something 
as in a certain state does not, in and of itself, contain the materials for a conception of how long F will remain in that 
state, nor does it contain within itself a representation of what will follow it (at least, this is not contained within the 
logical concept of a state itself, but necessarily lies outside it.  This is compatible with its being no accident that 
something in particular remains F for a given period of time—say, that John remains thirsty so long as he is in a 
state of dehydration—but this will always be due to the real nature of the subject of which the state is predicated, 
and has nothing to do with the concept of a state itself).  The representation of something as in a state contains 
within itself no principle of temporal unity.  See Sebastian Rödl (2007, 30).  
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recognition of something as a part or phase of what is progressing towards it.  There is no such 
thing as progression in abstracto, but only progression towards something specific that is not yet 
complete.167    
The progression of the motion of a living thing contains more than a temporal order; the 
motions and changes that a living thing undergoes or initiates contain a natural order, and the 
explanation of them necessarily makes reference to the life form as such.  This is what Michael 
Thompson notices in his discussion of the activity of living organisms.  Take a basic vital 
activity, such as mitosis.  Thompson notices that 
It may be happening here, under the microscope, in an amoeba; 
and there in a human being.  In the first case, an event of this type 
will of course be a phase in a  process of reproduction—one of the 
forms of generation available to that kind of thing.  But in the case 
of the human it will rather be a part of growth or self-maintenance; 
reproduction is another matter, and has another matter, among 
humans.  The distinction between the two cases of mitosis is not 
discovered by a more careful scrutiny of the particular cells at 
issue[…]168 
Thompson’s  point  is  that  if  we  stay  at  the  level  of  mere matter and do not take into account that 
for the sake of which the process itself unfolds, then we will not really know what sort of 
movement is taking place, because we will not know the end towards which it is currently 
progressing.  In a living thing, the end determines what any presently occurring movement is.  
For this reason, we say that everything a plant or animal does—every operation of every one of 
its powers—is for the sake of a single end, the exemplification of its own form.  When the 
sunflower grows towards the sun, when it sinks its roots into the earth, when its cells split up and 
                                                 
167 This is not just a statement about our judgments or concepts.  Action is just one instance of motion or change.  A 
motion is an imperfective happening that takes place between points or states of rest (non-motion).  Motion is, by 
definition, something that is under way, developing, or progressing, and thus something that is not yet complete, 
finished, resolved or done (once it ceases to be done, it ceases to be a motion).  Motion is a move in reality from 
imperfective to perfective, and our judgments capture this.   168 Thompson (2008, 55). 
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divide in such-and-such a way, all of these activities occur for the sake of a sunflower life 
coming to be and remaining in being.  
Like all representations of something in progress, the representation of an intentional 
action also contains within it a principle of temporal unity such that a non-accidentally specified 
point of completion necessarily governs an understanding of what is presently happening.  And 
like all living things, the representation of intentional action in a human being contains within it 
a principle of natural unity such that the natural end—the life form as such—necessarily governs 
an understanding of what is presently happening.  
In order to represent something as an intentional action that is in progress, one must have 
knowledge of the end that governs any particular action, but also the end that governs all 
subordinate ends: the life form as such.  The appeal to temporality does not contain within it the 
conceptual   resources   to   explain   this.         To   represent   an   action   in   one’s   own   practical   thought,  
however, is more than to represent some change that is in progress, and so it requires more than 
knowledge of the end that explains what is presently unfolding.   And that is because the way we 
know our own actions is fundamentally different from the way that we know other kinds of 
happenings that are presently in progress.  It is not enough just to be able to say that I understand 
what I am doing now in light of that towards which I am non-accidentally progressing.  After all, 
I may be able to see that I am non-accidentally progressing down the street at an alarming rate, 
because someone has put me in a cart and given it a good kick.  In such a case, I know that I am 
hurtling down the street, and that because of this I am going to crash into the wall at the bottom 
of the hill.  But certainly the way I know my own action is not at all like that.  And so a 
progressive form of representation of events is not yet a practical form.  All that the canonical 
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progressive representation of action tells us is something we took for granted all along: an action 
is an event, and thus a kind of motion or change.169  But this is not what is distinctive of them.  
5.3.2 Actions Contain a Rational Order 
Frege argued that thoughts are structured; they are articulate unities or orders.170  To 
grasp a thought must involve a rational appreciation of this unity or order, as this is what 
constitutes the thought as a thought.  Anscombe argued for a similar thesis with respect to action.  
To do something intentionally just is to realize an order or unity that is specifically practical, an 
order that is just as internal to the action itself as an order is internal to thought for Frege.  In this 
section, I argue that the order of action is a practical, teleological order: a unity of means to 
ends.171   Therefore, a representation of action is of a practically progressive form of events.  
The conclusion that intentional actions do have an internal, means-end rational order is 
supposed  to  be  demonstrated  by  Anscombe’s  famous  example  in  which  a  man  is  replenishing  the  
water supply of a house in order to poison the wicked Nazis who inhabit it.  According to her 
example, there is a man who is moving his arm up and down repeatedly (doing A), in order to 
operate a pump (doing B), which he does in order to replenish the house water supply (doing C), 
which he does in order to poison the inhabitants of the house (doing D).  These four actions 
(themselves  each   intentional)   form  a  series  of  nested  practical   rationalizations:   I’m  doing  A   in  
                                                 
169 This   makes   trouble   for   all   those   who   seek   to   explain   actions   in   terms   of   “propositional   attitudes”,   since   the  
essentially progressive form of the representation of action resists being captured in a propositional form.  For a 
more detailed argument to this effect, see Thompson(2008, 127-128), and Boyle and Lavin (2010, 170-174).   
170 See  Frege  (1997),  especially  “Thought”  and  “Concept and  Object.” 
171 It  is  tempting  to  want  to  call  this  an  “instrumental”  or  even  a  “calculative”  order,  but  I  think  we  should  resist  this,  
as it tends to import with it ideas about practically reasoning as essentially instrumental or calculative that I would 
reject.  Though I will do not have the space here to defend this view, I also reject the thought that the means-end 
order of action is likewise always an instrumental structure.    
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order  to  do  B;;  I’m  doing  B  in  order  to  do  C;;  I’m  doing  C  in  order  to  do  D.    The  ‘Why?’  question  
applies to each part of the action as we move up in the series:  
“Why  are  you  moving  your  arm  up  and  down?” 
“In  order  to  pump.” 
 “Why  are  you  pumping?” 
“In  order  to  replenish  the  house  water  supply.” 
“Why  are  you  replenishing  the  house  water  supply?” 
“In  order  to  poison the  inhabitants.”     
This  example  shows  us  that  the  ‘Why?’  question  is  typically  a  solicitation  of  what  one’s  end  is  in  
doing  whatever  one  is  presently  up  to.    And,  as  we’ve  seen,  the  end  is  itself  always  a  part  of  what  
is done at any stage.  For pumping his arms up and down, here and now, just is poisoning the 
inhabitants, because it is the means by which this man is currently attaining that end.    
This   is  further  evidenced  by  the  fact   that   the  series  of  ‘Why?’  questions  from  A-D also 
corresponds to a series  of  ‘How?’  questions  when  looked  at  in  the  reverse  order,  from  D-A.  So, 
looked at the other way around, we might ask our pumper:  
“How  are  you  poisoning  the  inhabitants?” 
“By  replenishing  the  house  water  supply.” 
“How  are  you  replenishing  the  house  water  supply?” 
“By  pumping  water.” 
“How  are  you  pumping  the  water?” 
“By  moving  my  arm  up  and  down  in  this  way,  which  operates  the  pump.”     
This shows that he knows how doing what he currently does is a means to achieving his end. 
Now,   one’s   ability   to   answer   both   questions,   ‘Why?’   and   ‘How?’   depends   upon   one’s  
ability  to  answer  a  corresponding  question  that  is  logically  prior  to  either  of  them:  “What are you 
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doing?”    For  one  must  obviously  know  what  one  is  up  to  in  order  to  be  in  a  position  to  answer  
either a  ‘Why?’  question  or  a  ‘How?’  question  with  respect  to  any  part  of  his  action.    So  the  very  
asking   of   the   ‘Why?’   question   presupposes   that   an   agent   knows  what   she   is   doing.172  More 
specifically, presupposes she knows the description of her action under which the question is 
posed, in part because she knows how that description relates to something else she is trying to 
attain.    And  if  she  didn’t  know  this,  the  question  would  be  refused  application.     
This  shows  that  the  ‘Why?’  question  elicits  a  response  about what one is presently doing 
as a means to doing something else, the end in doing it.   What looks like a means from one point 
in the chain will look like an end from another; everything depends on whether we are 
progressing upwards or downwards along the chain.  But these three questions—‘What?’,  
‘Why?’,  and  ‘How?’—are what help us to determine what is a means from what perspective, and 
likewise, what is an end.  This demonstrates, once again, the intimate connection between 
practical knowledge and the practical sense of the question that Anscombe seeks to articulate.  
Now, if actions are constituted by a means-end order, we should have a general account 
of what it is to represent such an order in any of its particular instantiations.173  Michael 
Thompson has given such a general account.  He argues that whenever two actions are related as 
means and end, the end is always what is represented in our thought as what is presently 
                                                 
172 Anscombe   does   not   dwell   on   the   necessity   of   “know-how”   or   practical skill in her book, though she does 
acknowledge that it must necessarily be in the background.  At the end of her discussion of practical knowledge, she 
writes,  “Although  the  term  ‘practical  knowledge’  is  most  often  used  in  connexion  with  specialized  skills, there is no 
reason  to  think  that  this  notion  has  application  only  in  such  contexts.    ‘Intentional  action’  always  presupposes  what  
might  be  called  ‘knowing  one’s  way  about’  the  matters  described  in  the  description  under  which  an  action  can  be  
called intentional,  and  this  knowledge  is  exercised  in  action  and  is  practical  knowledge.”  (2000, 87). 
173 It is important to note that there is not one, single means-end order that can make up a human action.  The way 
that a virtuous action relates to its end, for example, is not something that I will discuss here, but I should like to 
note that it is no less a means-end order, and it stands no less in need of a philosophical account.  The A-D order of 
action that Anscombe discusses—and is my topic here—is that which is most basic to a capacity of will, if we take 
this to be a capacity to order my activity in accordance with the general concepts of means and ends.  So what I am 
suggesting   here   is   not   an   “instrumentalism”   about   practical   reason,   or   even   a   wholly   instrumental conception of 
action.  What I am suggesting, however, is that the A-D order of action is primitive, or fundamental.  Some chains 
must begin.       
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incomplete or unfinished.  So, if some instance of a concept of doing A is to figure in thought as 
a means, with some instance of a concept of doing B as an end, then the latter must in principle 
figure   in   the   past   imperfective   judgment   ‘X   was   doing   B,’   or   in   the   present   imperfective  
judgment  ‘X  is  doing  B.’  What  a  representation  of  something as an end cannot do is figure in the 
past  perfective  judgment  that  ‘X  did  B’  or  ‘X  B-ed’    For  once  one  has  attained,  completed  or  is  
finished  with  doing  B,  it  can  no  longer  count  as  an  end  towards  which  one  is  progressing  in  one’s  
present action.  So   the  content  of   the  present   tense   imperfective   judgment,   ‘X   is  doing  B’  can  
only  explain  that  of  the  present  tense  imperfective  judgment,  ‘X  was  doing  A,’  or  that  of  the  past  
tense  perfective  judgment  ‘X  did  A.’    This  yields  the  following  temporal  schema of the order of 
action: if X is doing A in the service of doing B, then doing A must non-accidentally advance the 
progress of B, which is at present incomplete.174   
For example, suppose that in flipping a switch in order to turn on the light, I also make a 
clicking sound; and suppose I know, antecedently, that the clicking sound will occur. So as I flip 
the switch I know that I am making the sound, and not by observation, inference, or evidence.  
However, because making a clicking sound is not something I do because it is progressing me 
towards turning on the light, it is not a means to my end.  To see this, consider the truth of the 
following counterfactual: If for some reason the sound was rendered inaudible, or just failed to 
occur at all, the representation of my action qua intentional   would   not   change.      I’m   still  
knowingly flipping the switch in order to turn on the light, whether the sound gets made or not.  
Useful   though   it   seems   in   straightforward   cases   like   this,   the   trouble  with  Thompson’s  
formal schema is that considerations of temporality are not enough to capture the representation 
of something as a means or an end.  Taking a means to my end is more than just knowing that 
some doing is non-accidentally progressing me towards something that is presently incomplete.  
                                                 
174 See Thompson (2008, 122-134). 
118 
To see why, it is useful to borrow an example from Michael Bratman.175  Suppose that there is a 
runner who knows that in running a marathon he will thereby wear down his shoes.  Despite the 
fact that he does not want to wear down his shoes (he has no reason to do this, in fact he has 
reasons not to do it), he decides that this is just the price he pays for his sport, and he decides to 
go ahead and run it anyway.  Now, our runner, at the twentieth mile, knows that what he is 
currently doing (i.e., running the marathon) is non-accidentally progressing something else he is 
doing (i.e., wearing down his shoes), which further thing is not yet complete.  It looks as if we 
have  a  case  here  of  an  “explanation  by  imperfective.”176  But surely no one wants to say that his 
running the marathon is a means to his end of wearing down his shoes.  
                                                 
175 Bratman (1987, 123) 
176 It will not help Thompson here to say that on his view the runner is clearly not doing A in order to do  B  (I’m  
running the marathon in order to wear down my shoes) or that he is not doing A because he’s  doing  B  (I’m  running  
this  mile  because  I’m  wearing  down  my  shoes).  It is true that we are clearly supposed  to  think,  by  Thompson’s  own  
lights, that Bratman’s  case  will  not  fit  into  the  general  formula  of  a naïve rationalization.  But my whole point here is 
that we cannot give a philosophical account of why it  doesn’t  fit   it   if  we  only  have  Thompson’s  general temporal 
schema at our disposal, or his account of “explanation  by  imperfective”  in  mind.    The  “because”  and  the  “in  order 
to”  here  clearly   involve  more   than   just   the  notion  of  non-accidental progression towards something that is as yet 
incomplete, and to give a proper account of the work they are doing here, we need to bring in more than the 
temporal unity of an action.  We need to show the unity is specifically practical in its form.  But this is precisely 
what  goes  missing  in  Thompson’s  account. 
To be fair to Thompson, he does recognize that a crucial part of the story must be about the dependence of the action 
on thought—on practical thought and calculation in particular—and that the sort of connection that he is discussion 
is  one  of  “rationalizations.”    But  he  takes  these  notions  for  granted,  and  does  nothing  to  explain  them;;  it  is  a  happy  
coincidence that the examples he chooses illustrate the issues without raising any thorny questions for the reader.  
For instance, in his characterization of the category   of   naïve   rationalizations,   he   writes,   “X’s   doing   A   is   an  
intentional action (proper) under that description just in case the agent can be said truly, to have done something else 
because  he  or   she  was  doing  A”  where   the   “intended   sense  of   “because”   is the one deployed   in   rationalization.”  
(2008, 112)    But  as  Bratman  style  cases  show  us,  all  the  work  is  contained  in  what  we  mean  by  this  “because”  and  
what  sort  of  thing  can  fit  under  “doing  A.”      Thompson seems to think that he can leave questions about practical 
knowledge and practical thought offstage altogether, as if they were elements merely in the background of the true 
account,  which  has  fundamentally  to  do  with  the  temporal  structures  he  articulates.    Thus,  he  writes,  “Of  course,  this  
particular etiological relation of happenings to an imperfective present over-arching process—the relation that 
constitutes the unity of such happenings with one another in an intentional action—cannot be supposed possible 
except  where  an  agent’s  thoughts have come potentially  to  subserve  it.    It  is  plain  that  our  formula  “explanation  by  
the   imperfective”   can   stand   only   as   the   isolation   of   a   genus,   and   that   the   specific   difference   of   straightforward  
rationalization will emerge properly only with its intellectual aspect.  This last, though, is a matter I have put outside 
the scope of the  present  investigation.”  (2008,  133).  What I am arguing here is that insofar as the topic of practical 
judgment and knowledge and its relation to the constitution of the formal representation of means-end structure of 
intentional  action  are  outside  the  scope  of  his  inquiry,  he’s  not  really  doing action theory at all.     
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So  Thompson’s  general,  temporal  schema  cannot  be  the  complete  story,  because  it  does  
not manage to pick out the specific kind of non-accidental unity of an intentional action, nor does 
it show that the representation of the means-end order is specifically practical, rather than merely 
progressive in its form.  To represent doing A as a means to doing B in practical thought is more 
than just to be able to know how doing A non-accidentally advances the progress of doing B,  it 
is to know how doing A is practically necessary to doing B, and the source of such a 
representation could only lie in a self-conscious act of practical reason.  For the sort of causal 
nexus exhibited   in   Anscombe’s   example—between an arm raising, a handle pumping, a 
replenishing of the cistern, and a poisoning of some Nazis—could in principle only be supplied 
by a capacity to rationally determine such an order, as well as a capacity of will to be moved to 
produce the order that has been so determined.  The A-D order of action is practical, then, 
because it comes to be (and could only come to be) through a self-consciously determined act of 
practical reasoning, and a power of will that is moved in accordance with it.  
To  see  this,   let  us  return  to  Anscombe’s  gardener.     He  wants  something  general:   to  kill  
some party chiefs.  This wanting is an act of will; specifically, it is an intention towards some 
end the agent is seeking to attain.  But there are many ways one could set about doing this, and 
the gardener must choose some specific, determinate way of bringing it about.  Now, his choice 
of the means he will take is constrained by many factors: his circumstances (including the 
material resources he has at his disposal), his practical skills, his other ends, needs, desires, and 
so on.  And assuming that he does not kill party chiefs every day, he is going to have to 
deliberate about how best to make the object of his general intention a concrete reality, here and 
now.    Let  us  suppose,  in  keeping  with  Anscombe’s  example,  that  he  wants  to  kill  the  Nazis  in  the  
least conspicuous way, as the last thing he wants to be is a martyr for his cause.  Since he is the 
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house gardener and it is part of his usual job to pump water into the cistern, he decides that the 
best way to get what he wants is to poison the water supply of the house, by pumping water into 
the cistern, which has been contaminated with a deadly cumulative poison, the effects of which 
are unnoticeable until  the  damage  is  irreversible.    This  is  how  he  deems  it  best  to  “polish  that  lot  
off”,   here   and  now.     He  makes   a   practical   judgment   to   do   this   specific   action,   and   his  will   is  
moved accordingly.  In the act of practical judgment—the judgment of choice or decision—the 
end is willed, no longer generally, but through some rationally specified means.  The object of 
this judgment is the whole action: its means-end structure.  His will, being a capacity to be 
moved in accordance with such judgments, is moved accordingly, and straightaway he acts: He 
begins to do whatever is necessary to operate the pump.177 
What I want to stress here is that our gardener could not know that in beginning to 
operate this pump he is killing some Nazis except through a self-conscious determination of his 
own practical reason and will.178  For there is no other way to connect these four action 
concepts—moving a handle up and down, operating a pump, replenishing the house water 
supply, and poisoning some Nazis—together and make them into one single action, except by 
way of a practical judgment that I ought to take these particular means to attain this end, here and 
now, in these circumstances.179  Such a practical judgment reflects what Anscombe called an 
“Aristotelian   necessity.”   That   is,   the judgment that I ought to do A, here and now, is a 
representation of necessity in the sense of the necessity of that which it represents (doing A) on 
                                                 
177 This   “straightaway”   talk   comes   from  Aristotle,   but   it   is   not   meant to mark temporality.  Rather, it meant to 
indicate the end of practical thought and the beginning of the action.   
178 Though my account relies upon an explicit bit of practical deliberation or reasoning, the practical order of an 
action that I have identified does not depend upon a prior act of such deliberation.  Virtue and skill often drive out 
deliberation in favor of an immediate perception of what to do, and my account can accommodate this fact.  I have 
brought out an act of deliberation here to make explicit what is often merely implicit: the rational structure of action.  
This structure is easiest to see when deliberation is explicit. 
179 A full account of practical judgment would relate it to the intrinsic aim of practical reason, and would lay bare its 
different forms.  Such an account, however, lies outside the scope of this chapter.  It is enough for now, I hope, to 
see how actions are related to a potential practical syllogism, as Anscombe suggests.    
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which the attainment of some further good (doing D) depends.  Such a practical judgment is 
necessary precisely because there are many ways to kill some Nazis, just as there are many ways 
to bring about the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth.  If one is to have such intentions at all, one must 
make judgments about the specific means to achieve them. 
A practical judgment  of  the  suitable  means  is  made  in  light  of  one’s  general  conception  
of the good as this bears on what is wanted, here and now, and cannot be made intelligible 
independently of such a conception.  The judgment of means is grounded in considerations that 
go beyond what is contained within the end to which they are ordered.  The determination of 
suitable  means  is  made  taking  one’s  other  ends  (to  which  one’s  present  intentions  are  typically  
related), needs, desires, feelings, circumstances, practical capacities, etc. into consideration.  This 
means  that  the  principle  that  unites  the  parts  or  phases  of  one’s  action  is  more  than  a  principle  of  
knowledge that grounds the temporality of the action; it must be a principle of knowledge of the 
practical necessity of taking these means to a specific end, given all the other practical 
considerations that are in play in a human life. Only an unwarranted empiricist tendency to 
consider  actions  in  isolation  from  the  rest  of  one’s  practical  life  would  make  it  seem  so  natural to 
suppose otherwise.180   
Now,  the  will,  as  a  capacity  for  rational  desires,  is  moved  by  one’s  practical  judgment  of  
specific means, and thus the will is a capacity to bring about what a practical judgment 
represents as necessary to do.  An act of practical judgment supplies the will with an object to 
realize.  Because the will can only seek an object that has been determined by an act of practical 
                                                 
180 The isolationist tendency fits hand in glove with another empiricist tendency, which is to think that the proper 
understanding of practical thought must account for the lowest common denominator between bad and good 
practical thought.  For a paradigm example of this strategy, see Setiya (2007).  I think this strategy rests on a 
vulnerable metaphysical assumption, which is to think that we can specify what practical thought  independently of  
an account of what good practical thought is.  I think that is no more or less mistaken than to think that we can 
specify what a man is in absence from any account of what a good man is.   
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reason (i.e., practical judgment), its object is self-consciously known, because the object of every 
judgment of reason is self-consciously known.  And so it is right to say that the will is a capacity 
of practical knowledge: It tends to actualize an object that is self-consciously known through 
reason’s  own  act  of  judgment  that  is  should  be  so  actualized. 
I have argued that the order of an intentional action is a self-conscious, self-determined 
order of an act of practical reason.  Thus, what is distinctive of the way we know the end in 
practical knowledge is that the source of our knowledge of the end comes from a determination 
of our will through an act of practical judgment.  The end is something known, because the end 
is something intended to be brought about through some specific means; and the means are 
something known, because the means are chosen through an act of practical reasoning.  The sort 
of unity of an intentional action is thus more than a temporal unity of parts and phases—it is a 
practically rational unity of means and ends, ordered to one another for the sake of attaining 
something the agent intends, such as the death of some party chiefs.  This is why Anscombe says 
that practical knowledge—“the  agent’s  knowledge  of  what  he  is  doing”  is  that  which  “gives  the  
description  under  which  what  is  going  on  is  the  execution  of  an  intention.”181  Because whatever 
is known as an object of will or practical knowledge is known either as a means or an end, and 
thus  something  being  done  in  execution  of  the  agent’s  will.    And  to  know  something  as  either  a  
means or an end, is to know it as practically necessary or good.    
We are now in a position to see why an understanding of practical knowledge is 
necessary for an understanding of the guise of the good thesis.  For unless we understand why an 
action is an intentional object of a capacity of practical knowledge, the thesis that agents must 
represent their actions sub ratione boni amounts to nothing more than a claim about the beliefs of 
intentional actors, and a deeply suspicious one at that.  
                                                 181 (2000, 87). 
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5.3.3 Whole Prior to Its Parts 
I have argued that the will, as a capacity for practical knowledge, constitutes the material reality 
of the object it produces, and that the reality it produces has an essentially rational constitution.  
But I have also claimed that intentional actions are all ordered to a single, natural end: the life 
form as such.  But how can something with a rational constitution also have a natural 
constitution?   
One way to begin to see this, I think, is to notice that no part of an intentional action  is 
independently intelligible as a part, aside from an exercise of practical knowledge of the action 
as a whole.  Because an act of a capacity for practical knowledge constitutes the whole action, it 
also constitutes its parts.  Hence, the manner in which a self-conscious act of will, as a capacity 
for practical knowledge, constitutes the material reality of action is analogous to the way that a 
living organism constitutes the material reality of its parts.  
Consider how Aristotle understands the relationship between a living organism and its 
organs or parts.  On his view, the heart would not come to be at all, and certainly would not 
come to be as something that has the function it does—to pump blood—unless it were the 
coming to be of a living organism.  For what a heart is, as a material organ, is determined by the 
specific life form of the organism for the sake of which it comes to be.  In order for the organism 
to come to be, a heart must come to be that pumps blood.  Thus, what it is to be a heart depends 
essentially upon the larger life process for the sake of which it comes to be.  In this sort of 
explanation, the whole is prior to its parts, because of a principle of natural unity—its nature or 
life form.  Indeed, we can go further and say that the whole is the cause of its parts, which are not 
intelligible as parts independent of the whole.   
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Analogously, an intentional action, as a certain kind of material event unfolding in the 
world, can only come to be for the sake of the act of practical reason that determines it as coming 
to be for the sake of a certain end that the will desires.  So unless an agent has, through a 
determination of practical reason, the intention to poison some Nazis, there would be no arm 
moving up and down that came to be for the sake of it.  In intentional action the whole is also 
prior to the explanation of its parts, and the cause of their coming to be as parts—that is, as 
means to a specified end.  So just as the nature of a living organism is the most formal or 
defining element of its material organs or parts in Aristotelian natural philosophy, so the 
intention in acting is the most formal or defining element of the means or parts of an intentional 
human action—of the determination of its very material reality.  And just as there are, strictly 
speaking, no parts or organs at all apart from the living organism in which they function (a dead 
hand, Aristotle tells us, is not really a hand, but just a lump of decomposing material elements), 
so too, there are no independently intelligible intentional actions that stand as parts or means to 
an end apart from an act of will that determines them as means that come into being for the sake 
of  that  end.    A  part  of  an  action  as  means  is  only  intelligible  in  light  of  one’s  knowledge  of  one’s  
end, and the coming to be of some part of an action as a means is only metaphysically possible if 
it is the coming to be for the sake of the end.  And that could only be the case through an act of 
will that is productive of its own object, which as an object of a rational power, must be self-
consciously known.  
To see  this,  let  us  return  to  a  variation  of  Anscombe’s  case  of  the  gardener  who  poisons  
the house water supply. In the second case, Anscombe imagines a slightly different gardener, one 
who replenishes the house water supply with water he knows has been poisoned by someone 
else.  This second, indifferent gardener does not replenish the house water supply in order to kill 
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some   wicked   Nazis;;   he’s   just   doing   his   usual   job   in   the   usual   way.      Of   this   other   gardener,  
Anscombe writes: 
[A]lthough he knows concerning an intentional act of his—for it, 
namely replenishing the house water supply, is intentional by our 
criteria—that it is also an act of replenishing the house water 
supply with poisoned water, it would be incorrect, by our criteria, 
to say that his act of replenishing the house supply with poisoned 
water was intentional.  And I do not doubt the correctness of the 
conclusion; it seems to show that our criteria are rather good.182 
As   Sarah   Paul   has   pointed   out,   Anscombe’s indifferent gardener knows, just as much as the 
original   gardener   did,   that   ‘poisoning   the   inhabitants   of   the   house’   is   a   true   description   of   his  
action.183  But I think Paul is wrong to argue that it must be an intentional description, and for 
precisely the   reason   that   the   indifferent   gardener   rejects   the   ‘Why?’   question   under   the  
description   “Why   are   you  poisoning   the   inhabitants?”      “I   didn’t   care   about   that”   the   gardener  
snarls  in  response.    “I  just  wanted  to  do  my  usual  job.”    He  does  not  give  a  reason  in response to 
the question, because there is no reason to give.  And he does not have a reason, because his will 
was   never   to   poison   the   inhabitants   to   begin   with.      Rather,   ‘to   do   his   usual   job’   is   his  main  
intention, in that it governs the rest of what he does.  And if that is the case, then he does not 
need  to  deliberate  about  how  to  take  the  means  to  achieve  it;;  he’ll  just  do  whatever  he  normally  
does to finish his usual job.184  And if that is true, then he will make no practical judgment that 
using poisoned water is best to achieve his end; after all, he knows full well that any old water 
will do.  Nor does he represent the fact that the water is poisoned as practically necessary to 
                                                 182 (2000, 42). 183 Paul (2011, 4-7). 
184 Skill, for example, drives out deliberation.  Whenever one talks about the deliberative character of all action, 
there  inevitably  arises  two  objections:  (1)  we  don’t  always  deliberate,  and  (2)  oftentimes  it  is  manifestly  harmful  to  
deliberate, as in activities that depend on skill, such as sports.  See Arpaly and Schroeder (2012) for the most recent 
articulation of this objection.  Neither objection is a problem for this account because the role of deliberation is 
conceptual.  Insofar as an act is intentional, it is potentially deliberative, not actually deliberative.  It is such as to be 
bound  up  in  the  agent’s  own  deliberation  should  the  occasion  call  for  its  deliberative  structure  to  be  made  explicit.    
And this is compatible with its being the most utterly spontaneous act one can imagine.     
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attaining his end.  In fact, that someone else has poisoned the typical water supply appears to 
play  no  role  in  our  gardener’s  practical  judgment  about  what  to  do,  and  it  is  not  represented  in  
his  thought  as  practically  necessary  or  good.    Therefore  although  he  knows  that  he  is,  ‘poisoning  
the inhabitants by refilling the cistern’,  this  is  not  a  description  of  what  is  an  object  of  his  will,  
and so is not a description of an object of his practical knowledge.  Just as we said that making a 
clicking sound is accidental to illuminating the room in our earlier example, so we can now say 
that  poisoning  the  inhabitants  is  accidental  to  the  gardener’s  intention  in  replenishing  the  house  
water supply.  And just as we did not say then that the agent was making a clicking sound 
intentionally, so we should not say now that the gardener is poisoning the inhabitants of the 
house  intentionally.    The  ‘Why?’  question  would  rightfully  be  refused  in  both  cases.   
It follows that once the gardener begins moving his arm up and down, it would be 
incorrect to say that the intentional action being brought about is a poisoning.  For this pumping 
is not coming to be for the sake of a poisoning; it is coming to be for the sake of the replenishing 
of the house water supply—no more and no less.  And that is entirely compatible with its being 
perfectly true, and a part of his knowledge, that it is also a poisoning.  But the poisoning is not 
intentional,  because  not  an  object  of  the  gardener’s  will.185  
But  notice  that  the  sort  of  knowledge  the  indifferent  gardener  has  about  the  water’s  being  
poisoned is not practical;;   it   is   not   “the   cause   of   what   it   understands”   in   Anscombe’s   sense.    
Anscombe is clear that in acting intentionally we deploy both theoretical and practical forms of 
knowledge.  When I check to see how things are going, I am observing what is happening and 
this knowledge is theoretical.  Likewise, my general causal knowledge of the world, such as that 
poisoned water will lead to death, and that this water has been poisoned, is also theoretical 
                                                 
185 Of course, this does not get the gardener off the hook, morally speaking!  He does, after all, knowingly kill some 
people by doing his usual job, and he could have and should have prevented that from happening.  We are morally 
responsible for the known side-effects of our intentional actions.   
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knowledge.  It is theoretical because these facts are prior, and independent of my will.  But my 
knowledge   that   I’m   “doing  my   usual   job”   isn’t   at   all   like   this,   and   it   is   this   knowledge   that  
determines the nature of my action.  And so it is this knowledge that is essential to the question 
of which descriptions of the action are the intentional ones. 
And   all   this   shows   that   not   everything   one   knows   about   one’s   action   is   an   object   of  
practical knowledge, nor is the mark of the unintentional mere ignorance.  What is an object of 
practical knowledge is an object of will.  An object of will, as we have seen, is a representation 
of something to be realized as good.  Poisoning of the inhabitants does not stand in this 
intentional  relation  to  the  indifferent  gardener’s  will.    As  he  admits,  he  “doesn’t  care  about  that.”    
An intentional  description  of  an  action  is  one  that  is  an  expression  of  one’s  intention  or  aim,  and  
of what one knowingly does as a means to attaining that aim. What lies outside an exercise of 
practical knowledge could be a foreseen side effect of what one does intend, but in general it is 
any  description  of  one’s  action  that  is  not  suited  to  fit  into  practical  thought  as  either  a  means  or  
an end.  
These reflections also contain all the necessary materials for saying that knowledge of 
intentional action depends upon knowledge of how to live, and thus that rational action depends 
upon a natural end: living as a human being.  For to understand the difference between the 
indifferent   gardener’s   action,   and   the   murderous   pumper’s   action,   which   at   one   level   of  
description appear to be one and the same, is to understand the difference between their general 
ends, or that for the sake of which they typically act.  Both, of course, are in error about how to 
live, as neither knows which particular actions are ways of being just.  But perhaps the 
indifferent   gardener  does  not  have   justice   as  one  of  his   ends.     Perhaps   he   “doesn’t   care   about  
that,”  but  just  wants  to  do  his  job,  support  his  family,  and  live  a  private  life  in  pursuit  of  his  own  
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enjoyments.  In order to know, we would  have  to  press  our  question  ‘Why?’  further.    If  we  press  
the question further, at some point the question will bottom out in something that we naturally 
know to be good.  Anscombe does not want to do that, but the fact that we manifestly can press 
the question further, and can expect an answer that displays the same connection between 
practical knowledge of the end and knowledge of the means, is enough to prove the general 
point. 
5.3.4 Action Can Be Contradicted 
Now we are finally in a position to understand why statements of practical knowledge are subject 
to a uniquely practical form of contradiction.  A statement of practical knowledge is not 
contradicted by another statement of fact, but by the doing of another action with a contradictory 
aim.  If in response   to   the   question   ‘Why?’,   I   assert   that   I   am   replenishing   the   house   water  
supply, I am making a statement of practical knowledge; the contradiction of this statement, 
Anscombe  claims,  is  not  “oh  no  you  aren’t,  the  fact is  there  is  a  hole  in  the  pipe”,  but  rather,  “oh  
no  you  aren’t”  as  one  sets  about  making  a  hole  in  the  pipe.  (§31,  emphasis  added)    And  this  is  
because a statement of practical knowledge is not contradicted by observing what the facts are on 
the ground, for the simple reason that, as we have already demonstrated, there are no 
independently intelligible facts on the ground which could stand as evidence against a statement 
of practical knowledge.  This was one of the lessons of the last two sections.    Rather, a practical 
contradiction is one that involves the doing of another action, which would prevent the action 
that  is  being  contradicted  from  becoming  fully  realized.    Thus,  I  contradict  someone  else’s  will  
not by demonstrating that the facts are not actually in accordance with his statement about what 
he is doing (i.e., appealing to facts to prove that it is not true), but by doing something that 
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prevents this statement from remaining true (i.e., by doing something that thwarts his will and 
prevents it from being realized).186     
Because an expression of practical knowledge can be contradicted in this way, this gives 
us  a  clue  into  one  way  to  check  the  truthfulness  of  someone’s  response  to  the  question  ‘Why?’,  
which is to see if doing something that stands in opposition to what one has expressed as a 
statement of knowledge of their will (and thereby, their action) does constitute a genuine 
practical contradiction.  Take the case of our indifferent gardener again.  If his response to the 
‘Why?’  question  is  sincere,  then  the  following  conditionals will be true:  (1) If the house water 
supply does not in fact get replenished with poisoned water (say, because someone else comes 
along  and  puts  in  another  agent  that  neutralizes  its  poisonous  qualities),  then  the  gardener  won’t  
consider his action to have been thwarted.  Accordingly, he will not feel or act frustrated by any 
infringement upon his will.  (2) Supposing he does manage to get the poisoned water into the 
cistern, if, nevertheless, the Nazis are never poisoned (say, because they were tipped off and 
decided  to  drink  bottled  water  instead),  our  gardener  won’t  set  about  doing  other  things  to  make  
sure that the poison somehow gets ingested by them.  In fact, he will do nothing in addition to 
whatever it takes to finish his usual job. (3) If, in the end, all that ever happens is that the house 
supply is replenished, and no one dies or is poisoned or is even remotely inconvenienced by what 
the  gardener  has  done,  and  the  Nazis  keep  going  and  the  war  doesn’t  end,  then  our  gardener  will  
still feel satisfied with a job well done, and not seek to correct anything.  If these conditionals 
turn out to be true, then it is clear that the act of replenishing the house supply with poisoned 
water  was   not   a  means   to   any   end   of   the   gardener’s,   and   thus   that   he  was   not engaged in an 
                                                 186 Anscombe   also   says   that   it   is   a   contradiction  of   another’s   intention   to   say   that   the  object   of  will  won’t   come  
about, even if you take the intended means to it, or that it will come about regardless if you take the intended means 
or not.  Again, her main point is that what is contradicted is not some independently accessible fact, but the object of 
will itself.   
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intentional poisoning of the inhabitants of the house.  In that case it will be clear that he really 
was just doing his normal job.     
5.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have argued that the will is a self-conscious capacity of desire, which is rightly 
characterized by Anscombe as a capacity for practical knowledge, because its object is given to it 
through a self-conscious act of practical judgment, which it is the nature of the will to seek to 
actualize.  Such an object, I have argued, is formally represented under the aspect of some good.  
I arrived at this conclusion by arguing that to act intentionally necessarily involves knowledge of 
the means-end  order   that   one   is   realizing   through  one’s  own  activity,  which   is   the   same   as   to  
know the action   itself.     Such  knowledge   is  practical  knowledge   in  Anscombe’s  sense:   it   is   the  
“cause  of  what   it  understands.”     This  knowledge  in  turn  depends  on  knowledge  of  a   final  end:  
human life.  Thus knowledge of human life is also the cause of what it understands: the 
intentional actions of human beings.   
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6.0  CONCLUSION 
This dissertation advances a point of view that is very much against the grain of prevailing trends 
in contemporary moral theory, philosophy of action, and what has come to be known as the 
“meta-normative”  project.187  So perhaps it is worth teasing out some of the implications that I 
see for all three. 
First   and   foremost,   I   am   arguing   that   ethical   norms   are   “first-nature”   norms,   because  
rationality pertains to our first nature, simpliciter.  We are not merely potentially rational until 
we come into a language and concepts.  We are essentially rational animals.  The space of 
reasons and the space of human life are one and the same.  In order to return to such a picture, 
we will need to return to a vocabulary that is presently out of fashion: power, act, object, end.  In 
particular, if we want to be ethical naturalists, we cannot make the case in any other terms.  
I am also arguing that we should take seriously the idea that human norms are both 
natural and rational in the following sense: the norms that govern human life are the norms of 
our own nature.  But the way we know our nature, and thus know these norms, is fundamentally 
different than the way that any other rational being could know them.  And yet what is known is 
one and the same.  
If a theory like this can work, then it shows that it is a mistake to define normativity in 
terms of rationality, insofar as this is supposed to be something above, or over against, or in 
                                                 187 For a description of this meta-normative project, see Evans and Shah (forthcoming). 
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some other way opposed to what is.  This is, of course, the normal way of proceeding.  Joseph 
Raz, for instance writes that: 
The normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, or 
provides,   or   is   otherwise   related   to   reasons…[so   that]   ultimately  
the explanation of normativity is the explanation of what it is to be 
a reason, and of related puzzles about reasons.188 
So long as this remains our starting point, we can never see how a rational power can be 
governed by natural norms.  
This goes hand-in-glove with a certain conception of nature as form-less.  Korsgaard 
expresses this conception well when she writes: 
Reality is something hard, something which resists reason and 
value,  something  which  is  recalcitrant  to  form…[V]alue  must  find  
its way into the world somehow.  Form must be imposed on the 
world of matter.189   
Obviously, I am resisting this notion of nature as formless and devoid of value.  Moreover, I am 
resisting a picture of reason as something pure and that floats free from nature, and does not need 
to answer to it.  The picture of rationality (and thus freedom) that I have articulated is one that 
can only be understood from within nature, not from without or above it.  We might say that 
reason is the form of human action, because a rational principle defines our nature.  But it is our 
own, human nature that is lived in accord with a rational principle.  From a practical point of 
view, this means that it is distinctively human goods that must be brought into rational order.    
Perhaps it is best to sum things up from  where  we  began,  by   returning   to  Anscombe’s  
suggestion   that   we   stop   searching   around   for   an   explanation   of   a   supposedly   special   ‘moral  
ought.’ 
                                                 188 Raz (1999, 34-35). 189 Korsgaard (1996, 5).  Korsgaard backs away from this in her later work, though she does not back away from 
constructivism, for reasons having to do with her formal, Kantian conception of rationality. 
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What Anscombe wanted to avoid was thinking about morality in terms of special content, 
precisely because it is once we make that move that the thesis she wants to advance—that human 
acts are by definition moral acts—appears insane.190  If morality has to do with what is especially 
important  or  weighty,  then  of  course  not  all  human  acts  are  moral  acts.    What’s  so  moral about 
tying my shoes, or going for an afternoon stroll?  But what matters to the morality of human acts 
isn’t  primarily  what  they  are  about,  but  that  in  which  they  necessarily  figure:  a  human  life  and  a  
human society.  And each action is only fully intelligible when understood in that broader 
context.   
Anscombe considers this point throughout her writings.  In a paper on promising, she 
writes: 
It is clear that what you do is not a move in a game unless the 
game is being played and you are one of the players, acting as such 
in making the move.  That involves that you are acquainted with 
the game and have an appropriate background, and also 
appropriate expectations and calculations in connection with, e.g., 
moving this piece from point A to point B.  To have these is to 
think you are playing the game.  That is to say, when we put our 
problem,  “If   to  M   includes   thinking   you  are  M-ing, what can M-
ing be? For the account of it will include mention of it as the 
content of a thought and so no account of it can be given,”   we  
made a mistake in supposing that the explanation of the thought of 
M-ing must include an account (of M-ing) as something contained 
in the thought.191(1981,17) 
Anscombe’s  point  is  that  when  one  is  playing  a  game  of  chess,  one  is  not  thinking  the  thought,  ‘I  
am  hereby  making  a  valid  move  in  chess.’    Rather,  knowledge  of  what  constitutes  a  valid  move  
in chess is part of general background knowledge I need in order to make any move in chess, 
including this one.  No one can play chess without that knowledge.  Likewise, when one acts, it 
is  not  as   though  one  has   the   thought,   ‘I  am  hereby  acting  well’  or   ‘I   am  hereby   living  a  good  
                                                 190 See  especially  “Good  and  Bad  Human  Action”  and  “Action,  Intention  and  ‘Double  Effect.’”  (2005). 191 1981b (17). 
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life.’ Rather, one has to have some knowledge of what acting well is, or how to live well, in 
order to act at all.  I have argued that such knowledge will be practical knowledge of our own 
nature, and it will figure essentially in the explanation of human action.  
Of course, the difference between life and chess is that I will necessarily come into a 
possession of such a conception insofar as I am a human being, which is to say someone who is 
raised in a human community, and not by wolves, or in social isolation, or is being kept alive in a 
merely vegetable state.  To live as a human being just is to live in a human community, which 
just is to occupy a position in moral space.  Everything one does is either good or bad in such a 
universe, because everything is either living well or badly.  
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